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This paper examines the transformation of the system of corporate governance of France and 
Germany from the mid-1990s to early 2007. I focus on the rise of foreign ownership as a key in-
dicator of shifts in corporate governance. The empirical data presented in this paper on the in-
vestment portfolios of short-term institutional investors, namely actively managed mutual funds, 
shows a marked preference for the French market over that of Germany. The case of American 
and British-based hedge funds serves as a supporting comparative case study. I argue that the 
firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace organization constitute the most significant 
variable to account for this difference – the concentration of power in top executives in France 
fitting better with the preferences and investment strategies of short-term oriented institutional 
investors. I do not want to suggest that the institutional characteristics of workplace organization 
constitute the only investment driver of actively managed mutual funds. I also analyze the 
shortcomings of three alternative co-varying explanations – degree of internationalization, own-
ership structure of companies, and background of corporate executives. I demonstrate how key 
notions of the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective – institutional interaction, institu-
tional latency, and the distinction between institutional framework and the mode of coordination 
that follows from these institutions – provide important theoretical insights to assess the impli-
cations of causal complexity phenomenon. In particular, this mid-range level theoretical perspec-
tive illuminates how necessary and/or sufficient conditions operate and vary across advanced 
capitalist economies.  Introduction 1  
 
     This paper examines the transformation of the system of corporate governance in 
France and Germany from the mid-1990s to early 2007, a period of tremendous change 
in European finance. The topic of corporate governance – the system by which firms are 
controlled and operated, the rules and practices that govern the relationship between 
managers and shareholders, and the overall process by which investment capital is allo-
cated -- has become an important issue for policy makers and scholars in recent years in 
the wake of financial scandals in Europe and in the United States.2 The increasing 
importance of corporate governance in Europe, however, goes beyond the advent of 
recent acts of corporate malfeasance. It reflects the importance of critical trends with 
serious political implications for advanced European capitalist economies.3 Tremendous 
changes have pushed these systems toward the adoption of greater shareholder value in  
the strategy of companies in recent years.4 Will the globalization of finance and invest-
ment lead to convergence across European systems of corporate governance along the 
lines of the American model? 
                                                 
1Paper presented at the 2006 meeting of the Council of Europeanists Conference, Chicago. I wish 
to thank Suzanne Berger, Frieda Fuchs, Peter Gourevitch, Peter Hall, Bob Hancké, Martin Hoep-
ner, Andy Martin, and David Soskice for their comments. Interviews with fund managers at Fi-
delity and State Street were highly insightful. The usual disclaimer applies.  
2Good overviews of the causes and dynamics of recent corporate scandals in Europe and the 
United States are explored in John Coffee, “Understanding Enron: It’s About the Gatekeepers, 
Stupid,” Business Lawyer 57, 4 (August 2002): 1403-20; and John Coffee, “A Theory of Corporate 
Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 21,2 (Summer 2005): 
198-211.     
3Excellent analyses of the political dimensions of the transformation of national systems of cor-
porate governance are Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: 
The New Global Politics of Corporate Governance (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and 
Mark Roe, “Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control,” Stanford 
Law Review 53,3 (December 2000): 539-606.  
4For comprehensive overviews of the rise of shareholder value practices in France and Germany, 
see Jurgen Beyer and Anke Hassel, “The Effects of Convergence: Internationalization and the 
Changing Distribution of Net Value Added in Large German Firms,” Economy and Society 31,3 
(August 2002): 309-332; Ben Clift, “Debating the Restructuring of French Capitalism and Anglo-
Saxon Institutional Investors: Trojan Horses or Sleeping Partners?” French Politics 2,3 (December 
2004): 333-46; Ben Clift, “French Corporate Governance in the New Global Economy: Mecha-
nisms of Change and Hybridization within Models of Capitalism,” forthcoming in Political Stud-
ies (2007); Richard Deeg, “The Comeback of Modell Deutschland?” German Politics 14,3 (Septem-
ber 2005): 332-53; Peer Fiss and Edward Zajac, “The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested Terrain: 
The (Non) Adoption of a Shareholder Value Orientation among German Firms,” Administrative 
Science Quarterly 49,4 (December 2004): 501-534; Michel Goyer, “The Transformation of Corporate 
Governance in France,” in Pepper Culpepper, Peter Hall, and Bruno Palier, eds., Changing France: 
The Politics that Markets Make (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006); Martin Hoepner, “Corporate 
Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and Industrial Relations 
in Germany,” Discussion Paper #01/5 (Cologne: Max Planck Institute, 2001); Gregory Jackson, 
“Corporate Governance in Germany and Japan: Liberalization Pressures and Responses during 
the 1990s,” in Kozo Yamamura and Wolfgang Streeck, eds., The End of Diversity? Prospects for Ger-
man and Japanese Capitalism (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 2003); Mary O’Sullivan, Contests 
for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United States and Ger-
  1 
     The research question of this paper on France and Germany is two-pronged: to ac-
count for the different patterns of transformation of the two systems of corporate gov-
ernance, and to assess its implications for their respective national models of capitalism. 
I focus on the rise of short-term foreign ownership as a key indicator of shifts in corpor-
ate governance. The empirical question of this paper revolves around the greater attrac-
tiveness of French firms over their German counterparts to short-term, impatient inves-
tors. Actively managed mutual funds, a prominent category of institutional investors 
with short-term trading strategies, were about twice as likely to invest in France than in 
Germany on the basis of several indicators between 1997 and early 2007.5 The invest-
ment gap took place in a context where Germany has been the world’s largest exporter 
of goods for the last four years despite poor macroeconomic performance at home.6  
 
     France and Germany constitute ideal candidates to assess the causes and effects of the 
development of financial markets and the arrival of impatient Anglo-American institu-
tional investors as major shareholders of domestic companies. They are characterized by 
the extensive deregulation of their financial systems, the removal of barriers on capital 
mobility, European Union membership and their participation in the EMU, and their ac-
tive involvement in M&A activities in the United Kingdom and the United States. More-
over, state officials in the two countries have been very public in their criticism of the de-
mands made by Anglo-American institutional investors on domestic companies as 
shareholder value has come to be associated with layoffs and short-term thinking that 
privileges the next quarter’s financial results over the long-term competitiveness and 
social responsibility of the firm. The exclusion of foreign buyers for Aventis, the large 
French pharmaceutical firm, and the depiction of Anglo-American institutional investors 
as “locusts” by Franz Münterfering, the former German Social Democratic Party Chair-
man, in the wake of the forced resignation of the CEO of Deutsche Börse, represent strik-
ing examples of the rather hostile reception to this new American export.  
 
     Two critical methodological considerations serve as motivation for the research ques-
tion of this paper. First, how does one assess the advent of institutional change in cor-
porate governance? As Campbell (2004) reminds us, we often mistake evolutionary 
shifts for more revolutionary developments and vice versa.7 The absence of an analytical 
framework to distinguish between patterns of institutional change leaves us powerless 
to distinguish between them and to understand their consequences. Changes in corpor-
ate governance might be a more recent development in continental Europe, but ad-
vanced capitalist economies underwent substantial institutional change in many areas in 
                                                                                                                                                 
many (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Sigurt Vitols, “Negotiated Shareholder Value: 
The German Variant of an Anglo-American Practice,” Competition and Change 8,4 (December 
2004): 357-374; and Nicholas Ziegler, “Corporate Governance and the Politics of Property Rights 
in Germany,” Politics and Society 28,2 (June 2000): 195-221.  
5The corresponding ratio for American and British-based hedge funds, another category of short-
term oriented institutional investors, was 1.6 to 1 in favor of the French market on the basis of 
publicly available information (see tables A and B of annex 1).  
6Mark Landler, “Germany’s Export-Led Economy Finds Global Niche,” New York Times, April 13, 
2007.  
7John Campbell, Institutional Change and Globalization (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2004). 
  2the last twenty-five years without resulting in either internally revolutionary transfor-
mation or in cross-national convergence.8 Second, the current interest in accounting for 
institutional change is understandable given the predominant consensus that institu-
tions do matter for economic, political, and social outcomes.9 The design of institutional 
frameworks is seen by scholars and policymakers as the key variable for important pub-
lic policy issues.  
 
     What accounts for the greater propensity of short-term oriented, actively managed 
mutual funds to invest in the French market as compared to that of Germany? The argu-
ment presented in this paper is the following. First, I draw on notions of the institution-
ally based Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) theoretical perspective to understand both insti-
tutional transformation and the maintenance of differences between contemporary capi-
talist economies. The VoC perspective emphasizes the critical importance of patterns of 
institutional complementarities across the various sub-spheres (finance and corporate 
governance, industrial relations, innovation system, inter-firm relations) of the economy 
that lead to diverging forms of behavior on the part of economic actors. The key insight 
is that the impact of institutional change cannot be studied in isolation as the effects of 
new developments are mediated by their interaction with other features of the national 
institutional framework, therefore implying that different types of institutional fit are 
possible.10 In other words, national institutional frameworks engender interaction effects 
that shape in different ways the behavior of economic actors according to the particular 
combination of institutions found in the national setting. The outcome is that advanced 
capitalist economies are distinguished by their specific configuration of interdependent 
institutions.11 These national institutional configurations of interlocking and interde-
pendent institutions reinforce each other, thereby often proving resistant to change.12 
Finally, the VoC perspective contends that superior economic performance and the de-
                                                 
8The case for divergence is best asserted in Suzanne Berger, “Introduction,” in Suzanne Berger 
and Ronald Dore, eds., National Diversity and  Global Capitalism (Ithaca NY: Cornell University 
Press, 1996); Suzanne Berger, How We Compete: What Companies Around the World Are Doing to 
Make It in Today’s Global Economy (New York: Doubleday 2005); and Peter Hall and David Sos-
kice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” in Peter Hall and David Soskice, eds., Varieties 
of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001).  
9See John Campbell, Institutional Change and Globalization, pp. 1-9; and Douglass North, Under-
standing The Process of Economic Change (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).  
10The classic statement on the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective is Peter Hall and 
David Soskice, “Introduction: Varieties of Capitalism,” pp. 1-71. 
11Hall and Soskice (2001) identify two dominant clusters of interdependent institutions: liberal 
market economies (LME) and coordinated market economies (CME). These two clusters constitute 
different ways to solve coordination problems faced by firms – market instruments being pre-
dominant in the former while a greater range of institutional arrangements such as peak associa-
tions, network monitoring based on the exchange of private information, and relational contract-
ing constitute the hallmarks of adjustment processes for the latter. 
12Insightful analyses of the durability effects of institutional frameworks and patterns of institu-
tional complementarities are Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, “Complementarities and Systems: 
Understanding Japanese Economic Organization,” Estudios Economicos 9,1 (January-June 1994): 3-
42; and David Soskice, Robert Bates and David Epstein, “Ambition and Constraint: The Stabiliz-
ing Role of Institutions,” Journal of Law and Economic Organization 8,3 (October 1992): 547-60. 
  3velopment of competitive advantage result from the extent to which patterns of in-
stitutional complementarity support the development of firm competencies.13 In other 
words, each institutional feature fits with the others and makes them more effective than 
they would be on their own. The notion of competitive advantage is institutionally 
based as firm performance lies in the achievement of a proper fit between their organi-
zational features and the requirements associated with specific market niches. The pres-
ence of institutional complementarity constitutes a source of economic efficiency as it 
contributes to solve coordination problems since the actions a firm takes in one sphere of 
the economy is contingent on the action of others in different spheres.14 As a result, 
different patterns of institutional fit across nations should be good at excelling at differ-
ent types of activities, thereby leading to different types of specialization.15  
 
     Second, I argue that the firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace organiza-
tion constitute the most significant variable to account for the diverging ability of French 
and German firms to attract funds from actively managed mutual funds and, on the 
basis of publicly available information, hedge funds. There are many other reasons why 
these two categories of institutional investors proceed to invest in a single company – 
the two most prominent being macroeconomic conditions and the ownership structure 
with its associated set of legal rights for minority investors – but none of these alterna-
tive explanations can satisfactorily account for the disparity in their investment port-
folios in the two countries. Actively managed mutual funds and hedge funds possess 
short-term investment strategies and time horizons. They also exhibit firm-specific pref-
erences since the performance of their portfolio is shaped by the behavior of a smaller 
number of companies than it is the case for passively managed mutual funds and pen-
sion funds who primarily seek diversification through an index-based investment stra-
tegy. The argument presented in this paper stresses the importance of portfolio com-
panies implementing shareholder value strategies of corporate restructuring that gener-
ate corporate earnings within a rather specific time frame. The degree of fit between the 
preferences of short-term oriented, actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds) 
and the firm-level institutional arrangements of advanced capitalist economies reflects 
the ability of the CEO and top managers to reorganize the workplace in a unilateral fash-
ion. The institutionally embedded corporate decision-making process in France, which is 
management-led and excludes the workforce, provides for a great match. French firm-
level institutions are characterized by the concentration of power in the CEO that, in turn, 
allows for a rapid reorganization of the workplace under the guidance of a small num-
                                                 
13See Peter Hall and Daniel Gingerich, “Varieties of Capitalism and Institutional Complementari-
ties in the Macroeconomy: An Empirical Analysis,” Discussion Paper #04/5 (2004), Max Planck 
Institute, Cologne; and David Soskice, “Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and Uncoor-
dinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s,” in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks, and J. 
Stephens, eds., Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism (New York: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1999).  
14An excellent analysis of the problem of economic coordination in regard to the question of train-
ing is Pepper Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe (Ithaca 
NY: Cornell University Press, 2003).  
15Peter Hall and David Soskice, “Introduction: Varieties of Capitalism,” pp. 36-44.  
  4ber of corporate officials.16 The strategies and preferences of actively managed mutual 
funds and of hedge funds, in contrast, do not fit as well with the firm-level institutions 
found in Germany. Firm-level institutions impose several constraints on the ability of 
management to develop and implement strategies in a unilateral fashion. Several institu-
tional and legal obstacles stand in the way of a rapid and unilateral reorganization of the 
shop floor. Adjustments to external pressures in Germany are the result of negotiation 
between management and employees.17 Large companies in these two countries have 
proceeded to adjust to changes in capital and product markets, but in different ways. As 
a result, actively managed mutual funds and hedge funds – two categories of short-term, 
impatient capital – displayed a marked preference for France over Germany as an in-
vestment site. 
 
     The implication of the above argument is that an assessment of the consequences as-
sociated with the rise of foreign ownership and the growth of securities markets in 
France and Germany requires a sophisticated differentiation between investors. The rise 
of foreign ownership in the form of institutional investors pushing for a greater share-
holder value orientation cannot by itself constitute a radical transformation of European 
corporate governance. I distinguish primarily between pension funds, index-based/ 
passively managed mutual funds, actively managed mutual funds, and hedge funds. 
Pension funds constitute long-term investors which acquire an equity stake in corpora-
tions primarily for diversification purposes; index-based mutual funds represent a cate-
gory of medium to long-term investor whose investment managers aim at producing a 
return that matches that of a benchmark index; actively managed mutual funds repre-
sent a category of short-term oriented investors that seek to maximize assets under their 
management as they possess a shorter term horizon and operate under competitive 
pressures to beat market benchmarks; hedge funds are mostly unregulated, short-term 
oriented institutional investors that at achieving absolute returns on managed funds 
trough a variety of techniques not available to other categories of investors. The impor-
tance of this distinction between different types of investors is primarily driven by its 
implication for the mode of coordination of firms. As Hall and Soskice (2001) have 
argued, access to patient capital constitutes a key feature of coordinated market econo-
mies, as opposed to liberal market economies that rely on short-term, impatient capital. 
The investment strategies and time horizons of actively managed mutual funds/hedge 
funds and index-based mutual funds/pension funds have different implications for the 
sustainability of national models of European capitalism 
 
                                                 
16Excellent analyses of patterns of adjustment in French firms are Bob Hancké, Large Firms and In-
dustrial Adjustment: Industrial Renewal and Economic Restructuring in France (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002); and Vivien Schmidt, From State to the Market? The Transformation of French 
Business under Mitterrand (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996). For the more specific 
case of corporate governance, see Antoine Rebérioux, “European Style of Corporate Governance 
at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40,1 
(March 2002): 111-34.  
17The key readings on the negotiated process of firm-level adjustment in Germany are Wolfgang 
Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic Performance (London: Sage Publications, 1992) and Kath-
leen Thelen, Unions of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 
1991).  
  5     Third, I argue that the institutionally-based VoC is best conceptualized as a middle 
range theory whereby differences in institutional frameworks across advanced capitalist 
economies shape what is a necessary/sufficient condition in a specific setting. The 
analysis of the investment strategies of institutional investors in France and Germany 
constitutes an ideal testing ground for the issue of complexity in qualitative methods. It 
is highly revealing of the nature of causation in social sciences. This study faces the typi-
cal problem of the comparison of observed cases limited in both their diversity and in re-
lation to the number of potential explanatory variables. Moreover, many of the variables 
relevant to the research question of this paper potentially co-vary, thereby heightening 
the difficulties associated with the process of logical inference. I compare the VoC per-
spective with two alternative explanations – namely the degree of internationalization of 
companies and the ownership structure of portfolio companies.   
 
     Firm-level institutional arrangements of work organization account for the greater at-
tractiveness of France over Germany, but do not constitute the sole factor driving the in-
vestment strategies of mutual funds – consistent with the Hall and Soskice (2001) stress-
ing of the central position of (institutional) structure in conditioning the strategy of ac-
tors, but not in fully determining it.18 The Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective 
illuminates how necessary and/or sufficient conditions vary across the advanced capi-
talist economies. The evidence presented is that the presence of co-variation in the 
French case does not travel to the German case. The presence of high degrees of interna-
tionalization of firms and the dispersion of ownership constitute co-varying features for 
the investment portfolio of actively managed mutual funds in France, but not in Ger-
many. The intuitional arrangements of workplace organization in Germany act as a 
“missing” variable.  
 
     The VoC theoretical perspective, however, has come under attack in recent years. The 
broad line of criticism is that the tools developed by comparative political economists in 
the last twenty years have provided us with a better understanding of institutional re-
siliency, but have not been as helpful in accounting for institutional transformation.19 
The theoretical insights of the concept might be quite useful in accounting for stability, 
but they are far too static to account for institutional discontinuity. This theoretical chal-
lenge to the VoC perspective is comprised of several elements. First, processes of incre-
mental and continual institutional change can lead to significant discontinuity without 
requiring dramatic disruptions.20 Rather than radical change breaking current patterns 
of institutional complementarity and reshaping the preferences of actors, the process of 
                                                 
18Hall and Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” p. 15.  
19The broadest theoretical critiques of the Varieties of Capitalism perspective are Colin Crouch, 
Capitalist Diversity and Change: Recombinant Governance and Institutional Entrepreneurs (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Chris Howell, “Varieties of Capitalism: And Then There Was 
One?” Comparative Politics 36,1 (October 2003): 103-24; and Glenn Morgan, “Institutional Comple-
mentarities, Path Dependency, and the Dynamics of Firm,” in Glenn Morgan, Richard Whitley, 
and Eli Moen, eds., Changing Capitalisms? Internationalization, Institutional Change, and Systems of 
Economic Organization (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
20The thesis of significant transformation via incremental processes of change is best provided in 
Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, “Introduction: Institutional Change in Advanced Politi-
cal Economies,” in Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional 
Change in Advanced Political Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
  6institutional transformation often results from ongoing and accumulating dynamics that 
involve small adjustments. Thus, institutional transformation frequently is an evolution-
ary process that unfolds in an incremental manner and without major disruptions over 
long periods of time, resulting in profound change.21 Second, and related to the previous 
line of criticism, the transformation of the dynamics found in capitalist societies can take 
place without formal institutional change. A process of functional conversion, whereby 
institutions are redirected to new purposes, can occur in the presence of formal institu-
tional stability.22 In other words, the practices associated with an institution can change 
without a similar transformation in its formal structure. Major changes in institutional 
practices are coupled with stability in institutional structures.23 The implication of the 
mechanism of functional conversion is that the link between institutional form and firm 
behavior is less tight than originally conceived in VoC.24 Third, the environment faced by 
firms is increasingly characterized by the presence of institutional hybridization, with 
the consequence that advanced capitalist economies might no longer fit neatly into a 
single model. This process of hybridization can result from firms borrowing from the 
features of different models, as the process of institutional adoption tends to be piece-
meal rather than full-scale.25 Fourth, the sustainability of institutional frameworks can-
                                                 
21This theoretical perspective of institutional change constitutes an explicit criticism of punctu-
ated equilibrium models whereby prolonged periods of institutional stability are interrupted 
suddenly by critical exogenous shocks that result in a conflictual period of transition until a new 
pattern of institutional complementarity is established, thereby resulting in a new stable equi-
librium. 
22See Ronald Gilson, “Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,” 
American Journal of Comparative Law 49, 2 (spring 2003): 329-57; and Kathleen Thelen, “How Insti-
tutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,” in James Mahoney and Dietrich 
Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003).  
23An example of this process of function conversion is the evolution of industrial relations in Ger-
many. First, the institutions of labor representation have changed in relative importance while 
conserving their original form. The increasing volatility of markets and the need to adjust quickly 
has increased the prominence of firm-level works councils and reduced the importance of na-
tional unions – under a stable institutional framework. Second, the institutions of Codetermina-
tion have experienced a substantial change in their function and activities despite the stability of 
their institutional forms. From being an element of the postwar social democratic consensus, the 
institutions of Codetermination are increasingly serving as a mechanism for maintaining the abil-
ity of firms to succeed in areas of incremental innovation as well as to facilitate adjustment in 
light of new capital market pressures. See Gregory Jackson, 2005, “Contested Boundaries: Ambi-
guity and Creativity in the Evolution of German Codetermination,” in Wolfgang Streeck and 
Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Kathleen Thelen, Union of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar 
Germany.  
24For an insightful account of loosely coupled institutional arrangements, see Michael Mayer and 
Richard Whittington, “Strategy, Structure and ‘Systemness’: National Institutions and Corporate 
Change in France, Germany and the UK, 1950-1993,” Organization Studies 20,6 (November 1999): 
933-959.  
25On the concept of hybridization, see Jan Nederveen Pieterse, “Globalization as Hybridization,” 
in Mike Featherstone, Scott Lash, and Roland Robertson, eds., Global Modernities (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995); and Marino Regini, “Between Deregulation and Social Pacts: The Responses 
of European Economies to Globalization,” Politics and Society 28,1 (March 2000): 5-33.  
  7not be assumed to occur in an automatic fashion simply because it is economically effi-
cient. Instead, it requires active maintenance by actors in order for institutions to adapt 
to environmental changes.26 Institutions are often born of historical struggles in which 
actors fight over the design and content of institutions, but dominant social groups are 
likely to influence the building of one set of institutions located in the issue area in 
which they are located rather than trying to shape all of the institutions in a given frame-
work.27 These four lines of criticism constitute a serious challenge. If the VoC perspec-
tive’s ability to explain institutional change is less successful than its account of diver-
gence, its theoretical contribution would be seriously weakened.  
 
     What does my analysis of the investment patterns of institutional investors in France 
and Germany entail for the VoC theoretical perspective? The argument presented in this 
paper testifies to the importance of national institutional frameworks and of the theoreti-
cal insights of the VoC perspective for the study of institutional change. First, the fea-
tures of existing institutional arrangements exert tremendous influence on the transfor-
mation of corporate governance in France and Germany. Domestic institutions interact 
to complement each other and consequently cannot be studied in isolation regardless of 
whether one is analyzing the presence of stability or the occurrence of change in the 
broader institutional framework. The effects of a single institutional variable vary ac-
cording to the presence of other institutions in the economy.28 This is particularly true 
since institutional change is almost invariably piecemeal rather than full-scale, thereby 
highlighting the importance of the interaction between the new institutions and those al-
ready in place. I recognize that processes of institutional conversion and hybridization 
can, and do, occur. Nonetheless, their occurrence still requires an argument to assess 
whether institutional conversion or hybridization constitutes a revolutionary or evolu-
tionary transformation. The notion of interaction among the various elements of an insti-
tutional framework represents a highly helpful indicator to assess the consequences as-
sociated with the process of institutional transformation. The importance of institutional 
interaction for the Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective enables it to provide 
significant insights for causal complexity phenomenon, the outcome of a given variable 
                                                 
26See Richard Deeg, “Change from Within: German and Italian Finance in the 1990s,” in Wolf-
gang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, eds., Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Politi-
cal Economies (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
27Bruno Amable, The Diversity of Modern Capitalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 
pp. 66-73. Instances of this piecemeal institutional focus by interest groups are numerous. For ex-
ample, trade unions are more likely to care about institutions related to labor-market policies and 
wage bargaining than those related to the ownership structure of companies and the legal rights 
of shareholders, despite the interactive complementarity between industrial relations and corpor-
ate governance. This focus on specific institutions results from the fact that actors do not possess 
a perfect vision of all of the interdependencies between institutions. See also Martin Hoepner, 
“What Connects Industrial Relations and Corporate Governance? Explaining Institutional Com-
plementarity,” Socio-Economic Review 33,2 (May 2005): 331-57.  
28This argument is best developed in Peter Hall, “Central Bank Independence and Coordinated 
Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany,” German Politics and Society 31 (Spring 1994): 1-
23; and Peter Hall and Robert Franzese, “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordi-
nated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union,” International Organization 52,3 (Summer 
1998): 505-35. 
 
  8being driven by several factors. It highlights the perils associated with piecemeal institu-
tional reforms given that the impact of a single institution depends on the configuration 
of other institutions within that setting.  
 
     Secondly, institutions are characterized by an element of latency, their effects and im-
portance changing over time. In the case of France, for example, the firm-level institu-
tional arrangements that are (currently) proving highly attractive for short-term, impa-
tient capital cannot be held solely responsible for the inability of companies to access 
long-term finance since they have been largely stable over the last three decades. The 
present attractiveness of firms to short-term, impatient investors is a recent phenomenon 
but the institutionally-based concentration of power in the CEO is not something new. 
Prior to the mid-1990s, the CEO’s power correlated with the provision of long-term, pa-
tient capital in the form of bank loans since policymakers impeded the development of 
direct (bonds and stocks) finance, fixed interest rates at low levels, and implemented 
preferential credit policies.29 The concentration of power in French firms, as embodied in 
the institutional arrangements of workplace organization, came to be conducive to short-
term capital in the second half of the 1990s because of the deregulation of the banking 
system and the decision of long-term domestic shareholders to sell their holdings – as 
well as the advent of the international strategy of institutional investors. International 
shifts came to have a substantial impact after internal changes in corporate governance.  
 
     Finally, and perhaps most importantly, I highlight in this paper the need to distin-
guish between institutions and the mode of coordination which follows from these insti-
tutions.30 I argue that the divergent patterns of investment of institutional investors are 
deeply influenced by differences in firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace 
organization reflecting the power structure of French and German companies. But pow-
er concentration (diffusion) has been a stable feature of French (German) firms at the 
same time as tremendous changes in several institutional spheres took place. It is impor-
tant to note that while institutions have undergone tremendous change in the two coun-
tries, the effects of this change on a key aspect of the mode of coordination of large blue-
chip firms in the two countries have been marginal. 31 In particular, the process by 
which large French and German firms develop and sustain their innovative capabilities 
                                                 
29See Michael Loriaux, France After Hegemony: International Change and Financial Reform (Ithaca NY: 
Cornell University Press, 1991) and John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Sys-
tems and the Politics of Industrial Change (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), pp. 99-169, for 
historical analyses of the French financial system.  
30The original thesis is Peter Hall and Kathleen Thelen, “Institutional Change and the Varieties of 
Capitalism,” paper presented at the APSA annual meeting, September 1-4, 2005, Washington DC.  
31A good example of this dichotomy between coordination and institutional change is the transfer 
of Japanese methods of production (just-in-time, teamwork) in France and Germany in the last 
twenty years. In France, the introduction of such methods served as an additional means of con-
trol for management as well as constituting a source of added productivity. In Germany, the 
same organizational change strengthened the position of the Meister and the central role of train-
ing in the production process. See Peter Doeringer, Edward Lorenz, and David Terkla, “The 
Adoption and Diffusion of High-Performance Management: Lessons from Japanese Multina-
tionals in the West,” Cambridge Journal of Economics 27,2 (March 2003): 265-86; and Mari Sako, 
“Training, Productivity and Quality Control in Japanese Multinational Companies,” in Masahiko 
Aoki and Ronald Dore, eds., The Japanese Firm (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 
  9has remained largely unchanged despite important changes in corporate governance.32 
The coordination of activities in French firms is characterized by the vesting of unilateral 
authority in top managers and senior technical staff. The bulk of the workforce does not 
contribute to the development of the organizational capabilities of the firm.33 In the 
coordination of activities in German companies, by contrast, authority is shared with the 
bulk of the workforce to a high degree. The development of innovative capabilities takes 
place on the basis of the long-term contribution of skilled employees through institution-
alized career paths.34 This stark divergence in the development of innovative capabilities 
remains stable despite impressive changes in both corporate governance and industrial 
relations. Thus, the presence of institutional hybridization and the occurrence of func-
tional conversion are not sufficient to conclude that countries and firms are experiencing 
revolutionary developments that will undermine their nationally specific capacities for 
strategic coordination.  
 
          The roadmap for this paper is the following. First, I provide an overview of the 
changes in the external financial environment in which French and German companies 
are embedded. Second, I empirically analyze the transformation of these two systems of 
corporate governance by highlighting the differences in the nature of foreign capital at-
tracted by domestic companies in the two countries. Third, I highlight the critical impor-
tance of the institutions of workplace organization to account for the direction of change 
of corporate governance. Fourth, I review alternative potential explanations for the in-
vestment patterns of actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds) in France and 
Germany. I analyze the potential theoretical insights provided by macroeconomic ori-
ented views of capital flows, the influence of the ownership structure of listed firms and 
their associated nationally-based legal arrangements of shareholder protection, and the 
educational background and career patterns of top executives on the decision making of 
investment allocation of actively managed mutual funds and of hedge funds. Without 
rejecting the importance of these three perspectives, I nevertheless conclude that they do 
not provide as much insight for understanding the diversity of investments by actively 
managed mutual funds and, on the basis of publicly available information, of hedge 
funds in France and Germany as compared to a Varieties of Capitalism institutionally-
                                                 
32For an analysis of the continuing differences in the processes by which institutions of workplace 
organization enable large firms to develop their innovative capabilities in France and Germany, 
compare David Marsden, A Theory of Employment Systems (New York: Oxford University Press 
1999); Marc Maurice, Francois Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, The Social Foundations of Indus-
trial Power: A Comparison of France and Germany (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1986); Arndt Sorge, The 
Global and the Local: Understanding the Dialectics of Business Systems (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005); and Richard Whitley, “The Institutional Structuring of Organizational Capabilities: 
The Role of Authority Sharing and Organizational Careers,” Organization Studies 24,5 (June 2003): 
667-95. 
33See Robert Boyer, “Wage Austerity and/or an Education Push: The French Dilemma,” Labour 9 
(special issue 1995): 19-65; and Pepper Culpepper, “Individual Choice, Collective Action, and the 
Problem of Training Reform: Insights from France and Eastern Germany,” in Pepper Culpepper 
and David Finegold, eds., The German Skills Machine: Comparative Perspectives on Systems of Educa-
tion and Training (New York: Berghahn Books, 1998).  
34See Arndt Sorge, The Global and the Local: Understanding the Dialectics of Business Systems, chapter 
5; and Richard Whitley, “The Institutional Structuring of Organizational Capabilities: The Role of 
Authority Sharing and Organizational Careers,” pp. 667-95. 
  10inspired perspective on workplace organization. I rely on the logic of necessary condi-
tions to discriminate between theoretical perspectives while acknowledging that the in-
vestment strategies of actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds) represent a 
causally complex phenomenon. Fifth, I conclude by presenting the theoretical implica-
tions for the analysis of institutional change that emerges from the study of French and 
German corporate governance.  
 
I. Structural Changes in European Finance  
 
     The French and German systems of corporate governance have experienced an im-
portant transformation resulting from a series of cumulatively externally-based and far-
reaching changes. These developments have decreased the importance of debt finance as 
a source of external finance and have heightened the importance of stock markets for do-
mestic firms. Three features previously characterized the two systems of corporate gov-
ernance. First, corporations had a high debt-equity ratio, i.e., bank loans were more im-
portant than stock issues as a source of external finance.35 Product market share was of-
ten more important for managers than the stock market capitalization of companies. Sec-
ond, the ownership structure of blue-chip companies was highly concentrated in the 
hands of friendly cross-shareholdings among companies, a large owner in the form of a 
family firm, banks’ direct share and proxy voting in Germany, and extensive public sec-
tor in the French case.36 Third, as a result of the previous factors, the market for corpor-
ate control was fairly restricted.37 In particular, hostile takeovers were a rarity.  
 
     The bank-based financial system of corporate governance of the two countries crum-
bled under the impact of several factors. First, their financial systems underwent a mas-
sive process of deregulation: the use of credit ceilings as a means of controlling inflation 
has been replaced by the discipline of central bank independence and of high real inter-
est rates, capital controls have been removed under pressure from the EMS and the sus-
pension of the dollar’s convertibility into gold, and access to the bond market has been 
deregulated.38 Moreover, the liberalization of financial markets has created an environ-
ment that not only raised interest rates as banks were forced to compete for deposits 
with new competitors, but also removed the impediments on the developments of direct 
finance that led to the introduction of new financial instruments for raising capital.  
 
                                                 
35John Zysman, Governments, Markets, and Growth: Financial Systems and the Politics of Industrial 
Change, pp. 69-75. 
36See Jeremy Edwards and Klaus Fisher, Banks, Finance and Investment in Germany (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994); and François Morin, La Structure Financière du Capitalisme 
Français (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1974).  
37Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, “Corporate Ownership and Control in the U.K. Germany, and 
France,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9, 4 (Winter 1997): 30-45.  
38See John Goodman, “Monetary Policy and Financial Deregulation in France,” French Politics and 
Society 10,4 (Fall 1992): 31-40; Michael Loriaux, France After Hegemony: International Change and 
Financial Reform; John Goodman and Louis Pauly, “The Obsolescence of Capital Controls? Eco-
nomic Management in an Age of Global Markets,” World Politics 46,1 (October 1993): 50-82; and 
Jonathan Story, “Finanzplatz Deutschland: National or European Response to Internationaliza-
tion?” German Politics 5, 3 (December 1996): 371-94.  
  11     Second, the transformation of corporate governance in France and Germany is the re-
sult of developments that have raised the importance of equity capital. Three key factors 
account for the rise in importance of the stock market capitalization of firms. In the first 
place, the removal of capital controls by European policymakers enabled investors to 
pursue a strategy of international diversification of their assets. The assets managed by 
American pension funds experienced substantial growth, from $868 billion in 1980 to 
$7.87 trillion in 2001.39 Moreover, a significant segment of this growth has been allocated 
to international equities – the average percentage of total assets held in international 
stocks by the twenty-five largest American pension funds increased from 7.7 percent in 
1993 to 17.5 percent in 2000.40 The assets managed by hedge funds experienced a signifi-
cant increase from an estimated $38.9 billion in 1990 to nearly US$ 1 trillion by mid-
2006.41 The most important category of institutional investor, however, remains mutual 
funds. The assets under their management grew from $150 billion in 1980 to a little over 
$8 trillion in late 2005.42 The resulting impact of these developments on the strategy of 
large companies should not be underestimated. Anglo-Saxon institutional investors 
have expressed clear preferences for the adoption of shareholder value practices that 
maximize return on equity. Moreover, the rise of foreign ownership often came at the 
expense of domestic cross-shareholdings among large domestic firms as patterns of 
cross-shareholdings – especially in the French case – collapsed in the late 1990s.43  
 
     Another development that has increased the importance of securities markets is the 
changing conditions associated with the successful completion of a takeover bid in the 
United States in the last decade. The importance of equity swap, whereby companies is-
sue additional stocks to pay for the shares of the target firm, has increased dramatically. 
In 1988, nearly 60 percent of the total value of deals over $100 million in the United 
States was paid for entirely in cash. The similar figure for deals paid in stock was less 
than 2 percent. By contrast, about half of the value of large deals in 1998 was paid entire-
ly in stock – and 17 percent was solely financed in cash.44 What is the significance of the 
changing characteristics of takeover activity in the United States on the transformation 
of European systems of corporate governance? The importance of takeover activity in 
the United States for European corporate governance is intimately related to the process 
by which firms build their innovative capabilities. Large French and German firms are 
                                                 
39Conference Board, “Financial Assets and Equity Holdings: Patterns of Institutional Investment 
and Control,” Institutional Investment Report 5,1 (March 2003): 37, p. 14.  
40Conference Board, “Equity Ownership and Investment Strategies of US and International Insti-
tutional Investors,” Institutional Investment Report 4, 2-3 (May 2002): 1-45, pp. 41-42.  
41William Fung and David Hsieh, “Hedge Fund Replication Strategies: Implications for Investors 
and Regulators,” Financial Stability Review 10 (April 2007): 55-66, p. 56; Filippo Stefanini, Invest-
ment Strategies of Hedge Funds (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2006), p. 4. 
42Robert Radin and William Stevenson, “Comparing Mutual Fund Governance and Corporate 
Governance,” Corporate Governance 14, 5 (September 2006): 367-376, p. 367.  
43See Martin Hoepner and Lothar Krempel, “The Politics of the German Company Network,” 
Competition and Change 8,4 (December 2004): 339-356; and François Morin and Eric Rigamonti, 
“Evolution et Structure de l’Actionnariat en France,” Revue Française de Gestion 28,141 (Novem-
ber/December 2002) : 155-81.  
44Alfred Rappaport and Mark Sirower, “Stock or Cash? The Trade-offs for Buyers and Sellers in 
Mergers and Acquisitions,” Harvard Business Review 77,6 (November-December 1999): 147-58.  
  12engaged in a process of institutional arbitrage.45 They have sought to gain access to radi-
cal types of innovation through the acquisition of companies in the United States via 
takeovers. Firms with higher stock market capitalization possess a substantial advantage 
in the global merger marketplace in using equity swap as a means of payment.46 The is-
sue of additional stocks to pay for the shares of the target company is reserved for firms 
with substantially higher stock market capitalization. A concern for the valuation of the 
value of equity capital has become a necessary condition if French and German compa-
nies want to be able to acquire others.  
 
     A final important development in the environment of French and German firms is the 
proliferation of financial techniques and commercial valuation models through which 
corporate and managerial performance are disclosed and modeled: economic value 
added, cash flow return on investment and many others.47 These newly created financial 
metrics are important since they allow for a comparison and ranking of performance. 
The ability to compare corporate performance does not entail that the French and Ger-
mans are now subject to the dictates of Anglo-American institutional investors. The in-
fluence of these financial matrixes depends not so much on their adoption by compa-
nies, but rather on the scrutiny and the effects of knowing that one is being examined 
and evaluated.48 A central concern of corporate executives is to avoid surprising finan-
cial markets with unexpected bad news.49 Corporate executives do not want their 
actions to be misrepresented. Getting the right expectations into play enables managers 
to secure access to external finance at reasonable costs if needed, and avoid exposing the 
firm to potential unwanted takeover activities following a sharp drop in its stock market 
capitalization. But taking seriously the new financial techniques and commercial valua-
tion models, in turn, can contribute to shape the subjectivity of the finance directors and 
other highly placed corporate executives, thereby potentially channeling and sustaining 
shareholder value oriented demands from external investors. There is a difference be-
tween creating shareholder value and managing the indicators of that value, but the jus-
tification of corporate activities is increasingly taking place through a reference frame in-
fluenced by the financial considerations of Anglo-American institutional investors.  
                                                 
45Peter Hall and David Soskice, “Introduction: Varieties of Capitalism,” p. 57. Data on the distri-
bution of activities of French and German firms between their home base and their American 
subsidiaries is presented in John Cantwell and Odile Janne, “Technological Globalisation and In-
novative Centres: The Role of Corporate Technological Leadership and Locational Hierarchy,” 
Research Policy 28,2-3 (March 1999): 119-44; and Manuel Separio and Donald Dalton, “Globaliza-
tion of Industrial R&D: An Examination of Foreign Direct Investments in R&D in the United 
States,” Research Policy 28,2-3 (March 1999): 303-16.  
46John Coffee, “The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Gov-
ernance,” Northwestern University Law Review 93,3 (1999): 641- 708. 
47Julie Froud, Colin Haslam, Sukhdev Johal, and Karel Williams, “Shareholder Value and Finan-
cialization: Consultancy Promises, Management Moves,” Economy and Society 29,1 (February 
2000): 80-110.  
48See John Roberts, Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker, and John Hendry, “In the Mirror of the Mar-
ket: The Disciplinary Effects of Company/Fund Manager Meetings,” Accounting, Organizations 
and Society 31,3 (April 2006): 277-94.  
49John Hendry, Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker, and John Roberts, “Owners or Traders? Con-
ceptualizations of Institutional Investors and their Relationship with Corporate Managers,” 
Human Relations 59, 8 (August 2006): 1101-1131, p. 1119.  
  13II. The Transformation of French and German Corporate Governance: An Empirical 
Evaluation 
 
     The previous section highlighted changes in the external financial environment of 
French and German firms. A structural transformation has taken place in the form of the 
declining important of debt finance and the rise in prominence of equity capital. The in-
centives of French and German managers have changed in the last decade – the adop-
tion of shareholder value enhancing strategies having become more attractive. More-
over, the greater mobility of capital and the strategy of international diversification of 
Anglo-American institutional investors have been associated with a rise of foreign own-
ership. Foreign investors have become important shareholders in the capital structure of 
blue-chip companies in France and Germany (see Tables 1 and 2). Anglo-American insti-
tutional investors are operating in a new European financial environment that is charac-
terized by the importance of stock market capitalization for blue-chip companies. 
 
Table 1. Foreign Ownership Selected French Blue Chip Companies 
(in % of equity capital) (2002 unless otherwise indicated) 
Accor 51.7  Air Liquide 37.1  Alcatel 50.0 (*)  Alstom 48.0 
Aventis 60.6  AXA 80.0  BNP-Paribas 67.0  Cap Gemini 63.9 
Danone 42.0  Lafarge 54.9  Lagardere 48.1  L’Oreal 20.0 (*) 
LVMH 17.5  Michelin 47.0  Publicis 59.4  SocGen 50.8 (*) 
St-Gobain 40.5 (*)  Total 64.0  Vivendi 53.4 (*)  Vivendi. Envi. 27.0 
Source: annual report of companies, various years. *= data are for 2000 
 
         Table 2 Foreign Ownership Selected German Blue Chip Companies, 
(in % of equity capital) (2002 unless otherwise indicated) 
Adidas 57.0  Allianz 32.0  Altana 20.0  BASF 35 
Bayer 39.0 (2001)  Commerzbank 
35.0 
Daimler-Chrysler 29.9  Deutsche Bank 46.0 
D. Telekom 59.0  E.ON 57.9 (2000)  Fresenius 49.1  Linde 60.0 
Lufthansa 29.1  MAN 19.0 (2001)  Munich Re 37.0  RWE 15.0 (2001) 
SAP 57.6  Schering 52.0 
(2003) 
Siemens 54.0 (2000)  Volkswagen 23.1 (2001) 
Source: annual report of companies, various years. 
 
     These developments in French and German finance, however, mask substantial diver-
gence in regard to the composition of foreign ownership in the two countries. First, the 
growth of securities markets in France has been far more impressive than that of Germa-
ny. The traditional measure of the importance of securities markets in an economy is the 
aggregate market capitalization of domestic companies divided by the gross domestic 
product. These figures on stock market capitalization are presented in Table 3. Equity fi-
nance was marginal in continental European countries associated with an insider model 
of corporate governance until the mid 1990s. The rates of growth of the stock market 
capitalization among advanced industrialized countries in the second half of the 1990s 
did not exhibit a common trajectory. France experienced a bigger explosion of its securi-
ties markets than did Germany and Japan during the bull market of 1995-2001. More-
  14over, the relative decline of stock markets between 2000-01 and 2003, and the reversal of 
this trend since 2003, also put France in a very favorable position. However, it is impor-
tant to note that the growth of stock markets does not constitute the research question of 
this paper. The focus is on the composition of foreign ownership of French and German 
companies under a new financial environment of heightened importance for the level of 
their stock market capitalization.  
 
Table 3. Evolution of Market Capitalization as Percent of GDP, 1980-2004 
  1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2001 2002 2003 2004 
FRANCE  8 15 26  35  105  103  68    93   110 
GERMANY  9 29 22  28    68  61  35     54    62 
JAPAN  36 71 99  81     102  73  52    74  N/A 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
37 77 87  98  198  166  114  148   178 
UNITED 
STATES  
48 57 56  78  181  152   106  134   150 
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators, various years; and Christoph Van Der Elst, 
“The Equity Markets, Ownership Structures and Control: Towards an International Harmoniza-
tion?” in Klaus Hopt and Eddy Wymeersch, eds., Capital Markets and Company Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 11.   
 
     Second, an analysis of financial markets in Europe requires a nuanced understanding 
of the preferences and strategies of investors. Theoretical inferences cannot be drawn 
simply from the growing importance of capital mobility across borders.50 Anglo-
American institutional investors, moreover, do not constitute a monolithic bloc, thereby 
requiring a greater sophistication in the analysis of their preferences and tactics. I distin-
guish primarily between passively managed mutual funds/pension funds versus active-
ly managed mutual funds/hedge funds. These four categories of investors possess pref-
erences and time horizons that can clash or fit with the institutions of European com-
panies. Pension funds constitute long-term investors that acquire an equity stake in cor-
porations primarily for diversification purposes. The incentives for managers of pension 
funds lie in the generation of a certain minimum amount of revenues required to cover 
regular payments to retirees. Actively managed mutual funds, in contrast, possess a 
shorter term horizon as they face greater liquidity concerns -- funds under their manage-
                                                 
50The growing importance of institutional investors in Europe undoubtedly results in growing 
pressures placed on managers to adopt shareholder value enhancing strategies, but whether 
these new shareholders are able to change in a fundamental ways the strategy of portfolio firms 
remains to be seen. The growth of institutional investors in the United States in the 1980s and 
1990s, for example, did not lessen the degree of control of managers over the allocation of corpo-
rate resources. The incentives of American managers might have changed in the last two decades, 
but their control over the types of investments firms make and how returns from these invest-
ments are distributed has remained largely intact. The ability of institutional investors to trans-
late shareholder ownership into corporate power remains an empirical issue. For a discussion of 
these issues, see Peter Gourevitch, “The political economy of institutional investors in corporate 
governance: Some comparative problems,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the Ameri-
can Political Science Association, August 31-September 3, 2006, Philadelphia PA; and Mary O’Sul-
livan, Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United 
States and Germany. 
  15ment being redeemable on demand by investors. Investment managers of seek to out-
perform financial benchmarks by picking firms undervalued in financial markets. Pas-
sively managed mutual funds, on the hand, do not seek to surpass financial benchmarks 
despite the funds under their management being also redeemable on demand. Instead, 
the composition of the investment portfolio of passively managed mutual funds reflects 
that of a benchmark index. The strategy of these funds is top attract (and keep) investors 
via the delivery of constant, long-term returns while minimizing the various costs (equi-
ty research, securities trading, managerial compensation fees) associated with the opera-
tion of an investment company. Finally, hedge funds are largely unregulated limited 
partnerships characterized by arbitrage strategies, high turnover and aggressive trading, 
and heightened managerial incentives to maximize absolute returns. They collect funds 
from wealthy and more sophisticated investors willing to assume higher levels of risk 
for potentially superior returns.  
 
     The growth of foreign ownership in France and Germany has been characterized by 
substantial divergence in regard to its composition. First, large firms in the two countries 
have been a favorite destination for the international diversification strategy of pension 
funds (see Table 4). France and Germany are consistently among the top foreign destina-
tions for pension fund investment. This reflects the fact that corporate law in the two 
countries provides an acceptable level of financial transparency, a sufficient level of pro-
tection for minority shareholders, and that the quality of law enforcement is excellent.51  
 
     Another feature of the investment strategy of pension funds is that the size of the 
French portfolio for the pension funds listed in Table 4 is superior to that of the German 
portfolio by 70 percent. France appears to be leading Germany as an investment destina-
tion for large U.S. pension funds. However, the data presented in Table 4 do not provide 
support for the validity of this conclusion. The percentage of assets directly managed by 
pension funds has substantially diminished in the last twenty years, reflecting their in-
creasing reliance on external money managers. Hedge and (particularly) mutual funds 
have become important actors as external money managers for pension funds and 
derive substantial revenues from their management of corporate benefit plans. For ex-
ample, U.S. pension funds in 1999 managed only 42 percent of assets they collected, with 
the rest being delegated to other institutional investors.52 The figures presented in Table 
4 represent all assets managed both internally and externally by pension funds. Thus, it 
is not possible to assert whether the French dominance over Germany constitutes an out-
come driven by the preferences of pension funds or the investment strategies of external 
money managers – or both. The annual reports of pension funds present data on inter-
nally versus externally managed funds on an aggregate basis without distinguishing by 
country of investment. Moreover, securing data on the assets directly managed by pen-
                                                 
51See, e.g., Mark Roe, “Corporate Law’s Limits,” Journal of Legal Studies 31,2 (June 2002): 233-71 
and Mark Roe, “Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets,” Harvard Law Review 120,2 
(December 2006): 462-527.  
52Conference Board, “Financial Assets and Equity Holdings,” Institutional Investment Report 4,1 
(November 2000): 43. Moreover, the bulk of the assets of pension funds are managed by mutual 
funds, not hedge funds. In 2005, only 0.8 percent of the assets of the 200 largest American defined 
benefit plans were managed by hedge funds (William Fung and David Hsieh, “Hedge Fund Rep-
lication Strategies: Implications for Investors and Regulators,” p. 56).  
  16sion funds for their French and German portfolios might not entail substantial promise 
for the analysis of institutional change in comparative corporate governance. Data on the 
investment patterns of short-term oriented hedge and mutual funds are likely to be 
more interesting since access to long-term, patient capital has traditionally been a key 
feature of these two continental European economies. The investment strategies and 
time horizons of mutual/hedge and pension funds have different consequences for the 
sustainability of national models of European capitalism. By contrast, the relatively new 
presence of long-term oriented American and British pension funds with their demands 
for financial transparency and respect for the rights of minority shareholders is highly 
compatible with the institutional arrangements of German Codetermination that allow 
for substantial workers’ involvement.53
 
     Third, the empirical issue in this paper revolves on the differences in the allocation of 
financial assets by actively managed mutual funds. This category of institutional inves-
tors has chosen France over Germany in a proportion of about 2 to 1 as a site for invest-
ment in continental Europe. The investment portfolios of short-term oriented American 
and British-based hedge funds, on the other hand, have also exhibited a preference for 
the French market in a proportion of 1.6 to 1. I argue in the next section that the firm-
level institutional arrangements of workplace organization constitute the most signifi-
cant variable to account for the above differences in investment allocation, but without 
being the only reason why actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds) invest in a 
single company. The fit between the investment strategies of these two categories of in-
vestors and the firm-level institutional arrangements of advanced capitalist economies 
depends on the ability of the CEO and top managers to reorganize the workplace in a 
unilateral fashion. The firm-level institutional arrangements with their associated deci-
sion making and adjustment processes in France, which is management-led with the ex-
clusion of the workforce from the decision-making process, constitute a great match 
with the preferences and investment strategies of these two types of institutional inves-
tors. Workers possess fewer opportunities to block managerial initiatives.54 French firm-
level institutions are characterized by the concentration of power in the CEO that, in turn, 
allows for a rapid reorganization of the workplace under the guidance of a small num-
ber of corporate officials. The strategies of mutual and hedge funds, in contrast, do not 
fit well with the firm-level institutions found in Germany. Those institutions impose 
several constraints on the ability of management to develop and implement strategies in 
a unilateral fashion. The process of adjustment in Germany is the result of negotiation 






                                                 
53See Martin Hoepner, “Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Share-
holder Value and Industrial Relations in Germany,” pp. 27-33.  
54See Bob Hancké, Large Firms and Industrial Adjustment: Industrial Renewal and Economic Restruc-
turing in France, pp. 57-87; and Vivien Schmidt, From State to the Market? The Transformation of 
French Business under Mitterrand, pp. 393-416. 
55See Kathleen Thelen, Unions of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, pp. 25-104.  
  17Table 4. Percentage of International Portfolio Invested in France and Germany 
by Pension Funds (%) 


















CalPERS  7.8  Top 3  5.8  Top 6 
General Electric (2004)  13.0  3  5.2  5 
New Jersey (08/2005)  14.3  3  6.1  6 
NY State & Local (2003)  6.1  Top 3  2.9  Top 8 
NY State Teachers (2005)  10.9  3  6.8  5 
North Carolina (07/2005)  10.2  3  6.1  5 
Ohio Public (07/2005)  7.9  3  5.8  4 
Ohio Teachers (2003)  9.8  3  6.4  5 
Texas Teachers (2005)  8.4  NA  5.6  NA 
Washington State (2005)  8.6  3  6.1  4 
Wisconsin (2004)  12.2  3  10.9  4 
Source: Annual Reports, various years 
 
     Moreover, it is also important to note that my argument on the importance of firm-
level institutional arrangements for the investment strategy of actively managed mutual 
funds is not contingent on the status of institutional activism. I remain agnostic in this 
paper on the debate over the activist nature of institutional investors. The ability of insti-
tutional investors to translate shareholder ownership into corporate power remains an 
empirical issue. The debate pits those who view institutional activism as an essential 
mechanism by which to monitor companies against those who assign a strong element 
of passivity to institutional investors.56 For the former perspective, the primary goal of 
actively managed mutual funds investing in France is to convince the CEOs of the value 
of specific strategic changes. This is because the implementation of restructuring policies 
requires, almost exclusively, the CEO’s approval as employees have no means of inter-
vention.57 Moreover, the overall weakness of employees reduces the ability of French 
CEOs to claim that they are constrained in the elaboration and implementation of firm 
strategy and that they are unable to make concessions. The concentration of power in the 
top management of French firms increases the size of the win-set of the CEO in his nego-
tiations with Anglo-American institutional investors, but diminishes the strength of his 
bargaining position. In this two-level game, autonomy from internal pressures translates 
                                                 
56For a view that supports the importance of institutional activism in the governing of corpora-
tions, see Jayne Elizabeth Zanglein, “From Wall Street Walk to Wall Street Talk: The Changing 
Face of Corporate Governance,” DePaul Business Law Journal 11, 1 (Fall/Winter 1998): 44-122. For 
a position that emphasizes the overall passivity of institutional investors, see Bernard Black, 
“Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States,” in Peter Newman, ed., 
The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (London: Macmillan Reference, 1998). 
57This is the position adopted by Antoine Rebérioux, “European Style of Corporate Governance at 
the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement,” p. 125.  
  18into a weaker position with external investors.58 For the latter perspective, in contrast, 
short-term institutional investors cannot afford to engage in activist tactics. The process 
of portfolio building requires the identification of companies that are likely to imple-
ment strategies of corporate restructuring that will generate corporate earnings and that 
will boost the market capitalization of the firm within a specific time frame. French firms 
are attractive to activist institutional investors since the elaboration and implementation 
of a new strategy can be undertaken quickly and in a unilateral fashion. The decision to 
pursue shareholder value strategies remains a managerial prerogative that is not dic-
tated by actors on financial markets, but the ability of French corporations to pursue 
these shareholder-value-friendly strategies is greatly facilitated by the relative weak 
position of employees. The reverse logic applies for the German case – the entrenched 
position of employees limits the ability of CEOs to conduct the strategy in a unilateral 
fashion and, moreover, increases the CEO’s bargaining position with institutional 
investors.59  
 
     The rest of this section is divided in three parts. First, I provide an overview of the 
differences between these three groups of investors. Second, I discuss the nature of the 
activism by institutional investors. Third, I present data on the presence of mutual and 
hedge funds in the two countries.  
 
A)  Hedge, Mutual and Pension Funds  
      
  Anglo-Saxon mutual and pension funds share two basic common features de-
spite different sets of regulation governing their operation. They are subject to the high-
est standard of care and prudence, i.e., the fiduciary standard. There are trustees who 
are committed to invest the funds of the contributors according to the fiduciary stan-
dard.60 Anglo-American institutional investors, however, have little else in common. 
                                                 
58On the notions of win-set and two-level games, see Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic 
Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42,3 (Summer 1988): 427-60. 
59At the same time, however, the preferences and strategies of actors cannot by themselves ac-
count for the different patterns of investment by hedge and mutual funds. Institutional frame-
works constrain even the most enthusiastic actors. See the discussion on pp. 78-80 of this paper.  
60Hedge funds, in contrast to other institutional investors, are largely unregulated since they are 
not subject to the regulatory constraints of the Investment Act of 1940. They do not have to regis-
ter with the SEC and are exempt from the disclosure requirements facing mutual (and pension) 
funds, such as reporting results and disclosing the composition of their portfolios. Hedge funds 
are traditionally set up as limited partnerships limited to a restricted number of wealthy indi-
viduals (500) with personal assets of at least $5 million who are willing to adopt highly risky 
short-term strategies and borrow on financial markets in exchange for high return potential. They 
cannot engage in public solicitations for their services. Hedge funds are otherwise similar to other 
mainstream mutual funds in several dimensions: defined contribution scheme, heightened mana-
gerial remuneration, short-term trading, and the absence of the actuarially mandated minimal fi-
nancial returns – thereby prodding fund managers to achieve as high financial returns as possible 
by picking undervalued companies. Hedge funds are also subject to antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws in the United States. Examples of charges brought against hedge funds in 
the United States include misappropriation of assets, misrepresentation of portfolio performance, 
falsification of past returns, and misleading disclosure regarding claimed trading strategies. For 
the purpose of this paper, hedge and mutual funds constitute two forms of short-term, impatient 
  19Four critical features set them apart with systemic consequences for comparative corpor-
ate governance: mode of collecting funds and issuing payments, time horizon and 
liquidity constraints, remuneration and managerial incentives, and process of picking 
portfolio companies. First, a key difference between these types of institutional investors 
lies in their mode of collecting funds and issuing payments “held in trust” for the benefi-
ciaries. Defined benefits schemes (DB) guarantee the level of benefits the fund will pay 
and the method of determining those benefits, but not the amount of the contributions. 
DB schemes guarantee a fixed payment in the future. The level of contributions in the 
current period is determined actuarially on the basis of the benefits expected to be paid 
to the retirees who contributed to the fund and the assumed rate of return. Defined con-
tribution schemes (DC), on the other hand, specify the level of contributions but not the 
amount of benefits to be paid. The amount available to the beneficiaries results from 
both the portfolio performance and the amount initially invested. 
 
     The existence of an almost perfect correlation characterizes the relationship between 
the method of collecting funds and the type of institutional investors. Pension funds – 
public and private alike – rely, to a substantial extent, on a DB scheme to collect and dis-
tribute assets.61 The assets of the two types of mutual funds, by contrast, are managed 
almost exclusively on a DC scheme.62 This is not surprising, since mutual funds are 
investment companies that pool funds from individuals and corporations with the 
provision that the money invested is redeemable on demand. In the case of actively 
managed mutual funds, moreover, the funds paid to investors are dependent on the 
market performance of the mutual fund.63 Finally, it is also important to note that 
pension funds do manage directly only a small percentage of the assets collected by 
them – mutual funds serving as external fund managers. The pension fund industry is 
increasingly dominated by reliance on mutual fund managers for asset management 
since 401(k) plans allow corporations to more easily outsource direct contribution 
pension plans to external DB fund managers.64
 
     Second, in spite of the shared fact that their salaries are based on a percentage of as-
sets under management, the incentives facing hedge, mutual and pension fund manag-
                                                                                                                                                 
capital. For overviews, see Stephen Brown and William Goetzmann, “Hedge Funds with Style,” 
Working Paper #8173 (2001), National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge MA; and Wil-
liam Fung and David Hsieh, “Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading Strategies: The Case 
of Hedge Funds,” Review of Financial Studies 10,2 (Summer 1997): 275-302.  
61Pensions &Investments, January 26, 2004: 16.  
62Robert Pozen, Mutual Fund Business (Cambridge MA: MIT Press, 1998), pp. 397-423.  
63Hedge funds are also managed on a DC scheme with investors uncertain to recover their invest-
ment since fund managers are typically given mandates to make an absolute return target regard-
less of the market environment. See William Fung and David Hsieh, “Empirical Characteristics of 
Dynamic Trading Strategies: The Case of Hedge Funds,” p. 276.  
64However, pension funds do retain some form of control by issuing specific guidelines on invest-
ment decision to external money managers. They often change external money managers that de-
viate from investment guidelines by taking excessive risks even for superior financial perform-
ance. See Diane Del Guercio and Jennifer Hawkins, “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund 
Activism,” Journal of Financial Economics 52, 3 (June 1999): 293-340; and Diane Del Guercio and 
Paula Tkac (2001), “Star Power: The Effect of Morningstar Ratings on Mutual Fund Flows,” 
working paper #2001-15, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, pp. 525-30.  
  20ers are strikingly different. Increases in the level of the financial compensation of fund 
managers can come from maximizing the value of assets under management or from at-
tracting new investors to the fund. In other words, managerial remuneration is based on 
the volume of assets under management and on the performance of the portfolio. Public 
pension fund managers, however, face constraints that deter them from maximizing the 
value of their portfolio despite incentives associated with the increase of assets under 
management. The first constraint consists of state regulations that impose caps on the 
salary of managers.65 In other words, the link between compensation and size of assets 
under management does not hold above a certain level – thereby resulting in overall 
lower salaries for public pension fund managers in relation to their hedge/mutual fund 
and private pension fund counterparts. Moreover, the number of beneficiaries in public 
fund schemes is limited by the size of the contributing workforce – a factor over which 
public pension fund managers have no control. The second constraint on public pension 
fund managers lies in the absence of any financial incentives tied to fund performance. 
The primary objective of DB public pension funds is to generate a certain minimum 
amount of revenues through the management of the assets under their control. Contri-
butions are determined actuarially on the basis of the level of the benefits expected to be-
come payable to the retirees. The payouts to beneficiaries are independent of the funds’ 
endowment. Fund managers earn a civil service salary and would not receive propor-
tional extra rewards for achieving returns beyond the mandated averages.66 Performing 
below the market index, on the other hand, is a sure cause for dismissal since the risks 
are borne by the pensioners. Finally, public pension fund managers are elected state 
officials or political appointees facing different types of pressure than their hedge/ 
mutual fund counterparts do.67 Pension fund managers have to consider the demands of 
powerful interest groups that often clash with the interests of their fiduciaries. 68
 
     The incentives faced by actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds) stand at 
the opposite end of the spectrum from those of their public pension fund counterparts. 
In the first place, compensation for mutual fund managers is based on a percentage of 
assets under management without any caps.69 Moreover, the behavior of investors in ac-
tively managed mutual funds exhibits a marked tendency to flock to “winners.” Funds 
displaying high returns during an assessment period will experience an inward surge of 
                                                 
65See Tracy Woidtke, “Agents Watching Agents? Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and 
Value,” Journal of Financial Economics 63,1 (January 2002): 99-131. 
66Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance (Cambridge MA: Blackwell Business, 1995), 
p. 125 
67An excellent analysis of the political motivations of pension fund officials is provided in Rober-
ta Romano, “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered,” Columbia 
Law Review 93,4 (May 1993): 795-853.  
68Private pension fund managers face a hybrid situation. Because the salaries have no caps, man-
agers’ compensation can reflect the total value of the fund. The average base salary for private 
pension fund managers is 33 percent higher than that of their public pension fund counterparts. 
See Tracy Woidtke, “Agents Watching Agents? Evidence from Pension Fund Ownership and 
Value,” p. 103. However, managers who outperform an index will not experience an inward flow 
of new funds, as entry is often limited. For example, the number of beneficiaries of the General 
Motors retirement plan is limited by the size of its workforce.  
69See Edwin Elton, Martin Gruber, and Christopher Blake, “Incentives Fees and Mutual Funds,” 
Journal of Finance 58,2 (April 2003): 779-804.  
  21new investment inflows in the fund in subsequent periods. In particular, capital inflows 
are highly correlated with a fund outperforming a market benchmark.70 In other words, 
managerial remuneration depends on the relative performance of the fund vis-à-vis that 
of others. As a result, mutual fund managers desirous of increasing the value of the fund 
– and boosting their compensation – face highly powerful incentives to maximize the 
volume of assets under management by attracting inflows of new investment. This 
strategy invariably entails the revision of the composition of the portfolio.71 As well as 
being relative to the performance of other funds, moreover, the compensation of man-
agers of actively managed mutual funds is also driven by internal performance and 
rankings. Numerous investment companies are using a ranking system to evaluate their 
managers. At Fidelity, for example, each manager’s returns are compared to benchmarks 
reflecting the risk specificity of the particular fund he or she manages.72 Fund managers 
outperforming benchmarks at Fidelity are rewarded with higher rankings vis-à-vis their 
own colleagues, more generous financial compensation, and faster internal progres-
sion.73
 
     The incentives and trading strategies of managers of index-based/passively managed 
mutual funds differ substantially from those of their actively managed counterparts. 
Mutual funds that are passively managed are composed of a selection of stocks that are 
as representative as possible of an index. The aim is to enable investors to access finan-
cial markets while diversifying their risks. The marketing strategy of passively managed 
mutual funds for attracting investors lies in the provision of constant returns without 
incurring the costs inherent to the operation and investment strategy of actively man-
aged mutual funds. Managers of index-based mutual funds do not seek to select individ-
                                                 
70Diane Del Guercio and Paula Tkac (2001), “Star Power: The Effect of Morningstar Ratings on 
Mutual Fund Flows.” 
71Mutual fund managers whose fund’s performance lags behind rivals at the midpoint of an as-
sessment period are likely to shift the composition of their portfolio by investing in a greater 
number of riskier companies, thereby increasing the volatility of the fund but also the probability 
of increasing its performance. See Keith Brown, W.V.Harlow, and Laura Starks, “Of Tournaments 
and Temptations: An Analysis of Managerial Incentives in the Mutual Fund Industry,” Journal of 
Finance 51,1 (March 1996): 85-110; Judith Chevalier and Glenn Ellison, “Risk Taking by Mutual 
Funds as a Response to Incentives,” Journal of Political Economy 105,6 (December 1997): 1167-1200.  
72Ian McDonald, “Fidelity Managers Gets Ranked,” Wall Street Journal Europe, January 21, 2003: 
M5  
73This process of internal ranking entails profound consequences for fund managers and corpor-
ate governance that are well illustrated by the case of Fidelity. The foreign segment of the Boston-
based mutual funds amounts to only ten percent of its overall stock portfolio. The French market 
only represents 0.5 percent of its stock portfolio. See Commission des Opérations de Bourse, “Les 
Critères d`Investissement des Grands Gestionnaires de Fonds Internationaux dans les Entreprises 
Françaises,” Bulletin COB # 322 (1998): 1-31. Nonetheless, managers of the European (or French) 
funds of Fidelity possess the same types of financial incentives as their counterparts managing 
bigger funds comprised of American companies. Financial compensation and progression within 
Fidelity require fund managers to outperform benchmarks whether their particular fund is com-
posed of American, European, or other types of funds. This point also illustrates the lack of crea-
tivity of actors in this outside-in perspective on the transformation of French and German corpor-
ate governance. The size of these two markets is insufficient to warrant a change in the strategy 
and tactics of fund managers from those that prevail in the domestic market.  
  22ual stocks, but rather match the composition of an index – thereby saving on the costs of 
research analyses and of trading securities. Moreover, the compensation fees paid to 
managers of index-based mutual funds are usually a lower fixed percentage of the assets 
under management – and sometimes as a declining percentage of assets under manage-
ment – than what prevails at actively managed mutual funds. The importance of recruit-
ing fund managers with truly extraordinary expertise and genuine market-beating skills 
in stock selection making is not really an issue for index-based mutual funds. Finally, the 
lower turnover rates of passively managed mutual funds – investment manager buying 
and selling according to changes in the composition of an index – implies that capital 
gains associated with the sale of securities are more likely to be taxed at the lower long-
term gains rate.  
 
     The incentives of hedge fund managers, as for the managers of actively managed mu-
tual funds, are also highly heightened by important financial considerations. As their 
mutual funds counterparts, managers of hedge funds are also compensated on the basis 
of the volume of assets under management and are given mandates to achieve the high-
est possible returns, regardless of the market environment. The financial incentives of 
hedge fund managers, moreover, differ in one fundamental way from those prevalent at 
mutual funds. Their total compensation comprises both the amount of assets under 
management as well as substantial incentives fees, the latter being paid only when 
hedge fund managers make a positive return. The typical remuneration contract of 
hedge fund managers is characterized by 1 to 2 percent of assets under management and 
5 to 25 percent of profits realized.74 Thus, financial incentives shape in diametrically op-
posite ways the pressures faced by hedge, mutual and public pension fund managers.  
 
     Third, the time horizon of institutional investors diverges considerably in regard to 
their patterns of trading. The annual average turnover rate of American public pension 
funds in 1997 was 19.3 percent.75 The similar figure for mutual fund managers and ex-
ternal money managers was 42.5 percent.76 The time horizons of the largest mutual 
funds, in particular, are considerably shorter.77 The average amount of time a share is 
held for Fidelity (actively managed mutual fund) was 2.63 years in 1999.78 By contrast, 
most public pension funds have longer-term horizons, as witnessed by their turnover 
rates: Florida state (12.5 years) and California State Teachers (7.6 years).79 Pension funds 
do not face similar liquidity constraints as mutual funds and external money managers, 
since payments to retirees are regular and predictable. Mutual funds managers do have 
liquidity concerns, as the funds provided by investors are redeemable on demand. 
 
                                                 
74Stephen Brown and William Goetzmann, “Hedge Funds with Style,” p. 2. 
75Conference Board, “Turnover, Investment Strategies, and Ownership Patterns,” Institutional 
Investment Report 2,2 (August 1998): 1-51. 
76Ibid. 
77See Daniel Bandru, Stéphanie Lavigne and François Morin, “Les Investisseurs Institutionnels 
Internationaux: Une Analyse du Comportement des Investisseurs Américains,” Revue Économie 
Financière 61 (2001): 121-37.  
78Ibid, p. 125 
79Ibid, p. 126 
  23     Hedge funds also display reliance on short-term trading, albeit in a different way 
from actively managed mutual funds.80 The investment strategies of hedge funds entail 
high turnover and aggressive trading on short-lived information, but not because of 
similar liquidity concerns such as those faced by mutual funds. Investors typically face 
an initial lock-up period of one year, and subsequent restrictions to quarterly intervals, 
during which they are not allowed to liquidate their investments.81 Instead, the short-
time horizon of hedge funds results from their characteristics of their investment stra-
tegies.82 Hedge funds practice statistical arbitrage that involves balancing positions in 
                                                 
80For an overview of the investment strategies of hedge funds, see Carl Ackermann, Richard Mc-
Enally, and David Ravenscraft, “The Performance of Hedge Funds: Risk, Return, and Incentives,” 
Journal of Finance 54,3 (June 1999): 833-74; Steven Drobny, Inside the House of Money: Top Hedge 
Fund Traders on Profiting in the Global Markets (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 2006); Filippo Ste-
hanini, Investment Strategies of Hedge Funds; and Securities and Exchange Commission, “Implica-
tions of the Growth of Hedge Funds,” staff report to the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Washington DC, September 2003).  
81The termination of the lock-up period is usually seen as a target for hedge fund managers to 
terminate their stake in specific stocks in order to capture capital gains – otherwise an outflow of 
funds is seen as probable. Although the investment portfolios of hedge funds can remain secret 
for as long as they want if the securities are bought on the over the counter markets, the typical 
one year lock-up period  means that investment managers possess incentives to trade for periods 
of less than twelve months. The managers of hedge funds do not want to be caught short by 
withdrawals of capital in the managed funds. I thank Bill Fung for his comments on this issue.  
82There is an additional reason why hedge funds rely on short-term trading – a feature that dis-
tinguishes them from all other types of institutional investors. Hedge funds are allowed unre-
stricted access to short selling – the U.S. Investment Act of 1940 making it almost impossible for 
mutual and pension funds to sell securities they do not own. Short selling refers to the acquisition 
and sale of securities through futures, options, and other derivative contracts with the aim of 
later repurchasing them at a lower price. The act of short selling involves borrowing securities 
from a broker and immediately selling them on the market with the provision of delivering them 
back to the broker at a later date, after buying the same amount of shares on the open market. 
The hedge fund earns a profit if the repurchasing price is lower than the initial selling price, the 
outcome of the transaction being contingent on the manager’s stock picking ability and market 
timing. Besides the traditional market risk – profits being reaped only if the fund manager cor-
rectly anticipates the process movements of the securities – the use of short selling involves a li-
quidity risk. The broker has the right to call in the lent securities at any time, thereby highlighting 
the dangers of a liquidity squeeze and the premium placed on short-term trading. The issue for 
hedge funds managers consists not only in correctly predicting the price movements on securi-
ties, but also in covering themselves against liquidity squeeze. Hedge funds could suffer if the 
price of the borrowed securities has not fallen below that of their original price. 
I do not analyze short selling in this paper; I focus on the investments of hedge/mutual funds in 
buying undervalued securities that are expected to grow in value and selling overvalued stocks 
(that they own) that are expected to lose value. Short selling, the practice of selling shares one 
does not own, does not require any disclosure requirements – thereby making it impossible to 
know with precision the exact holdings composition of hedge funds. However, the results pre-
sented in this paper are not affected by the lack of disclosure requirements associated with short 
selling. First, mutual funds (the world’s biggest asset managers) and other institutional investors 
cannot short sell shares they do not own. Second, most of short selling activities would have not 
been computed in this paper even if they were available, since I require a one-month holding 
period for an investment to be recorded (see p. 31). Third, short-selling requires fund mangers to 
identify firms that are expected to fall sharply in value. In several instances, the act of short 
  24assets (equity, government bonds, and national currencies) that are believed to be 
undervalued against others that are expected to fall in value. Hedge funds operate on 
the notion of contracts, i.e., putting bets that an asset will go above a designated target or 
will fall below it. Managers tend to follow strict procedures for selling stocks, i.e., fixing 
target prices constituting a threshold that, once reached, leads to the sale of the stocks. 
This practice is shaped both by their compensation scheme, whereby managers get paid 
only in the event of a positive return. Hedge funds tend to sell their positions in assets 
quickly once these threshold targets have been reached, thereby further accounting for 
their propensity to rely on short-term trading strategy.83
 
     Finally, the criteria and processes by which actively managed mutual funds versus 
pension funds/passively managed mutual funds select companies for investment also 
differ, thereby resulting in a different composition of the stock portfolio. The compo-
sition of the stock portfolio for public and private pension funds and passively managed 
mutual funds is essentially based on an index strategy. By late 1995, the percentage of 
assets managed on an index by American pension funds had risen to 60 percent and was 
climbing.84 This figure is even higher for some of the most activist funds. For example, 
around four-fifths of the stock portfolio of CalPERS was indexed in 1997.85 The growing 
recourse to indexing by pension funds and passively managed mutual funds reflects 
their assessment that active management of the equity portfolio produces results inferior 
to market indexing. These institutional investors often lack the firm-specific knowledge 
needed to take actions aimed at transforming the strategy of portfolio companies.86
 
     Actively managed mutual funds, by contrast, do not acquire an equity stake in a cor-
poration because it is part of an index. Managers are in stiff competition with other 
funds for the assets of investors which, in turn, can be redeemed at any moment. The 
structural characteristics of the mutual fund industry compel managers to achieve high 
returns, not simply match an index. Investment managers behave like stock pickers and 
                                                                                                                                                 
selling is often associated with firms suffering an important crisis and likely to experience a major 
downturn in their fortunes. The focus of this paper deals with institutional investors purchasing 
stocks hoping the price will rise so that they can sell it at a profit. Finally, regulatory issues as-
sociated with the dangers of short selling are closer to the interests of international political 
economists interested in systemic risks in the financial system. The use of leverage can have seri-
ous repercussions throughout the system if markets moved against the investments of hedge 
funds by the time they were forced to meet their margin calls. The concern of this paper, in con-
trast, focuses on the implications of the investments of short-term, impatient investors on the sys-
tem of corporate governance and model of capitalism of France and Germany.  
83The most famous embodiment of this investment strategy was George Soros’s Quantum Fund 
and the devaluation of the British Pound in 1992. This hedge fund placed a bet on the devalua-
tion of the British Pound on September 11 and took it off on September 22 after the devaluation 
became effective, thereby experiencing a gain of 25.5 percent for that month and gaining more 
than $1 billion in a single day. William Fung and David Hsieh, “Empirical Characteristics of Dy-
namic Trading Strategies: The Case of Hedge Funds,” p. 293.  
84Commission des Opérations de Bourse, “Les Critères d`Investissement des Grands Gestion-
naires de Fonds Internationaux dans les Entreprises Françaises,” p. 15.  
85Diane Del Guercio and Jennifer Hawkins, “The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activ-
ism,” p. 302 
86Ibid, pp. 305-306 
  25are in many ways the mirror image of DB pension funds.87 Finally, the compensation of 
hedge funds managers derives from the amount of assets under management and, to a 
substantial extent, from incentive fees. These incentive fees are paid only in the event of 
the returns on the portfolio exceeding pre-established benchmarks.88 The raison d’être of 
hedge funds is to pursue flexible and aggressive strategies that entail above-normal risks 
and potentially high returns under a framework of limited government oversight. As a 
result, it is not uncommon for hedge (and mutual) funds to spend significant amounts of 
money to acquire firm-specific information.  
 
Table 5: Weight of Top Ten Holdings in Selected Funds 
                  Pension Funds                                   Mutual Funds  
Name of Institution  Fund Type  %   Institution  Fund Type  % 




 Domestic  23.7 
(2004) 




 Domestic  28.0 
(2004) 
New York State 
Teachers 
 Domestic  14.2 
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Ohio Public    Domestic   5.3 
(2002) 
Gartmore UK   Europe  28.0 
(2003) 
Ohio Teachers   International   7.0 
(2003) 




 Domestic  12.3 
(2002) 
























 Domestic  30.0 
(2004) 
Source: Annual Reports    
 
     The importance of specific firms for the overall financial performance of a specific 
fund also illustrates the differences in the composition of the portfolios of actively man-
aged mutual funds and pension funds. The use of an index as an investment strategy by 
pension funds entails that their aim is to reproduce as closely as possible the economic 
profile of a sector/country. The investment strategy of actively managed mutual funds, 
in contrast, aims at picking undervalued firms that are likely to outperform the market 
in the short-term. These different investment strategies, in turn, entail diverging degrees 
of dependence on the performance of specific portfolio companies. The top portfolio 
companies for actively managed mutual funds account for a greater percentage of their 
overall investment than the top portfolio companies for pension funds. I present in Table 
                                                 
87Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, p. 163; and Robert Pozen, “Institutional 
Investors: The Reluctant Activists,” Harvard Business Review 72,1 (January-February 1994): 140-
149. 
88See Stephen Brown, William Goetzmann, and James Park, “Careers and Survival: Competition 
and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTA Industry,” Journal of Finance 56,5 (October 2001): 1869-1886.  
  265 the relative weight of the top ten holdings for selected mutual and pension funds.89 
For pension funds, I report that percentage accounted for by the top ten holdings in 
either their domestic or international portfolios. Mutual funds, on the other hand, 
manage several dozens of funds: thus I selected the most important funds in regard to 
assets under management for some of the biggest institutions. As Table 5 demonstrates, 
the financial returns of actively managed mutual funds are more dependent on the per-
formance of a selected number of top portfolio companies than they are for their pension 
fund counterparts.  
 
B) Institutional Investor Activism and its Implications for Corporate Governance  
 
     The decision-making processes and the preferences of institutional investors differ in 
important ways. The resulting variation in the investment strategies of institutional in-
vestors implies different sets of fit with the national institutions of the countries in which 
they invest. The preferences of institutional investors in corporate governance issues 
take place along a continuum from market-wide institutional concerns to firm-specific 
strategy related issues.90 The associated shareholder activism of mutual and pension 
funds exhibits striking variation, thereby implying different types of fit.  
 
     The type of shareholder activism displayed by pension funds is directly connected to 
their preferences.91 Their strategies are aimed at the transformation of the national insti-
tutions of corporate governance of a recipient country. They have economy-wide con-
cerns. The tactics followed by these DB funds consist of the adoption of measures de-
signed to affect the value of their entire portfolio. Pension funds do not have an over-
arching interest in improving the profitability of a single corporation. Improvement of 
                                                 
89Hedge funds do not have to reveal the composition of their portfolio and materials distributed 
to investors is often available on a restricted basis and published at irregular intervals. The low 
profile and secretive nature of hedge funds is designed to minimize regulatory and tax oversight 
(William Fung and David Hsieh, “Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading Strategies: The 
Case of Hedge Funds,” p. 301). As a result, it is impossible to acquire credible data on the hold-
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90Bernard Black, “Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,” UCLA 
Law Review 39 (1992): 811-893.  
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fit with different models of capitalism. See Peter Gourevitch, “The Political Economy of Institu-
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Edward Rock, “Pension Fund Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control,” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, 5 (May 2007): 1021-1093; Roberta Romano, “Less is 
More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance,” Yale Jour-
nal on Regulation 18,2 (Summer 2001): 174-251.  
  27the performance of a single company through extensive monitoring is likely to come at 
the expense of unmonitored portfolio firms. Pension funds have developed a set of 
guidelines for targeted companies that are institutional in nature and applicable to the 
entire portfolio: removal of anti-takeover devices, selection of independent directors, 
confidential voting, limits on executive pay, and linkage between managerial compensa-
tion and firm performance. Many issues arise in a similar manner for portfolio compa-
nies, thereby eliminating the costs associated with developing a new formula for each 
underperforming corporation. As Bernard Black argues, “specialized knowledge is 
needed to assess whether a company should build a new plant, but is not needed to 
decide whether the company should redeem its poison pill.”92  
 
     Moreover, the size and composition of the portfolio of pension funds militate against 
firm-specific measures since they hold a small equity stake in a great number of compa-
nies. They cannot properly monitor every portfolio corporation in which they hold an 
equity stake. The transaction costs of monitoring would cancel the benefits of diversifi-
cation associated with an indexed portfolio, since they hold a small equity stake in a 
great number of companies managed primarily on an index basis. Finally, the activism 
of pension funds is not linked to their investment decisions. They do not tend to divest 
from targeted firms even in the case of non-compliance.93 Index-based activist pension 
funds react to bad performance by shifting external money managers taking excessive 
risks rather than modifying the composition of their portfolio.94 The constraints associ-
ated with an index-based strategy entail that activist pension funds pursue tactics aimed 
at boosting the performance of the overall portfolio. Pension funds avoid submitting 
resolutions that require developed, firm-specific knowledge.95 Managers of pension 
funds do not want to micromanage individual corporations and do not have the exper-
tise to accomplish the task.96 They freely admit that they do not possess the competence 
needed to decide on the day-to-day operation of firms and whether portfolio companies 
are pursuing a sensible business strategy. Nonetheless, it is also important to note that 
preferences do not always translate into activism. The undertaking of activism by pen-
sion funds – in the form of shareholder resolutions that challenge management, the ela-
boration of good corporate governance codes of behavior, and the public targeting of 
underperforming portfolio companies – has been associated with a dozen public pen-
sion funds. The large bulk of private and public pension funds do not engage in activ-
ism. Shareholder activism in the United States is the product of DB pension funds man-
aged on an index basis where the election of fund managers is often surrounded by po-
litical overtones.97  
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94Diane Del Guercio and Paula Tkac, “The Determinants of the Flow of Funds of Managed Port-
folios: Mutual Funds vs. Pension Funds,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37,4 (De-
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96Bernard Black, “Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice,” p. 853.  
97See Roberta Romano, “Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered.” 
  28     The preferences and strategy of actively managed mutual funds and of hedge funds, 
in contrast, lie in influencing the business strategy of large corporations in which they 
hold an important stake. The institutions of corporate governance of a country are not as 
important to them since their concerns are more firm-specific. The strategy of portfolio 
firms stands at the heart of their concerns. These two categories of institutional investors 
can own larger equity stakes in a smaller number of corporations. However, they do not 
acquire a significant equity stake in a corporation because it is part of an index. They 
spend significant amounts of money to acquire firm-specific information, therefore be-
having more like stock pickers and being the mirror image of DB pension funds.98 Mu-
tual and hedge funds focus on underperforming companies as investment opportunities 
since they have greater room for improvement and hence higher trading profits. More-
over, the money managers of these funds are expected to surpass the index (actively 
managed mutual funds) or achieve high absolute returns (hedge funds) – if not, fund 
trustees could simply hire index-based mutual funds. As a result of these factors, active-
ly managed mutual funds and hedge funds are more risk tolerant than DB pension 
funds/index-based mutual funds. Finally, it is also interesting to note that hedge funds 
occasionally acquire high stakes in order to become activist rather than becoming in-
volved only ex post when companies are underperforming.
99
  
     A similar gap between preferences and activist tactics also applies to mutual funds. 
The presence of preferences in regard to portfolio management does not mean that insti-
tutional investors will engage in corporate governance activities with a goal of improv-
ing corporate performance. In fact, critics have been quite severe on the monitoring role 
performed by mutual funds. It has been argued that this category of investors has been 
invisible in solving problems of accountability in corporate governance in the United 
States.100 The overall reluctance of actively managed mutual funds to challenge man-
agement via public tactics of shareholder activism is shaped by a conflict of interest. 
Mutual funds also serve as external money managers for pensions and, thereby, derive 
substantial revenues from their management of corporate benefit plans. The risk of ali-
enating corporate clients and losing substantial management fees has been considered 
more important than the opportunity to increase portfolio value through corporate gov-
ernance activism.  
 
     The above criticism of mutual funds does indeed point to a substantial difference 
from their hedge/pension fund counterparts. The latter constitute single-purpose firms 
that do not have multiple sources of income leading to potential conflict of interest. 
Nonetheless, the preferences of mutual funds do matter for issues of comparative cor-
porate governance, despite their overall reluctance to engage in shareholder activism 
even in the United States. First, the positive relationship between the volume of pension 
                                                 
98See Robert Monks and Nell Minow, Corporate Governance, p. 163; and Robert Pozen, “Institution-
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  29business and the propensity to vote with management does not extend to investment de-
cisions. There is no relationship between levels of ownership and client relationships. 
The decision by mutual funds to invest in a company is independent of whether or not it 
serves as an external money manager for that particular firm.101 T h e  r o l e  o f  m u t u a l  
funds as external money managers influences their willingness to publicly challenge 
management, but has no bearing on the composition of their portfolio. The differences in 
the volume of investment by mutual funds in France and Germany cannot be accounted 
for by conflicts of interest resulting from their role as external money managers. Second, 
the lack of shareholder activism of mutual funds does not automatically extend to con-
tinental Europe precisely because they do not have significant business relationships as 
external money managers. Fidelity and other mutual funds can take a highly activist 
stance in Europe and display a willingness to confront management as a strategy to im-
prove corporate performance.102 The pay-as-you-go retirement systems of France and 
Germany mean that there are fewer opportunities for mutual funds to earn fees by man-
aging corporate pension accounts. Third, the unwillingness of mutual funds to confront 
companies publicly for which they earn substantial fees as account managers does not 
mean that they do not engage in some form of behind-the-scenes activism in the United 
States. The most frequent tactics used by mutual funds are direct discussions with man-
agement over changes in the business strategy of the firm – informal jawboning.103 The 
content of their demands focuses on measures that are directly related to the market 
capitalization of portfolio firms – with demerger and focus on a limited number of core 
business activities the most prevalent ones. It is also interesting to note the division of 
labor that takes place between mutual and pension funds.104 The early 1990s in the 
United States witnessed a wave of institutional activism that saw several CEOs resign 
after pressures from institutional investors. Pension funds, with CalPERS in the forefront, 
played a central role in raising critical issues by identifying the problems that plagued 
under-performing companies. However, they were unable to issue specific recommen-
dations beside corporate governance resolutions and their individual stake in troubled 
corporations was too small to force company officials to resign. Instead, giant mutual 
funds like Fidelity and Wall Street investment firms like JP Morgan did make recom-
mendations about strategic issues and used their financial clout to force out CEOs and 
other company officials. 
 
C) Presence of Mutual and Hedge Funds in France and Germany  
 
     I computed data on the presence of actively managed mutual funds in France and 
Germany with the use of several indicators. The first indicator is related to the disclosure 
requirements of listed companies. EU regulation requires shareholders owning 5 percent 
or more of the outstanding equity capital of a corporation to notify the national securi-
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  30ties regulations authorities.105 I recorded data on equity stake above the 5 percent thresh-
old from September 1997 to January 2007 for the sixty largest firms by stock market capi-
talization in both France and Germany.106 Large European companies with high trading 
volumes and high degrees of free float are said to be the primary focus of actively man-
aged mutual funds. Fluctuations in price following market transactions are likely to be 
more compressed for these firms than for smaller companies or those with lower 
amounts of shares available for purchase. I recorded every instance of acquisitions of 
equity capital over the 5 percent threshold by hedge and mutual funds under the follow-
ing conditions. First, my sample is composed of domestically based firms in France and 
Germany. Second, I discarded movements of capital above and below the 5 percent 
threshold within a thirty-day period. Some funds have adopted a policy of automatic 
sale of stocks if their equity stake goes above the mandatory disclosure requirement. 
Moreover, movements above and below the 5 percent threshold might reflect a share 
buyback program by a portfolio corporation rather than an intended strategy by an in-
stitutional investor. Third, I selected equity capital in a firm rather than voting rights as 
the indicator of movement of capital above the five percent threshold. Fourth, I dis-
carded holdings held by sub-custodians firms such as State Street and Brown Brothers 
Harriman. The 1940 Investment Act in the United States requires mutual funds to place 
their funds with sub-custodian firms for issues of shareholder protection. Thus, the 
holdings of such financial agents simply reflect holding the financial asset of mutual 
funds clients rather than a strategic investment decision.  
 
     Fifth, acquisitions of an equity stake above the five percent threshold by a mutual 
fund organization for firms that were successfully targeted as part of a takeover bid are 
also discarded from the sample. The reason is that one of the most consistent findings in 
finance theory is that target companies in M&A deals are sold at a premium that has fluc-
tuated between 30 and 50 percent in the United States. The corresponding figures for 
foreign targets have averaged between 20 and 50 percent. 107 In other words, the share-
holders of targeted firms stand to experience substantial financial gains in the event of a 
successful acquisition of their company. The implication is that mutual funds acquiring 
a large equity stake in these types of firms reflect an assessment about capital gains asso-
ciated with the completion of a takeover, not an investment decision driven by judg-
ments about the implementation of corporate restructuring measures that would result 
in greater corporate earnings. As a result, I discard equity stakes above the 5 percent 
level that occurred twelve months before the formal completion of what turned out to be 
a successful takeover bid. Finally, I crosschecked the data collected by relying on two na-
tional business directories: DAFSA Annuaire des Sociétés for France and Rudiger Liedtke’s 
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  31Wem Gehört die Republik for Germany.108 These two annual publications provide a full list 
of shareholders of listed companies and serve as useful reliability check mechanisms.  
 
     Data on the presence of actively managed mutual funds – a category of short-term, 
impatient institutional investors – in France and Germany reveal striking patterns of di-
vergence (see Table 6). The attractiveness of France over Germany is evident, as mutual 
funds have invested massively in the former, as measured by the overall number of 
stakes over the five percent threshold. Table 6 lists the largest French and German blue-
chip companies that are part of the top 1000 European firms by stock market capitaliza-
tion. For the top sixty French firms by market capitalization, thirty-three of them re-
corded sixty-four instances of investment over the 5 percent threshold by short-term 
Anglo-Saxon institutional investors. Because a firm can receive more than one invest-
ment from a single institutional investor, the number of investments is always higher 
than the number of companies receiving investment. For the top sixty German firms by 
market capitalization, only twenty-three of them recorded thirty-five instances of invest-
ment over the five percent threshold by Anglo-Saxon institutional investors. For blue-
chip companies, therefore, the total overall number of acquisitions in French firms was a 
little under twice those recorded for German companies.109  
 
     The data on the acquisition of a stake superior to the five percent threshold of the 
equity capital of large listed French and German firms provides a useful indicator of the 
presence of actively managed mutual funds in the two countries. Such concentrated 
positions in companies are highly revealing of the motivations of institutional investors. 
The assumption is that the increase in share price between the time of purchase and sale 
of the targeted stock is superior to the price decline associated with selling an important 
percentage of the equity capital of the company. Index-driven, diversified institutional 
investors do not face this issue since their average holding in a portfolio company is 
very small.  
 
     However, additional triangulated measures must complement this indicator in order 
to fully capture the preferences of institutional investors. First, mutual funds have differ-
ent objectives and investment strategies reflected in the turnover rate of managed funds. 
The turnover rate is defined as the percentage of the portfolio’s holdings that have 
changed in the previous year. Fund managers with high turnover rates trade actively, 
holding stocks for shorter periods. For example, a turnover rate of 100 percent indicates 
that the manager changes the entire portfolio within a year. Differences in turnover rates 
reflect fund managers’ assessment of the content and speed of corporate restructuring in 
portfolio companies. Being able to restructure themselves in a rapid fashion, portfolio 
companies force actively trading managers to turn over their portfolio quickly in order 
                                                 
108Dafsaliens, Annuaire DAFSA (Paris: Editions Dafsa), annual publication; and Rudiger Liedtke, 
Wem Gehort die Republik? (Frankfurt: Eichborn), annual publication. 
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  32to capture the potential changes in share price following restructuring. A full apprecia-
tion of a concentrated equity stake in a selected firm must be viewed jointly with the as-
sessments made about the nature of internal changes in the company.  
 
     Second, the quasi-totality of funds does not stand alone, but rather form a family of 
funds organized under a management company. Mutual funds are comprised of several 
individual funds with different objectives. For example, Fidelity Spar International is a 
passively managed fund focused on European stocks with a turnover of just six percent 
in 2005. In contrast, Fidelity Europe is also focused on European stocks but is a growth 
oriented fund that had a turnover of 99 percent in 2005. Thus, the same firm can appear 
in mutual funds categorized with different styles. The analysis of bottom-up indicators – 
from a specific fund of a mutual fund organization to a given portfolio company – must 
complement the use of top-down measurement, from the shareholding structure of the 
targeted company back to a mutual fund organization. Third, portfolio holdings below 
the five percent equity stake threshold are not entirely composed of diversification seek-
ing, passively managed mutual funds. Some short-term oriented mutual funds with 
high turnover rates also collectively constitute important shareholders of European com-
panies but shunned from acquiring more than 5 percent of any one security for both dis-
closure and foreign exposure reasons.  
 
Table 6: French and German Companies in the top 1000 European Index, Market 
Capitalization on December 17, 2003 (Overall European Rank) (Number of Investments above 
the 5 Percent Threshold by Mutual Funds) 
 
France Germany 
1) Total (5)                                                               (1) 
1997: Fidelity  Turnover Rate: >50% 
1) Siemens (16) 
2) BNP-Paribas (20)                                                 (1) 
1997 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2) Deutsche Bank (24) 
3) Aventis (29)                                                         (1) 
1997 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
3) Deutsche Telekom (25) 
4) Societe Generale (34)                                          4) Allianz (30) 
5) Carrefour (39)  5) E.ON (33) 
6) AXA (43) 6)  Daimler-Chrysler  (36) 
7) L’ Oreal (50)  7) SAP(38) 
8) Sanofi-Synthelabo (51)  8) BASF (44) 
9)Vivendi(52)                                                          (2) 
2004 : Fidelity  Turnover Rate: >50% 
2004: South East Asset Mgt Turnover Rate : <50% 
9) Munich Re (57) 
10) France Telecom (53)  10) Bayer (65)                                                          (1) 
2005: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
11) Danone (59)  11) BMW (83) 
12) LVMH (67) 12)  RWE (100) 
13) Alcatel(73)                                                         (3) 
1997: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2002: Brandes Turnover Rate : <50% 
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
13) Volkswagen (104)                                            (2) 
2004: Brandes Turnover Rate: <50%  
2004: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
14) Suez (74)  14) Schering (129) 
15) Credit Agricole (75)  15) Hypo Bank (130)                                              (1) 
2004: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
  3316) Air Liquide (77)  16) Commerzbank (131)                                        (1) 
2006: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
17) Saint-Gobain (78)                                               17) Thyssen Krupp (152) 
18) Renault (87)                                                       (2) 
1997 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2006 : Capital Group Turnover Rate : <50% 
18) Deutsche Post (153) 
19) Schneider (92)                                                   (2) 
2000: Janus Turnover Rate: >50% 
2005: Capital Group Turnover Rate : <50% 
19) Infineon (165)                                                   (4) 
2003: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
2003: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2006: Brandes Turnover Rate: <50% 
2006 Dodge & Cox Turnover Rate: <50%  
20) Lafarge (95)                                                       (1) 
2002: Putnam Turnover Rate: <50%  
20) Deutsche Borse (172)                                       (2) 
2003: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2004: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
21) Accor (134)                                                        (3) 
2003: Putnam Turnover Rate: >50% 
2004 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2005: Capital Group Turnover Rate : <50% 
21) Metro (178) 
22) Peugeot (138)                                                     22) Continental (204)                                              (1) 
2004: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
23) Lagardère (158)                                                (2) 
1997 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2006 : Fidelity Turnover Rate : >50%  
23) Altana (211)                                                       
24) Bouygues (160)                                                 (3) 
1998: Schroders (UK) Turnover Rate: >50%  
2002: Putnam Turnover Rate: <50%  
2005: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50%  
24) Henkel (214) 
25) Pinault Printemps Redoute (161)  25) Porsche (220) 
26) Arcelor (168)  26) Adidas-Salomon (223)                                     (1) 
2000: Templeton Turnover Rate: <50%  
27) VivendiEnvironment (182)                             (2) 
2002: Putnam Turnover Rate: <50%  
2005: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
27) Linde (253)                                                        (1) 
2006: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
28) Michelin (184)                                                   (2) 
2000: Templeton Turnover Rate: <50% 
2006: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
28) T-Online (264) 
29) Vinci (187)                                                          29) Lufthansa (294) 
30) CapGemini (190)                                              (1) 
2006 : Goldman Sachs Turnover Rate : >50%  
30) MAN (306) 
31) Pernod Ricard (197)                                         (2) 
2000: Silchester (UK) Turnover Rate: NA  
2001: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50%  
31) Beiersdorf (331) 
32) Essilor International (198)                              (1) 
2001: Amvescap (UK) Turnover Rate: NA 
32) Depfa Bank (340)                                              (1) 
1998: Janus Turnover Rate: >50% 
33) Thomson (217)                                                  (2) 
2006: Brandes Turnover Rate : <50% 
2006: Templeton Turnover Rate: <50% 
33) Puma (348)                                                        (1) 
2003: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
 
34) Pechiney (231)                                                  (2) 
1997 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2002 : Fidelity Turnover Rate : >50%  
34) TUI (368)                                                             
35) Publicis (236)                                                    (2)  35) Heidelberger Cement (382) 
  342001 : Putnam Turnover Rate : >50%  
2004 : Harris Associates Turnover Rate : <50% 
36) TF1 (247)                                                             (2) 
1997: Sanford Bernstein Turnover Rate: >50%  
2001 : Putnam Turnover Rate : >50%  
36) Fresenius (390) 
37) Casino (265)  37) Merck (409)                                                       (3) 
2002: Tweedy Browne Turnover Rate:<50%  
2004: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
38) Unibail (294)                                                     (1) 
1997 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
38) Hypo Real Estate Holding (439)                    (1) 
2005: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
39) Christian Dior (287)  39) MG Technologies (462)                                     (1) 
2003: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
40) Sodexho (327)                                                    40) Stada Arzneimit (487) 
41) Valeo (329)                                                        (2) 
2001 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2005: Brandes Turnover Rate: <50%  
41) Celanese (498)                                                   (1) 
2003: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
42) Thales (342)                                                       (1) 
2006: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50%  
42) Celesio (523) 
43) Dassault Systèmes (346)                                  (1) 
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50%  
43) MLP (547)                                                            (2) 
2006: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2006: Harris Associates Turnover Rate <50%  
44) Wanadoo (347)                                                 (1) 
2002: Goldman Sachs Turnover Rate: >50%  
44) Pro Siebensat (552)                 
45) Autoroutes Sud France (353)  45) Wella (558) 
46) Business Objects (374)                                     (3) 
2001: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2005: MA Financial Services Turnover Rate:>50%  
46) Epcos (565)                                                        (2) 
2002: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
2006 Dodge & Cox Turnover Rate: <50% 
47) Eurotunnel (378)                                              (1) 
2002: Oppenheimer Funds Turnover Rate: >50%  
47) Suedzucker (572)  
48) Technip-Coflexip (381)                                    (5) 
1997: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2000: Putnam Turnover Rate: >50% 
2004: Oppenheimer Funds: <50%  
2006: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50%  
2006: Trademarks NWQ Turnover Rate: <50%  
48) Hannover Ruck (577) 
49) CNP Assurances (411)   49) Medion (597)                                                     (2) 
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2004: Jupiter (UK) Turnover Rate:<50%  
50) Sagem (418)  50) IKB DT Industriebank (603) 
51) Air France (430)                                                  51) Douglas (608)                                                    
52) Atos (434)                                                          (1) 
1998: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
52) Singulus Technologies (621)                           
53) Hermes (436)  53) Bilfinger Berger (632)                                      (1) 
2005: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
54) Genica (438)  54) Karstadtquelle (643) 
55) Neopost (446)                                                   (3) 
1999: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
2003: Harris Associates Turnover rate:<50% 
2006: Jupiter (UK) Turnover Rate: <50% 
55) Kali & Salz (K&S) (658)                                   (1) 
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
                     
  3556) Havas (457)                                                       (3) 
1999: Putnam Turnover Rate: >50%  
2002: Putnam Turnover Rate: <50%  
2003: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50%  
56) Frankfurt Airport (714)                                   (2) 
2006: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
2006: Julius Bauer Turnover Rate:>50%  
57) Imerys (469)                                                        57) Heidelberger Druckmaschinen (723)            (2) 
2004: Brandes Turnover Rate:<50%  
2004: Fidelity Turnover Rate: >50% 
58) Natexis Bank (471)                                           (1) 
1997: Sanford Bernstein Turnover Rate: >50%  
58) AAreal Bank (737)                                           (1) 
2004: Capital Group Turnover Rate: <50% 
59) BIC (490)                                                             (4) 
2001 : Templeton Turnover Rate : <50% 
2002 : Oppenheimer Funds Turnover Rate : <50%  
2002: Amvescap (UK) Turnover Rate: NA 
2002: Silchester (UK) Turnover Rate: NA  
59) IVG Immobilien (776) 
60) Zodiac (509)                                                       60) Hugo Boss (785) 
 
     The second source of data concerning the presence of short-term institutional inves-
tors is taken from the analysis performed by Morningstar, Inc., the Chicago-based rating 
agency. Morningstar Inc. is the leading provider of independent research on American 
mutual funds and is highly influential with investors, reflected in the fact that an im-
provement in the rating of a fund is associated with significant new inflows of capital.110 
Data on the importance of mutual funds in France and Germany is collected from Morn-
ingstar Funds 500, an annual publication that evaluates the performance of the 500 big-
gest funds in the United States. Most of the funds covered in this annual publication 
have assets invested in domestic stocks and bonds.111 Between about seventy-five and 
one hundred listed funds per year are involved in international equity. For each of these 
internationally oriented funds, Morningstar Funds 500 lists the top countries of exposure, 
the turnover rate, and the top twenty holdings in the fund’s portfolio.  
 
     I compiled data on the importance of the French and German markets for mutual 
funds with the additional following indicators. First, I computed the number of times 
they appear among the top three foreign investment destinations of individual mutual 
funds, and highlight those investments that are part of a portfolio whose turnover is 
superior to 50 percent. I also collected for comparability purposes data for the United 
Kingdom, a liberal market economy with a system of corporate governance similar to 
that of the United States.  
 
     Second, and as previously mentioned, the annual report of Morningstar lists the top 
twenty holdings in the portfolio of every mutual fund it covers. I compute from this 
source the number of times French and German firms from table 6 – i.e. the top sixty 
listed companies in the two countries – are listed as being part of the top twenty hold-
ings in these funds’ portfolios. This strategy constitutes a bottom-up approach that en-
ables one to retrace an investment stake from a specific fund of an investment company 
to a listed portfolio firm. I also collect data on the number of French and German firms 
that are part of the top twenty holdings of a fund whose turnover rate is above 50 per-
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  36cent. The aim of the selection of an indicator for the turnover rate of a funds’ portfolio is 
to discriminate between actively managed and index-based mutual funds. The original 
motivation for a fund to acquire a stake in a listed firm is fully exposed through this in-
dicator.  
 
     The selection of a turnover rate superior to 50 percent is designed to capture short-
term capital mobility. Turnover rates over 50 percent indicate that fund managers 
change the entire portfolio within two years. This figure is about twice as high as the 
turnover rates of passively managed mutual funds. 112 The selection of this turnover rate 
is also designed to take into account the presence of barriers to external flexibility that 
makes short-term dismissals in France and Germany relatively difficult. The top execu-
tives of these two European economies face stringent employment protection regula-
tions in comparison to their counterparts in the liberal market economies. The option of 
using collective redundancies as a strategy to deal with fluctuations in the economy is 
severely constrained. Lengthier procedural notices, higher severance pay schemes, and 
the implementation of social/training measures constitute key components of any im-
portant collective dismissal plans in the two countries. Firm-level works councils can 
delay the implementation of job cuts, but cannot block them provided that companies 
have followed the appropriate procedures. The choice of an indicator of a turnover rate 
of 50 percent and above is designed to capture the preferences of French and German 
managers for the enactment of collective dismissals as a period of twenty-four months is 
sufficient for the implementation of administrative and legal procedures related to this 
type of dismissals.  
 
     Finally, the selection of this turnover rate is also justified by associated lower rates of 
taxation on capital gains. Levels of taxation constitute an important source of costs for 
mutual funds and the IRS code provide tax-sensitive investors with heightened incen-
tives to hold onto their holdings for more than a year – the rates on capital gains result-
ing from the sale of stocks held less than a year being a little over twice as high than for 
the realization of capital gains for positions held for more than twelve months.113 
Nonetheless, mutual funds investing in American companies face a trade-off – the capi-
tal gains on stocks held for less than a year might be higher, but an additional waiting 
period for the sale of portfolio stocks might risk missing the capture of the apex of what 
was an undervalued security. The greater level of short-term flexibility of the American 
economy implies that the implementation of corporate restructuring strategies, and the 
incorporation of these changes by financial investors, is likely to occur faster than in con-
tinental Europe. This trade-off is largely absent in France and Germany since the extent 
and nature of corporate restructuring of domestic firms is slower in the short-term than 
that of American companies. This being said, however, continental European economies 
do not constitute a monolithic bloc and provide for different degrees of fit with the stra-
tegies of actively managed mutual funds. The concentration of power in top manage-
ment in French companies provides a better match with short-term oriented mutual 
funds.   
 
                                                 
112 Mark Mobius, Mutual Funds (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley and Sons, 2007), p. 80.  
113 For example, see David Swensen, Unconventional Success:: A Fundamental Approach to Personal 
Investment (New York: Free Press, 2005), pp. 24-29.  
  37     The results are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The attractiveness of the French market 
over Germany for short-term oriented mutual funds is confirmed. First, investment in 
France is almost three times as important as Germany in regard to the country of expo-
sure of internationally oriented American mutual funds (see table 7). Second, French 
firms are more attractive for short-term oriented mutual funds with a turnover rate su-
perior to 50 percent as compared to their German counterparts (see table 8).  
 
Table 7: Number of times countries appear among the top three foreign investment 
destinations of individual mutual funds (of which turnover rate of the portfolio is superior to 
50%) 
Year Germany  France  UK 
1997  9 (4)  24 (12)  38 (16) 
1998  22 (17)   37 (25)  55 (36)  
1999  7 (4)  26 (16)  47 (29) 
2000  10 (8)  30 (20)  52 (35) 
2001  11 (8)  22 (17)  50 (34)  
2002  5 (4)   30 (17)  45 (21) 
2003  8 (6)  20 (5)  51 (21) 
2004  8 (5)  23 (9)  53 (21) 
2005  3 (1)  18 (5)  51 (19) 
2006  7 (4)  25 (6)  57 (19) 
Total 1997-2006           90 (61)  255 (132)  499 (251) 
Source: Morningstar, Morningstar Funds 500, various years. 
 
Table 8: Number of times top 60 French and German firms appear among the top 20 holdings 
of individual mutual funds (of which turnover rate of the portfolio is superior to 50%) 
Year  France   Germany  
1997  73 (43)  42 (18) 
1998 111  (79)  68  (47) 
1999  99 (65)  34 (16) 
2000  89 (70)  45 (29) 
2001 103  (78)  54  (36) 
2002 101  (55)  39  (26) 
2003  83 (26)  37 (13) 
2004  95 (46)  51 (32) 
2005  99 (37)  52 (30) 
2006                  109 (34)  62 (19) 
Source: Morningstar, Morningstar Funds 500, various years. 
 
     Finally, the selection of an indicator of a turnover of above 50 percent also highlights 
the different nature of the investment stake over the five percent threshold as listed in 
table 6. The acquisition of a large equity stake in a listed firm is the ultimate bet of mu-
tual funds – i.e. the assessment that measures of corporate restructuring would be signi-
ficant enough to result in higher stream of corporate earnings and level of stock market 
capitalization that will compensate for any decline in share price when the fund liqui-
dates its position. However, the acquisition of a significant stake in a company does not 
in itself reveal the nature and speed of corporate restructuring. Therefore, I identify the 
turnover rate (s) of the mutual fund organization that took a significant equity stake in 
French and German corporations.  The greater attractiveness of French firms for short-
  38term oriented institutional investors is further confirmed. Twenty-seven of the sixty-four 
instances of investment over the 5 percent threshold by mutual funds in France were 
part of an investment portfolio whose turnover rate was above 50 percent. By contrast, 
only twelve cases out of the thirty-five instances of investment above the five percent 
threshold in Germany were associated with a turnover rate superior to 50 percent.  
 
III. Argument: The Centrality of Firm-Level Institutions in France and Germany  
 
     The argument of this paper is that the variations in the firm-level institutional ar-
rangements of workplace organization of French and German companies constitute the 
single variable that mattered most crucially to account for the greater propensity of ac-
tively managed mutual funds to invest in the former. I do not wish to argue that differ-
ences in the firm-level institutions of French and German companies constitute the only 
investment criterion for this category of short-term, impatient capital. The investment 
decisions of fund managers are best understood as a process of causal complexity – sev-
eral factors accounting (jointly or separately) for the specific outcome of portfolio invest-
ment in a given country. We can identify two broad investment strategies, each with 
their own subsets of niche strategies.114  
 
     First,  institutional  investors  can  pursue a top-down investment strategy whereby 
fund managers build their portfolios based on the analysis of macroeconomic factors as-
sociated with different countries and/or regions.115 Geographical allocation is decided 
first, and only then would the fund manager select which stocks to invest in. Top-down 
managers seek to anticipate evolving market trends and of price changes on capital mar-
kets. The statistical analysis of the timing of economic cycles, rates of GDP growth, bal-
ance of trade, exchange rates, and the state of public finance constitute key variables in 
the investment making-process of top-down fund managers.  
 
     Second, institutional investors can pursue a bottom-up investment strategy whereby 
fund managers behave as stock pickers, i.e., selecting the companies to buy (and sell) af-
ter an examination of their fundamentals. The research undertaken at mutual funds or-
ganizations seek to discover undervalued stocks with potential higher returns than se-
curities in the same category.  The bottom-up approach to investing by mutual funds is 
usually divided into two analytical steps. The first one is based on quantitative analyses 
that aim at uncovering historical patterns in prices and volumes on stock trading in 
order to predict the evolution of a firm’s stock in the future. These types of quantitative 
analyses enable research analysts to develop large lists of candidate stocks for considera-
                                                 
114Moreover, institutional investors invest in many asset classes beside equities. They also invest 
in bonds, commodities, currencies, and diverse fixed income instruments. The argument pre-
sented in this paper focuses solely on equities, the logic and argument associated with the invest-
ment strategies of hedge and mutual funds being a different asset class. For example, fund man-
agers contemplating an investment in municipal bonds will actively research the state of public 
finance of the issuer, economic cycles and any recent piece of news that could affect its solvency. 
These criteria are obviously largely unconnected to issues raised by an institutional perspective 
such as Varieties of Capitalism.  
115Good reviews of the investment strategies of actively managed mutual funds are Lee Gremil-
lion, Mutual Funds Industry Handbook (Hoboken NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2005), and Robert Pozen, 
The Mutual Fund Business.  
  39tion. The second one is based on more qualitative research techniques designed to re-
duce the list of potential stocks to a selected group that fits with the investment strate-
gies and goals of the fund manager. Examples of qualitative techniques are on-site visits, 
interviews with top management, review of the trade literature, and an evaluation of the 
ability of senior corporate executives to implement strategies that will generate substan-
tial corporate earnings. The importance of institutionally-based varieties of capitalism in 
France and Germany – concentration of power in top management in the former and dif-
fusion of power among diverse stakeholders in the latter --  is most critical at this junc-
ture. The argument is that various events in the life of a company – reorientation of its 
strategy, focus on core competencies and disposal of non-core units, mergers and acqui-
sitions, distribution of cash flows to shareholders through dividends or share buybacks, 
and many others – can drive upward or downward the price of its stock towards a new 
value.116 The type and probable speed of corporate restructuring measures that manag-
ers are able to implement shape the extent to which the above income generating strate-
gies are likely to see the light of day.  The investment decisions of fund managers, in 
turn, rest on a bottom-up analysis in the sense that a good knowledge of the activities of 
firms constitutes the bulk of the investment analysis. The fund manager seeks to predict 
the outcome of potential corporate decisions, as well as the best time to invest in specific 
companies. The value of an investment portfolio can erode if a substantial investment 
stake took place and the predicted corporate event does not.  
 
     I argue in this paper that the varieties of firm-level institutional arrangements – with 
the associated divergence in the degree of power concentration in the firm – constitute 
the most important factor to account for the important aggregate investment gaps be-
tween France and Germany. This divergence occurs despite the presence of multiple 
causal paths to portfolio investment. What is the relationship between firm-level institu-
tional arrangements and the process of strategic investment of short-term, impatient 
capital? The overall aim associated with the investment decisions of any type of funds – 
long-term oriented pension funds as well as short-term driven hedge and mutual funds 
– is to generate capital gains (and/or secure company dividends) for their financial con-
tributors. Fund managers seek to build an investment portfolio that will experience an 
increase in value over time. This is done through buying what are perceived to be un-
                                                 
116The analysis of this second analytical step of the bottom-up investment strategy is further di-
vided into two sub-categories: frequent corporate events that managers have to confront on a 
regular basis versus special situations that arise out of extraordinary corporate events. The deci-
sion to pay dividends at the annual general meeting of the company constitutes an example of 
the former; the acquisition of highly depressed stocks of distressed companies in the expectation 
of a price rebound represents an example of the latter. An institutionally-based, middle-range 
theory such as Varieties of Capitalism is better suited to provide significant insights on bottom-
up investment strategies dealing with regular corporate events. Its strength lies in the analysis of 
how institutional frameworks enable firms to coordinate their activities and to develop their in-
novative capabilities. By contrast, the identification of companies that are destroying substantial 
shareholder value and of those on the verge of, in the middle of, or emerging from bankruptcy 
requires different types of bottom-up analyses for which the institutionally-based Varieties of 
Capitalism perspective does not seek to contribute. Such analyses, for example, would focus on 
the identification of the types of companies belonging to a distressed sector negatively affected by 
internal/external changes or those whose management lies to its shareholders through the 
pursuit of aggressive accounting practices and other similar tactics.  
  40dervalued stocks and selling overvalued ones. Thus, institutional investors share a pref-
erence for shareholder value strategies, i.e., managers making decisions that will spur 
the price of the company’s equity higher. Institutional investors, however, have little else 
in common. Their shared preference for shareholder value strategies does not translate 
into similar investment strategies. In particular, the time horizons of actively managed 
mutual funds (and hedge funds) result in preferences not only for shareholder value 
strategies, but for those that bring rather immediate results. Three key features of the 
mode of operation of mutual funds/hedge funds entail critical implications for their in-
vestment strategies.  
 
     First, fund managers are driven by performance concerns. They possess heightened 
incentives to surpass financial benchmarks (mutual funds) or reap as high as possible 
absolute returns (hedge funds), not just achieving targeted mandated minimum returns 
– the situation prevailing for pension funds. This focus on relative performance for mu-
tual funds (and on absolute performance for hedge funds) flows from two factors. The 
first results from the competitive environment for the management of the equity invest-
ment business of pension funds and individual savers. Investors can shift their assets 
across many funds. The second factor is the importance of variable pay for fund manag-
ers. Managerial remuneration is based on the volume of assets under management and 
the returns on investment associated with the composition of the portfolio. The presence 
of high profile league tables and the importance of variable pay entail that fund man-
agers face both constraining scrutiny and enabling inducement to achieve as high as 
possible returns.  
 
     Second, the holding period for actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds) is 
considerably shorter than that of their pension counterparts given higher liquidity con-
straints. The issue of payments to investors takes place on an irregular basis since funds 
are more redeemable on demand, in comparison to the situation that prevails for pen-
sion funds. Their preference for managerial actions that seek to boost the stock price is 
accompanied by a focus on shareholder value strategies that bring greater dividends in 
the short term. The appreciation in the value of the investment portfolio might be a com-
mon concern for both short-term driven and long-term oriented institutional investors, 
but the preferred time horizon associated with its realization differs sharply.  
 
     Thirdly, and following from the previous two features, senior fund managers primar-
ily conceptualize their role as financial traders, not as shareholders.117 They see them-
selves as professional share traders who compete with each other for managing inves-
tors’ funds and achieving high returns on their investment strategy. Their ownership 
stake in a company is viewed as the result of their trading. Their interests are divorced 
from those of long-term shareholders. Hedge and actively managed mutual funds do 
sometimes engage in activist tactics, but the gains associated with extensive monitoring 
                                                 
117See John Hendry, Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker, and John Roberts, “Owners or Traders? 
Conceptualizations of Institutional Investors and their Relationship with Corporate Managers,” 
pp. 1109-14.  
  41are considerably lessened if they are to occur in the medium or long run given the short-
term horizon of their trading.118  
 
     What is the relationship between the preferences of short-term, impatient investors 
and the institutional arrangements of workplace organization of French and German 
firms? Why is France a privileged destination of investment for actively managed mu-
tual funds? The relevance of firm-level institutions is best seen through the lens of the 
relationship between shareholders and portfolio companies. The rise in importance of 
institutional investors as major shareholders constitutes a novel development in French 
and German corporate governance. The large equity stake of these investors provides 
them with the right set of incentives to monitor companies, but without the propensity 
to extract benefits at the expense of minority shareholders – a phenomenon present in 
many common law economies with important blockholders.119 However, the ability of 
institutional investors to translate shareholder ownership into corporate power remains 
an empirical issue. The debate pits those who view institutional activism as an essential 
mechanism by which to monitor companies against those who assign a strong element 
of passivity to institutional investors.120  
 
     Anglo-American institutional investors do sometimes monitor extensively portfolio 
firms in France and Germany. Several instances anecdotal evidence testifies to the activ-
ism of investors on various issues ranging from executive pay to the presentation of 
codes of “good” corporate governance practices. The shareholder activism of short-term, 
impatient investors fits well with the organization of French companies. The primary 
goal of activist mutual and hedge funds investing in France is to convince the CEOs of 
the value of specific strategic changes. This is because the implementation of restructur-
ing policies requires, almost exclusively, the CEO’s approval, as employees have no 
means of intervention.121 Moreover, the overall weakness of employees reduces the abili-
ty of French CEOs to claim that they are constrained in the elaboration and implementa-
tion of firm strategy and that they are unable to make concessions.  
 
     However, shareholder activism by institutional investors, more often than not, does 
not represent the “normal” state of affairs in corporate governance. Several studies have 
highlighted the underdevelopment of shareholder activism in the interactive relation-
ship between institutional investors and top management, as well as the lack of financial 
                                                 
118Moreover, it is interesting to note the separation of tasks in the organizational structure of 
funds. The monitoring functions are carried out by an organizationally separate team of govern-
ance specialists. The stock pickers (i.e., traders) of a fund share little in common with these gov-
ernance specialists. See John Hendry, Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker, and John Roberts, “Own-
ers or Traders? Conceptualizations of Institutional Investors and their Relationship with Corpor-
ate Managers,” p. 1112.  
119A good summary of these issues is provided in Peter Gourevitch, “The Political Economy of In-
stitutional Investors in Corporate Governance: Some Comparative Problems,” paper presented at 
the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia PA, August 31- 
September 3, 2006; and Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control.  
120See note 56.  
121This is the position adopted by Antoine Rebérioux, “European Style of Corporate Governance 
at the Crossroads: The Role of Worker Involvement,” p. 125.  
  42consequences associated with instances of shareholder activism.122 As previously men-
tioned, the short-term trading strategy of actively managed mutual funds (and hedge 
funds) can substantially erode the gains associated with extensive monitoring.123 The 
equity stake of these investors in portfolio companies is often considerably shorter than 
the amount of time required for shareholder activism to bear its fruits. Short-term 
institutional investors conceptualize their primary role as being traders, not owners of 
companies. In fact, the personnel at mutual funds that are involved in activism are usu-
ally not the one involved in stock picking. Moreover, mutual funds in the United States 
face a conflict of interest that results from their multiple sources of income.124 Funds 
derive their income from managing a firm’s pension plan as well as maximizing the 
value of their stock portfolio, thereby presenting them with opposite strategies in regard 
to shareholder activism.125 Finally, institutional investors in advanced capitalist econo-
mies face a trade-off.126 In countries where the degrees of legal protection for minority 
shareholders are high, ownership is diffused, thereby leading to a “free rider” problem – 
namely, the financial gains associated with extensive monitoring are unlikely to be fully 
captured by the activist investor and likely to be widely distributed among the totality of 
the shareholder base. In countries with lower degrees of legal protection for minority in-
vestors, in contrast, concentrated ownership provide the incentives for large owners to 
monitor – but at the potential expense of minority shareholders who are vulnerable to 
insider exploitation.  
 
     Nonetheless, firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace organization remain 
crucial in understanding the investments of hedge/mutual funds in France and Germa-
ny even in the absence of institutional activism. The argument presented in this paper is 
not contingent on the status of activism by institutional investors. Differences in the de-
gree of power concentration – as embodied in the firm-level institutional arrangements 
of workplace organization – constitute the crucial mid-level variable that mediates 
broader endogenous and exogenous developments. In particular, firm-level institutional 
arrangements characterized by top managerial power concentration make it easier to 
translate quickly preferences for shareholder value into practice. The process of invest-
ment selection of short-term, impatient institutional investors requires the identification 
of companies that are likely to quickly implement changes that will boost its stock mar-
ket capitalization. French firms are attractive to hedge and mutual funds since the ela-
boration and implementation of a new strategy can be undertaken in a unilateral fash-
                                                 
122See Bernard Black, “Shareholder Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States”; 
and Roberta Romano, “Less is More: Making Shareholder Activism a Valuable Mechanism of 
Corporate Governance.” 
123John Hendry, Paul Sanderson, Richard Barker, and John Roberts, “Owners or Traders? Concep-
tualizations of Institutional Investors and their Relationship with Corporate Managers.”  
124See Peter Gourevitch, “The Political Economy of Institutional Investors: Some Comparative 
Problems.”  
125This argument, however, is more applicable to the case of the relationship between mutual 
funds and American companies. It does not automatically extend to continental European port-
folio companies since the pay-as-you retirement system in this region of the world limits the abil-
ity of institutional investors to act as external money managers for pension funds.  
126See Peter Gourevitch, “The Political Economy of Institutional Investors: Some Comparative 
Problems,” p. 6. 
  43ion. The decision to pursue shareholder value strategies might remain a managerial pre-
rogative that is not necessarily dictated by portfolio investors, but the ability of French 
corporations to implement these shareholder value strategies is greatly facilitated by the 
relative weak position of employees. The reverse logic applies for the German case – the 
entrenched position of employees limits the ability of CEOs to conduct the strategy of the 
firm in a unilateral fashion.  
 
     The rest of this section is organized in the following manner. First, I identify the in-
stitutional arrangements of firm-level organization that stand prominently in illustrating 
the concentration of power at the top of French companies and the constraints on mana-
gerial autonomy in Germany. I discuss four areas of firm-level organization – legal 
rights of firm-level works councils, skill certification and formation, segmentation of ac-
tivities, and the autonomy of employees in problem solving tasks. Second, I analyze how 
these institutional arrangements shape the adjustment process of companies which, in 
turn, provides for different degrees of fit with the preferences and strategies of different 
categories of institutional investors.  
 
A) Legal Rights of Employees  
 
     Substantial cross-national differences in the institutional and organizational features 
of firm governance and labor representation are shaped by the distribution of legal 
rights at the firm level. This distribution ranges from information, consultation, codeter-
mination, and unilateral worker control over various issues with substantial variation 
among OECD countries in regard to their presence and distribution.127 The distribution of 
legal rights presents management with constraints and opportunities in the elaboration 
and implementation of the strategy of the firm. The influence of labor in the national 
system of corporate governance is related to the extensiveness and comprehensiveness 
of their legal rights. In some cases, these legal rights provide employees with veto power 
(or quasi veto power) over important strategic decisions of the company. The German 
case is characterized by the presence of extensive and comprehensive legal rights for em-
ployees that provide them with several (quasi) veto powers. These (quasi) veto powers 
are extremely important for labor since its legally protected position does not rely on im-
plicit contracts.128 Corporate governance in Germany is a long-term iterated game since 
employees do not have to take into consideration whether it is in the interests of man-
agement to include them in the decision-making process. These legally secured rights 
provide labor organizations with multiple opportunities to intervene since consensus is 
almost required for adjustment. By contrast, the French case is characterized by the pres-
ence of extensive (but not comprehensive) legal rights for employees that do not result 
in the provision of (quasi) veto power. The legal rights of works councils in France pro-
                                                 
127See Herman Knudsen, Employee Participation in Europe (London: Sage Publications, 1995); and 
Eddy Wymeersch, “A Status Report on Corporate Governance Rules and Practices in Some Con-
tinental European States,” in Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda, Mark Roe, Eddy Wymeersch, and Stefan 
Prigge, eds., Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Emerging Research (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 1135-1151.  
128Katharina Pistor, “Codetermination: A Sociopolitical Model with Governance Externalities,” in 
Margaret Blair and Mark Roe, eds., Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington DC: Brook-
ings Institution Press, 1999).  
  44vide for employee expression in the workplace, but not for effective voice. The outcome 
of the underdeveloped legally-based veto rights of French employees is one where uni-
lateral employer prerogative is widespread.129  
 
     The overarching feature of the German system of labor relations is the detailed legal 
status of the actors and of their rights and responsibilities with the associated mandatory 
structures that provide for a strong foothold for employee involvement irrespective of 
managerial openness. The relationship between employees and other parties is bound 
by law, which severely reduces the ability of management to opt out of agreements. The 
legally-based veto points of German employees are embedded in the system of Codeter-
mination that operates at two levels: the representation of employees on the board of di-
rectors and the legal rights provided at the company level through the works councils. 
The 1976 law on Codetermination provides for equal representation of employees and 
shareholder-elected directors on the supervisory board. Employees and shareholder rep-
resentatives each possess one vote – with the chairman appointed from the shareholder 
side casting the deciding ballot in the event of a tie. The major function of the super-
visory board is to appoint, supervise and replace members of the management board. 
The selection of managers requires a two-thirds majority, thereby insuring a veto power 
for labor. Hard-line managers who are unable to get along with labor are virtually ex-
cluded from the board.130 In addition, the approval (single majority) of the board of di-
rectors is required for numerous corporate actions: approve accounts and profit alloca-
tion, authorize the issue of stock options and of new shares, and approve the erection of 
takeover defenses.131
 
     The second aspect of Codetermination rights refers to an overall extensive system of 
labor participation in corporate affairs through the works councils. Workers in any en-
terprise (or plant) employing more than five employees are entitled by law to elect every 
three years a works council to represent their rights at the firm level. The entire work-
force of an establishment elects work councilors, not only union members. While works 
councils are prohibited to engage in strikes and constitute a distinctive legal entity from 
                                                 
129Michel Goyer and Bob Hancké, “Labour in French Corporate Governance: The Missing Link,” 
in Howard Gospel and Andrew Pendleton, eds., Corporate Governance and Labour Management 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); and Rebecca Gumbrell-McCormick and Richard Hy-
man, “Embedded Collectivism? Workplace Representation in France and Germany,” Industrial 
Relations Journal 37,5 (September 2006): 473-491.  
130Klaus Hopt, “Labor Representation on Corporate Boards: Impacts and Problems for Corporate 
Governance and Economic Integration in Europe,” International Review of Law and Economics 14,2 
(June 1994): 203-214, p. 207.  
131At the same time, however, one must not overstate the influence of labor associated with co-
determined seats on the board of directors. The monitoring of the actions of management by the 
supervisory board has not been extensive. In fact, it is precisely because of the institution of Co-
determination that German managers and shareholders have prevented the supervisory board 
from evolving into an important governance institution. Thus, while codetermined boards insure 
that management cannot introduce unilaterally new measures at the expense of employees, it 
does not give labor adequate means to influence the conduct of the business strategy of the firm. 
For a full discussion, see Mark Roe, “Codetermination and German Securities Markets,” in Mar-
garet Blair and Mark Roe, eds., Employees and Corporate Governance (Washington DC: Brookings In-
stitution Press, 1999).  
  45union members, the great majority of councilors are elected on lists affiliated to the DGB 
– Germany's biggest unions.132 The head employee representative on the supervisory 
board also sits on the works councils. Moreover, the legal rights of works councils are 
both comprehensive and extensive that provide a strong foothold for employees and in-
hibit exclusionary strategies on the part of management (see Table 9). Overall, the legal 
participation rights of works councils are strong in social matters, weaker over personal 
issues, and modest in economic and financial matters. The legal veto rights of works 
councils on issues of job and bonus rates, overtime and the allocation of working hours, 
use of technical devices designed to monitor employees’ performance, or the introduc-
tion of new payment methods prevent German managers from acting unilaterally. In 
fact, the importance of works councils has substantially increased in recent years. The 
heightened volatility of markets and the need to adjust quickly has raised the promi-
nence of firm-level works councils and reduced the importance of national unions. The 
greater flexibility of decentralization of collective bargaining has shifted the locus of col-
lective bargaining, but did not result in unilateral managerial control over firm strate-
gy.133 Works councils have become “co-managers” of the firm in the implementation of 
painful restructuring measures and the elaboration of new strategic business deci-
sions.134
 
     In addition to their legally defined rights, works councils have been able to project 
their influence in two other ways. First, works councils have strategically used their veto 
power in some areas through linkage to other issues where they have weaker Codeter-
mination rights.135 Works councilors have often refrained from exercising their legal 
rights in areas where they are strong in exchange for greater influence on questions cov-
ered only by information rights. For example, the works council at Volkswagen’s Braun-
schweig plant did use its Codetermination rights on working times and wage grades to 
demand expanding the skills and training funds for affected workers in the 1980s.136 The 
second way through which works councils have exercised their influence at the firm 
level is through wage bargaining. The centralization of wage bargaining at the industrial 
level is supplemented by informal negotiation at the firm level through works councils – 
resulting in a substantial wage drift. The effect of centralization of initial wage bargain-
ing combined with the role of works councils at the final stage has prevented German 
                                                 
132See Kathleen Thelen, Unions of Parts: Labor Politics in Postwar Germany, p. 80.  
133Harry Katz, “The Decentralization of Collective Bargaining: A Literature Review and Compar-
ative Analysis,” Industrial and Labor Relations Review 47,1 (October 1993): 3-22; and Kathleen The-
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  46corporations from pursuing a low wage strategy.137 Large companies have been forced 
to compete in non-price competitive market segments capable of sustaining high wages. 
 
Table 9. Rights of the German Works Council According to the Works Constitution Law of 1988 
  Co-Decision (cd), Consultation (cons), 
& Information (inform) 
Rights of the Council 
SOCIAL MATTERS 
Conduct of Employees 
Working Hours 
Wage Payment Procedures 
Holiday Planning 
Installation of Electronic Surveillance Equipment 
Regulations regarding Accident Prevention 


















Planning of Structuring of Jobs, Operations, 
and Working Environment 




Written Employment Contracts* 
Recruiting and Selection Standards* 
Establishment of In-Plant Vocational Training Facilities 
Introduction of Vocational Training Programs 
Implementation of Vocational Training 
















Economic Conditions of the Company, Production 
Situation, Production Program, Financial Situation, 
Marketing Situation, Investment Program, 
Rationalization Plans, New Work Methods,**** 
Reduction or Close-Down of the Company, Transfer of 
the Plant, Mergers, Changes in the Organization and 
the Business Purposes 
Mass Layoff 









* Full Veto Power. 
**These rights hold only for firms with at least twenty employees. Only in specific cases is the 
works council entitled to hiring, classification, transfer, and redeployment. 
***Only in specific cases is the works council entitled to object to a dismissal. 
                                                 
137See Wolfgang Streeck, Social Institutions and Economic Performance; and Kathleen Thelen, Unions 
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  47****Consultation rights regarding the social, personnel, and economic consequences of new work 
methods on employees. 
Source: Stefan Prigge, “A Survey of German Corporate Governance,” in Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kan-
da, Mark Roe, Eddy Wymeersch, and Stefan Prigge, eds. Comparative Corporate Governance: The 
State of the Art and Emerging Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 1013.  
  
     The composition and workings of the works councils have significantly contributed 
to its limited role in France. The works councils are composed of fifteen elected council-
ors for companies with over 1000 employees, one representative from each union or-
ganization present in the firm, the CEO, and two members of management. The CEO con-
trols the agenda of the meeting and has veto power over its direction – thereby contrib-
uting to its lack of credibility for employees.138 Moreover, the power and influence of the 
works councils in France remain limited despite their extensive information rights. In 
fact, these rights are more extensive than in Germany since they cover several spheres 
(see Table 10). But the legislation on works councils assigns no veto rights that might en-
courage bargaining and serious discussion.139 French employees have no opportunity to 
link their information rights to other issues where they could block change. Finally, the 
information provided by management is often delivered late and is of little usefulness. 
The fulfillment of legal requirements imposed on management is characterized by for-
malism and has forced work councilors to sue management on numerous occasions.140
 
Table 10. Legal Rights of Works Councils 

















• • •  •  (•)
GERMANY 
Works Council 
• •       
U.K. 
Shop Stewards 
• • •    • 
SWEDEN 
Shop Stewards 
• • •     
Source: ETUC (2001), Benchmarking Working in Europe, p. 66. 
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  48B) Training and the Building of Firm Competencies  
 
     The second key firm-level institutions are those related to the process of skill forma-
tion and certification of the workforce, i.e., training. The matching of jobs and worker 
competencies in the two countries shapes, in different ways, the ability of management 
to implement restructuring measures in a unilateral manner. The German economy is 
organized around the presence of a majority of employees with certifiable skills as a 
strategy for firms to develop their capabilities. By contrast, French companies build their 
competencies around mid-level management and technical specialists rather than in-
vesting in the improvement of the skills of the bulk of the workforce.  
 
     The divergent method of coupling tasks and competencies is first reflected in the role 
of vocational training in the two countries. Vocational training, in particular, is promi-
nent in Germany and relatively neglected in France. The German system of occupational 
training is both prominent and autonomous – all in contrast to the French situation.141 A 
substantially higher proportion of workers in Germany have received some vocational 
training. In 1995, the average number of trainees for large German firms (over 500 em-
ployees) was six per 100 workers, with a retention rate of 85 percent.142 The correspond-
ing figure for large French companies was 2.2 per hundred workers in 1996, with a re-
tention rate of 35 percent.143
 
     The different patterns by which competencies and jobs are matched in the two coun-
tries are also visible throughout the entire career of employees – and are not simply lim-
ited to vocational training. The qualification of German employees determines the defi-
nition of jobs. The access to a majority of jobs in large firms is based upon the holding of 
a recognized diploma or qualification – most often acquired as part of a vocational or on 
the job training program. Training is invariably a prerequisite for employment and pro-
motion.144 The influence of firm-level works councils is paramount, as they have consis-
tently insisted that specific types of occupations should be associated with correspond-
ing levels of skills. Managers cannot move employees within the firm without prior ap-
propriate training. It is also interesting to note that mid-level managers and foremen 
must also undergo specific training in order to be appointed and promoted. As a result, 
the promotion process in German firms reflects the acquisition of the required technical 
expertise and completion of the relevant training. This process ensures that the authority 
of projects managers rests on technical competence, not based on their access to higher 
levels of managerial authority. By contrast, French employers use their own criteria to 
define jobs to which employees adapt either in training programs (blue-collar) or 
through the obtaining of university diplomas (white collar), the promotion system of 
French firms being a reflection of a change of status unilaterally decided by top manage-
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  49ment rather than through the acquisition of technical expertise. The relationship be-
tween training and promotion is reversed in France. Management selects workers to be 
promoted and then provides them with the appropriate training.145 French firms 
provide in-house training for employees who usually have substantial experience at the 
firm. Attempts by state officials to impose the recognition of training (vocational or on-
the-job) as a prerequisite for holding jobs have encountered strong opposition from 
employers.146
 
     The German training system, moreover, is well established and autonomous from 
managerial interference – in addition to being prominent. The presence of a majority of 
workers with certifiable skills in the German economy is legally based and protected 
from outside intervention.147 First, a high number of jobs require certifiable skills that 
are acquired in vocational training programs. Second, industrial or regional chambers 
must certify the training programs of firms, and any change in the content of training 
certification – the modification of an existing certification or the introduction of a new 
one – requires the approval of a body of experts in which national industrial unions (not 
works councils) occupy half of the seats. In turn, works councils have been instrumental 
in setting training standards as well as overseeing the implementation of training pro-
grams in the firm. The veto power of employees on the board of the industrial and re-
gional training commissions prevents significant modifications of the system and en-
sures a stable demand for certified employees. Third, firm-level works councils possess 
full veto power over hiring, thereby constraining managerial ability to rely on outside 
experts.148 New jobs must be offered first to the current members of the workforce. The 
inability of German employers to rely on external labor markets in their restructuring 
strategy – i.e., fire current workers, hire new ones – originated in a deal struck between 
the German labor movement and employers in the early 1980s. German employers were 
compensated for the closure of the external labor markets, as works councils took the 
lead in designing and implementing programs of internal flexibility in the firm.149 In 
other words, the position of organized labor and the works councils in the training sys-
tem has enabled them to impose significant constraints on hiring new employees when a 
company scaled back its activities to a few core competencies: since new training pro-
grams have to be approved by an expert body in which organized labor holds half of the 
seats, they have de facto veto power over these programs. The institutions of training 
constrain management on several fronts: skills are a prerequisite for jobs, management 
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  50must provide the relevant training to employees, the content of these programs must be 
certified by an outside body where labor possesses a veto, and the hiring of new em-
ployees with the requisite skills is subject to the approval of works councils.  
 
     By contrast, the development of the core competencies of French firms is not based on 
the skills of the bulk of the workforce. The educational system remains the primary 
mechanism by which employees are assigned to skilled positions, with vocational and 
on-the-job training occupying an inferior status.150 The French case is characterized by 
the absence of legal requirements to assign specific jobs to workers with certifiable skills. 
First, attempts by state officials to impose the recognition of vocational training as a pre-
requisite for holding specific jobs have been successfully opposed by French employ-
ers.151 Managers use their own criteria to define jobs to which employees adapt either 
through participation in training programs (blue-collar) or through obtaining university 
diplomas (white-collar). The content of training and the place of employees in the pro-
duction process represent areas of pure managerial prerogative.152 Second, boards of ex-
perts (business associations and employee committees) on training play a simple consul-
tative role.153 At the firm level, works councils possess only information rights as em-
ployers must specify how funds raised from tax levies will be spent. In the case of voca-
tional training, moreover, it is the Ministry of Education that is responsible for the elabo-
ration of the standards. Third, firm-level works councils possess limited information 
rights on the hiring of new staff – not full veto power that could prevent employers from 
replacing current workers with new employees.154 Relying on outside experts has, in 
fact, proven to be a privileged strategy of adjustment for French companies.155  
 
C. Work Organization and the Segmentation of Activities  
 
     The third major difference between the organization of the workplace in France and 
Germany concerns the extent to which activities are segmented, i.e., the degree of mana-
gerial control over the organization of the production process, especially in regard to 
how employers rely on the bulk of the workforce in organizing and carrying out tasks.156 
The French case is characterized by the segmentation of production activities and re-
sponsibilities between blue-collar employees and managers, a rather rigid but flexible 
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  51system of rules, and an emphasis on narrow and specialized skills.157 Firms rely on the 
presence of rules that regulate the nature of the tasks to be accomplished – rather than 
the functions to be performed – to organize the production process.158 The implementa-
tion of the business strategy is accomplished through numerous sets of carefully defined 
rules designed to specify the terms of exchange among parties. The organization of work 
is divided into fragmentary tasks. Highly qualified engineers elaborate the conception of 
products and employees carry out the tasks following instructions.159 The organization 
of the workplace in France results in a high supervisor-to-worker ratio and a strict divi-
sion of authority between management and employees.160 The separation between plan-
ning and execution limits the ability of blue-collar employees to participate in the con-
duct of the business strategy of the firm, since they possess a limited view of its opera-
tions. This limitation, in turn, contributes to the concentration of power at the top of the 
managerial hierarchy.  
 
     The initial rationale for this specific organization of the workplace in France is best 
explained by Crozier’s notion of the avoidance of face-to-face relationships and Hof-
stede’s classification of France as a country in which individualism ranks high as a val-
ue.161 The French propensity for uncertainty avoidance, combined with the antagonistic 
nature of industrial relations, led firms in the first three postwar decades to adopt 
mechanisms designed both to prevent the involvement of employees in the conduct of 
the strategy of the firm as well as to protect them from unpredictable and unwarranted 
intrusion. However, the advent of firm-level flexibility and the increasing importance of 
microprocessor technology in the late 1970s did raise the costs associated with the main-
tenance of this separation between elaboration and implementation of tasks. The need 
for companies to adapt quickly to a changing environment requires a change of attitude 
by workers.162 Employees must enter into a dialogue with management and different 
functional departments in order to achieve flexibility, quality and speed. The avoidance 
of face-to-face dialogue is no longer sustainable in this context. Consequently, greater 
participation by employees in the modification of their environment has taken place in-
side large French companies in the last twenty years.163 Employees are given a greater 
choice of tasks by management. They have become more involved in problem solving 
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  52and contribute in monitoring and evaluating performance, as more is expected of them 
from management.164 Nonetheless, the separation between planning and execution is 
still predominant in France and the organization of work has not lost its key fordist com-
ponent.165 Shop-floor restructuring in the last fifteen years might have provided for 
greater employee involvement in monitoring and evaluating performance, but does not 
allow for their influence over what tasks they perform and the conditions under which 
work takes place. Hierarchical relationships are still predominant inside French firms, 
despite the greater involvement of employees.166
 
     The organization of work in Germany, on the other hand, is more straightforward 
and characterized by the application of rules to broad functions, rather than by trying to 
predict all contingencies on the shop floor through heavy reliance on explicit instruc-
tions.167 The predominance of employees with certifiable skills and the subsequent reli-
ance of management on the bulk of the workforce as a strategy to develop the capabili-
ties of the firm constitute critical factors that have bridged the gap between conception 
and implementation in Germany.168 The role of training is particularly important in this 
process, as employees are grouped according to the types of qualifications they possess, 
and tasks are organized according to their skill requirements.169 The outcome is in which 
the institutional arrangements of the workplace are characterized by blurred organiza-
tional boundaries and reduced segmentation, the delegation of control over the nature of 
work processes resulting in the involvement of employees in many tasks, and low re-
liance on formal rules in evaluating performance.170
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D. The Autonomy and Competencies of Workers in Problem-Solving Tasks 
  
     The fourth firm-level institutional difference between France and Germany deals with 
the degree of autonomy for employees on the shop floor. I distinguish between the sepa-
ration of task execution and implementation (covered in the previous subsection) on the 
one hand, from the extent to which workers exercise discretion over how tasks are per-
formed and their ability to contribute to problem solving for two reasons. First, as noted 
by Kumazawa and Yamada, institutional arrangements in large Japanese firms enable 
employees to have some influence over the standardization process, but remain power-
less to shape the conditions under which work takes place once job tasks are standard-
ized.171 A similar argument has been made for France. The greater involvement of em-
ployees has not been match by a corresponding willingness of management to share au-
thority.172 Second, the ability of employees to contribute to problem solving is not inde-
pendent of the development of their organizational careers. The narrow skills of French 
employees limit their contribution to problem solving and the fulfilment of the organiza-
tional goals of the firm, despite greater managerial expectations.  
 
     The autonomy and competencies of employees in problem solving tasks in large com-
panies also sharply contrast between the two countries. The institutional arrangements 
of workplace organization in Germany provide for substantial autonomy in the defini-
tion of tasks and autonomy in their implementation.173 High levels of authority sharing, 
and the involvement of workers beyond the managerial hierarchy in the elaboration of 
the strategy of the firm link the fate of employees to that of management.174 Skilled em-
ployees possess strong incentives to develop problem solving capabilities, given the 
firm-specific stakes of their organizational career development. Moreover, the capabili-
ties of German employees are shaped in a profound manner by the content of their 
skills. The involvement of employer associations in the certification process ensures that 
skills would be relevant to their strategic needs. The involvement of national union rep-
resentatives in the certification process ensures that skills will be of general character 
and fit with broad job description.175 The content of the skill certification of employees is 
not tightly connected to specific jobs. National unions, and IG Metall in particular, have 
been adamant in insisting that skills should be broad rather than narrowly task-
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  54connected. Finally, the use of job rotations enhances the degree of polyvalence of Ger-
man employees, thereby increasing their capabilities to engage in problem-solving 
tasks.176 Job rotation allows companies to rely on employees with broad skills to tackle 
shifts in work demands.177 German employees are open to job rotations across depart-
ments and divisions since their career development is linked to their ability to contribute 
to the success of the firm.178 The degree of polyvalence of workers is high since the or-
ganization of the workplace favors the acquisition of broad based skills.179
 
     The institutional arrangements of workplace organization in France, by contrast, do 
not contribute in a significant manner to the development of the firm-specific problem 
solving capabilities of employees. First, job rotations in French enterprises are lower 
than in Germany.180 The working life of employees tends to be associated with specific 
tasks, therefore leading to substantial segmentation of work roles and greater functional 
specialization. Second, job demarcations are stricter. The segmentation of the activities of 
the firm between elaboration and execution and the narrow skills of French employees 
entail that they possess a limited view of the totality of the operations of the firm and 
rely on top management for coordination. Their ability to develop firm-specific problem 
solving capabilities are seriously limited since they have a limited view of the operations 
of the firm.181 The process of problem solving is management-led with the involvement 
of a few highly qualified technical specialists. 
 
E. Firm-Level Institutional Arrangements and Paths of Adjustment  
 
     The firm-level institutional arrangements of German firms place serious constraints 
on the ability of managers to conduct the business strategy of the firm in a unilateral 
manner. Nonetheless, companies have exhibited flexibility in adjusting internally to 
shifts in demand on world markets – although not in a manner that fits well with the 
preferences of actively managed mutual funds (and hedge funds). German firms have 
traditionally responded to the volatility of markets by redeploying the capabilities of 
employees to new uses – instead of relying on firings and other types of market-based 
adjustments.182 This adjustment process is possible because the skills of employees are 
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  55broad enough to accomplish a wide range of tasks in a context where labor laws make it 
difficult to proceed to dismissals. Broad skills and blurred organizational boundaries 
provide employees a fairly complete view of the operations of the firm. There is substan-
tial scope for the involvement of skilled workers in problem-solving activities.183 Train-
ing curricula and regulations are broadly defined to avoid overspecialization in narrow 
skill assignments and the blurring of boundaries and responsibilities allows employees 
to switch between different functions. The skills of employees shape their ability to solve 
problems that, in turn, present management with opportunities to reorganize the pro-
duction process. The volatility of markets punishes firms where the skills of the work-
force cannot be applied to a wide range of rapidly changing and previously unknown 
tasks. The possession of broad skills by employees provides German companies with the 
capacity for retooling in response to new market demands.184  
 
     This strategy, however, does not fit well with the preferences and tactics of actively 
managed mutual/hedge funds. The redeployment of the skills of employees to new eco-
nomic circumstances involves a process of experimentation to ensure that the certified 
skills are relevant to the production needs of companies. This learning-by-doing strategy 
is unlikely to be accomplished as rapidly as external mechanisms of adjustment that rely 
on dismissals and other types of market-based adjustment. This is particularly true in 
times of rapid product and technology change that require a radical transformation in 
skill content. The German system is plagued by important short-term rigidities. The in-
troduction of a new product or technology invariably gives rise to jurisdictional disputes 
between various employees.185 The respective role to be performed by each of the skill 
category in the introduction of new products must be bargained out.186
 
     The  centralized  and  functionally  differentiated work organization of large French 
firms, on the other hand, militates against experimentation with skill redeployment. It 
instead entails a separation between categories of workers: a small number of highly 
qualified employees sealed off from the implementation process, and the bulk of the 
workforce composed of low-skilled workers with narrowly specialized tasks that cannot 
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  56be redeployed with unpredictable shifts in demand.187 The importance of the failure of 
state officials to impose the recognition of training as a prerequisite for holding specific 
jobs becomes apparent in this context. Differences in training between France and Ger-
many are not simply a quantitative issue – i.e., more workers possessing certified skills 
in the latter. Despite state regulation that imposes a legal obligation on French firms to 
spend a percentage of their wage bill on training, flows of funds have been concentrated 
on managerial staff with already high levels of skill, not for the improvement of the gen-
eral skills of the majority of employees.188 The sharp segmentation of production activi-
ties and responsibilities between blue-collar employees and managers, a rigid system of 
rules, and the emphasis on narrow and specialized skills limit the ability of workers to 
participate in the conduct of the business strategy, thereby lessening the dependence of 
management on the skills of the bulk of the workforce.189   
 
IV. Alternative Explanations: Causal Complexity and Qualitative Methods  
 
     The analysis of the investment strategies of institutional investors in France and Ger-
many constitutes an ideal testing ground for the issue of complexity in qualitative meth-
ods. It is highly revealing of the nature of causation in social sciences. This study faces 
the typical problem of the comparison of observed cases limited in both their diversity 
and in relation to the number of potential explanatory variables. Moreover, many of the 
variables relevant to the research question of this paper potentially co-vary, thereby 
heightening the difficulties associated with the process of logical inference. But quali-
tative research methods are also well placed to deal with these issues, having high-
lighted the importance of complex causation, i.e., the analysis of outcomes in terms of 
several combinations of intersections and conditions. Quantitative and statistical meth-
ods, especially in low “n” cases, might be less well suited to tackle phenomena resulting 
from multiple causes since these events are not combinatorial.190
  
     The research design of this paper is composed of the following elements. The study 
variables are the differences in the strategic investment portfolio of actively managed 
mutual funds in France and Germany (dependent variable) and the firm-level institu-
tional arrangements of workplace organization (independent variable). I divide the con-
trol variables into two groups. First, I refer to five constant background variables: Euro-
pean Union membership, adoption of the single currency, removal of capital controls, 
size of the national economy, and a political climate quite hostile to the introduction of 
non-negotiated shareholder value strategies. These five potential explanations failed to 
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188Pepper Culpepper, Creating Cooperation: How States Develop Human Capital in Europe, p. 57.  
189See Marc Maurice, François Sellier, and Jean-Jacques Silvestre, The Social Foundations of Indus-
trial Power: A Comparison of France and Germany, pp. 59-90; and Arndt Sorge, The Global and the 
Local: Understanding the Dialectics of Business Systems, pp. 160-162. 
190However, the monopoly of qualitative studies for patterns characterized by causal complexity 
is somewhat artificial. Causal complexity constitutes an ideal problem for statistical methodology 
if viewed through the lens of the relative importance of conjunctural causation versus that of sub-
stitutability. For an analysis of causal complexity through the use of statistical methods, see Bear 
Braumoeller, “Causal Complexity and the Study of Politics,” Political Analysis 11, 3 (Summer 
2003): 209-233.  
  57co-vary with my dependent variable – thereby opening the way for them to be dis-
carded. Second, I analyze three alternative explanations that co-vary with my dependent 
variable: degree of internationalization of firms, legal protection of minority sharehold-
ers and ownership structure of companies, and the educational background and career 
development of German top executives. The presence of co-variation among these three 
alternative explanations and my dependent variable requires a research design that ac-
counts for complex causation phenomena. The results of the qualitative research design 
of this paper highlight that firm-level key institutions of workplace organization consti-
tute the single most important variable to account for the differences in the ability of 
French and German firms to attract funds from short-term, impatient investors – even if 
this is not the only cause for why short-term oriented institutional investors acquire an 
equity stake in a listed company. To show convincingly that institutions matter, this 
exercise requires the specification of both causal effects as well as the dynamics of the 
interaction among these institutional variables. In particular, I argue that institutional 
differences between France and Germany impact on the dynamics of logical inference. 
Institutional frameworks shape what is a necessary/sufficient condition in a specific set-
ting – with differences being observed across countries. The outcome is the achievement 
of analytical leverage whereby variation on the values of my key independent variable 
results in a large variance on the values taken by my dependent variable, illustrating the 
important explanatory power of this framework.191 What drives the investment strate-
gies of actively managed mutual funds? The organization of this section of the paper is 
divided in four parts. First, I present the features of the qualitative research design of 
this paper. There are five building blocks to my qualitative research design: method of 
difference, control for the spurious effects on my independent variable, the impact of the 
institutionally-based varieties of capitalism perspective on conjunctural causation and 
substitutability, methodology of necessary conditions, and most likely case components. 
In the following three sections, I compare the insightfulness of my varieties of capitalism 
institutionally inspired argument with three co-varying alternative explanations: degree 
of internationalization of firms, legal protection of minority shareholders and ownership 
structure of companies, and the educational background and career development of 
German top executives.  
 
A) Qualitative Research Design 
 
1)  Method of Difference  
 
     The first methodological building block of the qualitative research design of this pa-
per is the method of difference. This investigative strategy is characterized by the com-
parison of cases with similar and constant background features on a first set of control 
variables combined with changing values taken by the dependent and independent vari-
ables.192 The method of difference is well suited to the presence of fairly uniform back-
                                                 
191Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba, Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 29-31; Steven Van Evera, 
Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 17-
18.  
192For excellent analyses of the role of the method of difference in qualitative studies using a small 
number of cases, see James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macro-
  58ground characteristics between cases since it reduces the number of candidate causes. 
The study variables of this paper are the differences in the investment portfolio of active-
ly managed mutual funds in France and Germany (DV) and the firm-level institutional 
arrangements of workplace organization (IV). The similarities of the background charac-
teristics of these two cases are European Union membership, adoption of the single cur-
rency, removal of capital controls, size of the economy, and the rather hostile political 
opposition to foreign takeovers and short-term movements of capital associated with 
shareholder value demands that translate into painful firm restructuring. European 
Union and Euro zone membership control for competition, trade, and interest rate poli-
cies;193 removal of capital controls serves to eliminate the role of policymakers in 
regulating capital flows;194 the comparable size of the two economies is associated with a 
similar degree of exposure to foreign trade; and the political climate of these two 
countries is such that fund managers must take into consideration the fact that the 
pursuit of company strategies for the sole interests of shareholders is highly unpopular 
as compared to the United Kingdom and the United States.195
 
     The essence of the method of the difference is about the identification of invariant 
patterns of association.196 The presence of variation on the dependent variable cannot be 
accounted by stability (or incongruent variations) on the values taken by the alternative 
explanations, thereby enabling the researcher to investigate a congruent cross-case dif-
ference that causes the above variation. The method of difference performs a useful role 
by introducing parsimony to the qualitative analysis – the lack of covariance between 
the values taken by the dependent variable and the background alternative explanations 
allows for a process of elimination to operate. The validity of the logical inference be-
tween the dependent and independent variables is strengthened by the elimination of 
similar background characteristics for the two cases. The method of difference, however, 
is plagued by three shortcomings that necessitate that its use in qualitative strategy be 
complemented with other tools. First, the method of difference is always open to the cri-
ticism that important explanatory variables were not included in the analysis. I deal with 
this objection through the examination of three other alternative explanations: legal per-
spective and the ownership structure of companies, degree of internationalization, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
causal Analysis,” American Journal of Sociology 104,4 (January 1999): 1154-1196; and Steven Van 
Evera, Ibid., pp. 23-24, 50-55. 
193See Jeffry Frieden, “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of 
Global Finance,” International Organization 45,4 (Autumn 1991): 425-451; Jeffry Frieden, “Making 
Commitments: France and Italy in the European Monetary System, 1979-1985,” in Barry Eichen-
green and Jeffry Frieden, eds., The Political Economy of European Monetary Integration (Boulder CO: 
Westview Press, 2001); David Soskice, “Macroeconomics and Varieties of Capitalism,” in Bob 
Hancké, Martin Rhodes, and Mark Thatcher, eds., Beyond Varieties of Capitalism: Conflict, Contra-
dictions, and Complementarities in the European Economy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007); 
and Stephen Wilks, “Competition Policy,” in Helen Wallace, William Wallace, and Mark Pollack, 
eds., Policy-Making in the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005).  
194See Rawi Abdelal, Capital Rules: The Construction of Global Finance (Cambridge MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2007); and John Goodman and Louis Pauly, “The Obsolescence of Capital Con-
trols? Economic Management in an Age of Global Markets.”  
195See Mark Roe, “Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control.”  
196James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Inferences in Small-N Analysis,” Sociological Methods and 
Research 28,4 (May 2000): 387-424.  
  59the educational background and career development of German top executives. This is-
sue also serves as a reminder that the methodological insights of the method of differ-
ence are best captured when combined with a rich narrative analysis that provides a de-
tailed and nuanced understanding of the dependent variable.197
 
     Second, the method of difference has a deterministic understanding of causation. The 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables is understood as one of 
necessary and sufficient condition given the congruence between their changing values 
– and the rejection of alternative explanations with constant values. The method of dif-
ference is not well suited to processes of complex causation.198 The strategy of identify-
ing invariant patterns of association provides a significant contribution to qualitative 
strategies of causal inference, namely by enabling the researcher to demonstrate that in-
variant alternative explanations cannot constitute necessary causes. The uniform case 
conditions on five key dimensions – European Union membership, adoption of the sin-
gle currency, removal of capital controls, exposure to trade, and political opposition to 
unmediated shareholder value – make it highly unlikely that they could in themselves 
serve as a key causal variables. But it does not imply that the firm-level institutional ar-
rangements of workplace organization (IV) constitute a necessary and sufficient condi-
tion to account for the differences in the investment strategies of hedge and mutual 
funds in France and Germany. The conceptualization of causation as a necessary and 
sufficient process creates two problems for the method of difference: the dependent vari-
able could be either present or absent in the event of a sufficient cause being absent; the 
dependent variable could be either present or absent in the event of the necessary cause 
being present.199 The method of difference, therefore, needs to be complemented by an 
analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions.  
 
     Third, the acknowledgement of complex causation is not sufficient for the validity of 
the strategy of causal inference associated with the method of difference. As previously 
mentioned, I argue that short-term, impatient institutional investors can pursue a top-
down investment strategy whereby fund managers build their portfolio based on the 
analysis of macroeconomic factors associated with different countries or a bottom-up in-
vestment strategy whereby the characteristics of firms play a fundamental role in their 
decisions to buy and sell. The acknowledgment of the multiplicity of investment strate-
gies fits well with my argument, namely that that the firm-level institutional arrange-
ments of workplace organization constitute the most significant variable to account for 
the variation on my dependent variable. I do not seek to account for all of the instances 
of investment by hedge and mutual funds; I aim at accounting for “most” of the vari-
ation.200 However, this concession is still insufficient since it gives rise to a double stan-
                                                 
197The pioneer work combining the method of difference and a rich narrative analysis remains 
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 
198See Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), pp. 36-42. 
199James Mahoney, “Strategies of Causal Inferences in Small-N Analysis,” pp. 392. 
200A similar strategy is used by Thomas Ertman in his analysis of the development of early mod-
ern states in Europe. See Thomas Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Me-
dieval and Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
  60dard: how can I reject alternative explanations by arguing that they cannot fully explain 
the variation on the dependent variable while preserving my own independent vari-
able?201
 
2) Control of Spurious Effects 
 
     A central concern for qualitative social scientists is to control for the possibly spurious 
effects of other variables when establishing causal inference. How could I evaluate objec-
tions claiming that my argument of the importance of firm-level institutional arrange-
ments of workplace organization is spurious due to omitted variable(s)? Two criteria 
have been suggested for assessing the presence of bias due to omitted variable(s).202 
First, the absence of a correlation between the control variables and the independent var-
iable lessens considerably the danger of spuriousness on the latter. The independent var-
iable is therefore not likely to be the byproduct of an alternative omitted explanation. 
The emphasis placed in this paper on the importance of firm-level institutional arrange-
ments is further strengthened by their historical position in the two varieties of capi-
talism. The question of capital mobility in the form of Anglo-American institutional in-
vestors might be a recent phenomenon but the institutionally-based concentration (dis-
persion) of power in the French (German) CEO is not something new. The process by 
which large French and German firms develop and sustain their innovative capabilities 
has remained largely unchanged for the last thirty years despite important transforma-
tions in corporate governance and industrial relations.203 The coordination of activities 
in French firms is characterized by the vesting of unilateral authority in top managers 
and senior technical staff. The bulk of the workforce does not contribute to the devel-
opment of the organizational capabilities of the firm.204 In the coordination of activities 
of German companies, by contrast, authority is shared with the bulk of the workforce to 
a substantial degree. The development of innovative capabilities takes place on the basis 
of the long-term contribution of skilled employees through institutionalized career 
paths.205 These long-term differences in the values taken by the key independent vari-
able substantially reduce the risks that the three alternative explanations – degree of in-
ternationalization, legal perspective and ownership structure, and educational back-
ground and career development of German top executives – could account for the ori-
gins of these critical firm-level institutional arrangements.206 Moreover, the absence of 
                                                 
201See James Mahoney, “Nominal, Ordinal, and Narrative Appraisal in Macrocausal Analysis,” 
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  61spuriousness between variables is also driven by the absence of compelling logical argu-
ments: internationalized multinationals display different modes of internal organiza-
tion;207 similarities in managerial orientation (financial/functional) can be associated 
with differences on the institutional structures of the decision-making process and vice-
versa;208 and the broad historical similarities in the protection of minority shareholders 
in French and German corporate law have been associated with continuing differences 
in the organization of work.209 The consideration of the three alternative explanations – 
degree of internationalization, legal protection of minority shareholders and ownership 
structure, and educational background and career development of German top execu-
tives – also allows for a partial control of potentially spurious effects on my key inde-
pendent variable.  
 
     The second criterion for controlling spuriousness effects requires that the omitted var-
iables have no effect on the dependent variable. This criterion is hard to sustain – the de-
gree of internationalization of firms, the extent to which France and Germany protect 
minority shareholders, and the educational background and career development of Ger-
man top executives – co-vary with the investment choices of hedge and mutual funds. 
Therefore, I need to tackle phenomenon of causal complexity and issues of necessary 
and sufficient conditions in order to demonstrate the insightfulness of my argument 
about the importance of firm-level institutional arrangements.  
 
3) Causal Complexity 
 
     The third methodological building block of the qualitative research design of this pa-
per is the institutionally contingent nature of the necessary or sufficient conditions asso-
ciated with the independent variable and the alternative explanations of this study. I 
rely below on some of the newly elaborated procedures for testing hypotheses about ne-
cessary and sufficient causes. However, and to anticipate the empirical results, the pre-
sentation of such techniques is theoretically embedded in a context where the institu-
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  62tionally based varieties of capitalism theoretical perspective matters for the operationali-
zation of the logic of inference across advanced capitalist economies. The implication of 
the importance of different institutional frameworks is that what is a necessary or suffi-
cient condition differs across national settings. In other words, the nature of the interac-
tion between variables in a complex causation process is contingent on the institutional 
context.  
 
     What is causal complexity?210 Formal definitions are often lacking because of the slip-
pery nature of the concept. The analysis of causal complexity in qualitative methods is 
characterized by the dominant use of two separate dimensions: conjunctural causation 
and substitutability.211 Conjunctural causation refers to a situation whereby only the 
combination of multiple conditions will produce a specific outcome: X1 and X2 produce 
Y. The impact of one institution or variable depends on the presence of others. Ragin re-
fers to conjunctural causation as cases where “an outcome results from the combinations 
of conditions.”212 A first implication of conjunctural causation is that the independent 
variables are necessary without ever being sufficient. A second implication is that there 
are multiple paths to the non-occurrence of the dependent variable since only the combi-
nation of X1 and X2 has a causal impact.213 A third implication is that a change on the 
value taken by one variable can have dramatic consequences, the absence of one factor 
being sufficient for the occurrence of a different value on the dependent variable. For the 
varieties of capitalism literature, the process of conjunctural causation conceptualizes in-
stitutional arrangements as interacting to complement each other. As a result, the pres-
ence of stability or the occurrence of change in the broader institutional framework of 
countries cannot be inferred from change in any one institution.214 The varieties of capi-
talism perspective highlights the pitfalls associated with piecemeal institutional change 
given that the effects of a single institutional variable on the overall operation of the po-
litical economy vary with the presence of other institutions that are already in place. 
 
     Substitutability, in contrast, refers to the multiple and independent paths to a com-
mon outcome: X1 or X2 produces Y. The concept of substitutability highlights the pres-
ence of multiple and independent causal paths. It resonates well with Merton’s concept 
of functional equivalency.215 Different institutional clusters can result in a similar out-
come. A first implication is that the key individual independent variables are always 
sufficient, but never necessary. A second implication is that there are multiple paths to 
the occurrence of the dependent variable since the presence of either (or both) X1 and X2 
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  63has a causal impact.216 A third implication is that a change in the value taken by one of 
the independent variables does not necessarily entail dramatic consequences, the pres-
ence of one factor being sufficient for the occurrence of a different value on the depend-
ent variable. The extent to which a change in one independent variable impacts on the 
dependent variable decreases as the value taken by the other independent variable in-
creases (and vice versa).217 For the Varieties of Capitalism literature, the concept of sub-
stitutability calls for a greater theoretical sophistication between the character of coordi-
nation and the institutional framework that supports it.218 Variation in the latter does not 
necessarily entail change in the former.  
 
4) Testing Procedures for Necessary and Sufficient Conditions  
 
     The phenomenon of complex causation requires specific methodological tools for 
causal and descriptive inference that enable the researcher to test for necessary and suffi-
cient conditions. A surge of publications in the last ten years has addressed the meth-
odological implications of necessary and sufficient conditions – two often overlooked 
concepts whose properties are apparently self-evident.219 These methodological tools 
operate in two stages. First, the researcher seeks to establish whether a variable is a nec-
essary or sufficient condition for an outcome to occur. Second, and in the presence of co-
variation between the tested variable and the outcome, the focus shifts to establishing 
whether the tested variable is trivially necessary or trivially sufficient. Triviality implies 
that the variable possesses little or no importance to account for the presence (or ab-
sence) of the dependent variable. Several techniques exist to tackle these issues.  
 
     First, the use of “typological theory” provides for an assessment of whether variables 
are systematically matched in a pattern of correspondence consistent with necessary or 
sufficient causation.220 Assume a 2x2 matrix with the different cells representing the 
different values (absent=0; present=1) taken by the dichotomous tested variable (X) and 
the dependent variable (Y). The use of typological theory enables the investigator to 
credibly argue that a given variable (X) is not necessary for an outcome if it is both pre-
sent and absent among a group of cases where the dependent variable is present. In 
other words, the distribution of observations in cells III and IV of figure 1 would provide 
the significant insight that X is not a necessary condition since the dependent variable is 
always present no matter the value taken by X. Likewise, the researcher would be in a 
strong position to conclude that a given variable (X) is not sufficient for an outcome if it 
is present in both cases where the dependent variable is present and absent. In other 
words, the distribution of observations in cells II and IV of figure 1 indicates that the 
constant occurrence of X is not always associated with Y being present.  
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  64     Second, the process by which the researcher concludes that a variable is a necessary 
condition for an outcome to occur is greatly facilitated if one clearly establishes its speci-
fic theoretical properties and empirical implications. Braumoeller and Goertz present 
two procedures for assessing the notion of necessity.221 The first proposition conceptual-
izes X as a necessary condition for Y if X is always present when Y occurs (see figure 2). 
The presence of Y in the absence of X would seriously shatter the necessary character of 
the latter. The second proposition conceptualizes X as a necessary condition for Y if Y 
does not occur in the absence of X (see figure 2). In other words, the absence of X is suffi-






Y=0 I  II 
Y=1 III  IV 
 
     The above discussion generates three implications for the testing of necessary condi-
tions. The first implication is that the probability of cases falling into the third cell (X=0, 
Y=1) should be close to zero in statistical terms for necessary conditions. The second im-
plication is that the collection of observations from cell II (X=1, Y=0) is unneeded from 
the perspective of testing for necessary conditions, thereby illustrating the mistake in the 
utilization of data from the four cells. The third implication, which follows from the 
previous two, stipulates that the bulk of the observations found in cells I and IV (X=0, 
Y=0; X=1, Y=1) confirms the hypothesized relationship of necessity between X and Y.  
 
Figure 2 
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Source: Bear Braumoeller and Gary Goertz, “The Methodology of Necessary Conditions,” Ameri-
can Journal of Political Science 44,4 (October 2000): 846.  
 
     Third,  the  empirical  evaluation  of  necessity requires an additional step – namely 
whether X is trivially necessary. The concept of trivialness refers to the degree of impor-
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  65tance of a necessary condition. The low (or absence of) importance of a trivial necessary 
condition lies in its inability to account for the values taken by the dependent variable. 
Braumoeller and Goertz refer to a trivial necessary condition as one being present in all 
cases in the universe of analysis – both in the presence or absence of the dependent vari-
able. The distribution of observations associated with a trivial necessary condition 
would fall in either two sets of cells: lack of variation on the independent variable (II and 
IV of figure 1) or lack of variation on the dependent variable (I and II of figure 1). In 
other words, the occurrence of a trivial necessary condition follows from the fact that 
one the variable does not vary in statistical terms. Trivialness becomes more likely as the 
number of cases in either cell I and IV of figure 1 (X=0, Y=0; X=1, Y=1) decreases toward 
zero. To put it differently, the absence of trivialness requires significant variation in both 
the distributions in the Y=0 and Y=1 rows (problem of the lack of variation on the inde-
pendent variable) and in the X=0 and X=1 rows (problem of the lack of variation on the 
dependent variable). Finally, it is also important to note that trivialness constitutes an 
empirical, rather than theoretical, concept. It refers to the inability of X to account for the 
values taken by Y, not that there is no logical connection between the two variables. 
Therefore, the notion of triviality is to be distinguished from the concept of irrelevancy 
whereby Y never occurs no matter the value taken by X.  
  
 5) Most-Likely Case Components  
 
     A final dimension of the qualitative research design of this paper is the use of critical 
case studies for casting doubts on the explanatory power of alternative variables. This 
concept was developed by Harry Eckstein, who sought to build case studies that would 
provide definitive evidence for testing a theory.222 I focus in this paper on the notion of 
most-likely case components – a specific dimension of critical case studies. Most-likely 
cases are designed around the notion that the values taken by an independent variable 
strongly posit a specific outcome – and that evidence contrary to the predicted outcome 
cannot simply be considered deviant or due to chance. The assumption is that the valid-
ity of alternative explanations depends on the extent to which the test the theory has 
failed is arduous. Therefore, most likely cases are tailored to cast doubts on a theory – 
the absence of the predicted outcome being sufficient to seriously impugn the causal 
mechanism by which the hypothesized independent variable is assumed to operate.  
 
     The use of critical case studies in social sciences has been controversial. The debate is 
centered on whether a case study constitutes a single observation or not. If it does, then 
the usefulness of critical case study is said to be seriously diminished since few explana-
tions depend upon only one causal variable.223 I avoid this issue in this paper by empha-
sizing some of the most likely components of alternative explanations. I do not seek to 
unambiguously reject alternative explanations by building critical case studies tailored 
to cast fatal doubts on them. The investment strategy of actively managed mutual funds 
is characterized by motivational multiplicity with several factors influencing the de-
cision to invest – but firm-level differences in the institutions of workplace organization 
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  66constitute the most significant variable to account for the differences in their investment 
portfolio in France and Germany. I emphasize some key most-likely components of al-
ternative explanations that make it unlikely that their relative explanatory importance 
would be superior to that of the firm-level institutional arrangements of workplace or-
ganization. First, the degree of internationalization of German firms in terms of sale is 
superior to that of their French counterparts – thereby highlighting their lower degree of 
dependence on their slow-growth domestic market. Thus, the expectation is that of 
greater investment in Germany by mutual funds if the degree of internationalization of 
firms is the key driving factor. Second, the use of deviations to the one share-one vote 
principle is substantially greater in France than in Germany, thereby preserving the abil-
ity of large owners to control the strategy of the firm without compromising on their 
ability to raise equity capital. Moreover, the size of the private benefits of control is also 
higher in France, implying that large owners also enjoy gains other than those associated 
with the stock market capitalization of the firm. Thus, the primacy of the legal perspec-
tive emphasizing ownership structure as a key criterion for investment would imply 
that hedge and mutual funds would prefer Germany over France as an investment site. I 
tackle these two issues in the next two following sections.  
 
b) Macroeconomic Variables and the Investment Strategy of Hedge and Mutual 
Funds 
 
    The first alternative, co-varying explanation under consideration highlights the impor-
tance of macroeconomic conditions in regard to the investment strategies of institutional 
investors. Fund managers can build their portfolio by deciding first on the geographical 
allocation (country/region) of the assets under their management, and only then select-
ing which stocks to invest in. Top-down investment strategies are characterized by a fo-
cus on evolving market trends and rates of economic growth rather than firm-level fea-
tures.  
 
     However, the explanatory power of a top-down investment perspective to account 
for the differences in the investment patterns of short-term, impatient institutional inves-
tors in France and Germany is limited by two sets of factors. First, the comparison of 
France and Germany entails for a contingent generalization of the findings. The explana-
tion for investment differences in France and Germany is not likely to travel well to oth-
er cases that do not share key elements of background similarities between these two 
countries. The variables that account for outcomes in these two advanced capitalist 
economies are likely to be different from those operating in different countries.224 In par-
ticular, the rates of economic growth in these two advanced capitalist economies are 
more likely to be constrained than those found in some developing or transition coun-
tries since total productivity growth cannot be generated from the movement of their 
workforce away from agriculture and from other factors. Emerging economies with un-
derdeveloped stock markets possess greater opportunities to grow. Moreover, the pres-
ence in the Euro zone of economies with traditionally lower degrees of commitment to 
fighting inflation than France and Germany has resulted in higher interest rates that are 
                                                 
224For an example of the differences in the effects of corporate law reforms in advanced civil law 
capitalist economies versus transition/developing economies, see Mark Roe, “Corporate Law’s 
Limits.” and Mark Roe, “Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets.” 
  67warranted for the latter two.225 The French economy might have achieved slightly higher 
overall growth than Germany between 1998 and 2005, but the key issue is that firms in 
these two countries cannot count on favorable macroeconomic factors to raise their prof-
itability.226  
 
     Second, the strategy of internationalization of French and German firms also contrib-
utes to the inability of macro explanations to fully account for the investment flows of 
actively managed mutual funds. The process by which firms in the two countries de-
velop their innovative capabilities remains embedded in their specific variety of capi-
talism, but their profitability is no longer as tightly linked to their domestic market. Dur-
ing the past twenty years, large companies have made considerable steps towards the in-
ternationalization of their profile. For French firms, the process of European integration 
has been central to their strategy of internationalization.227 The crisis in the dirigiste 
model of policymaking in the early 1980s highlighted the increased inability of state offi-
cials to rely on demand-side policies to significantly shape the competitiveness of com-
panies. An important dimension of the subsequent restructuring of the French corporate 
sector took place through an ambitious M&A program – a strategy that enabled firms to 
tackle problems related to their size and innovative capabilities.228 The process of the 
completion of the internal market not only enabled the shopping spree to take place, but 
it also led French top management to recognize that the only way to compete was to 
penetrate markets in Europe and elsewhere. For German firms, the process of interna-
tionalization reflected a search for the most suitable institutional framework to comple-
ment their domestic strength.229 The comparison of German domestic investment with 
German FDI reveals sharp differentiations in the type of jobs performed at home and 
                                                 
225Bob Hancké and David Soskice, “Wage-Setting and Inflation Targets in EMU,” Oxford Review of 
Economic Policy 19,1 (Spring 2003): 149-160.  
226The rate of GDP growth in constant prices for France was 15.6 percent between 1998 and 2005. 
The corresponding figure for Germany was 9.2 percent. The growth of GDP of these two econo-
mies put them below the EU average with only Italy achieving lower rates than both of them. 
Source: OECD, National Accounts of OECD Countries: Detailed Tables (Paris: OECD, 2006). Moreover, 
the inability of national macroeconomic conditions of France and Germany to account for the in-
vestment strategies of hedge/mutual funds is further reinforced by a geographical shift. Top-
down fund managers increasingly use a European portfolio, national funds being discontinued 
(See Commission des Opérations de Bourse, “Les Critères d`Investissement des Grands Gestion-
naires de Fonds Internationaux dans les Entreprises Françaises”). Finally, the inability of macro-
economic explanations to contribute significantly to our understanding of the investment allo-
cation of hedge and mutual funds is further damaged by France being the top continental Euro-
pean countries for American mutual funds. See Morningstar, Morningstar Funds 500, various 
years.  
227See Vivien Schmidt, From State to the Market? The Transformation of French Business under Mitter-
rand, pp. 347-368; and W. Rand Smith, The Left’s Dirty Job: The Politics of Industrial Restructuring in 
France and Spain (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998).  
228See Lise Dervieux, “L’Accélération de l’Internationalisation des Grands Groupes Français entre 
1997 et 2002,” Economie et Statistique 363-365 (2003): 207-234; and Mary O’Sullivan, “Acting Out 
Institutional Change: Understanding the Recent Transformation of the French Financial System,” 
Socio-Economic Review 5,3 (July 2007): 389-436.   
229Matthew Allen, “Is German Direct Investment a Substitute for Domestic Investment?” German 
Politics 11,1 (April 2002): 125-146.  
  68abroad: radical innovation and low skilled jobs taking place in foreign subsidiaries, 
highly skilled blue-collar related activities occurring in Germany. The institutions of 
workplace organization do not create a zero-sum game between the domestic and for-
eign investment of companies.  
 
     Finally, and perhaps more importantly, the internationalization of the activities of 
French and German firms, realized through M&A, was not strategy neutral. Their pro-
cess of internationalization was characterized by two features. The first one deal with 
the motivations of companies going abroad through M&A. Demand factors emphasize 
the need to meet the needs of local customers; supply side factors highlight the enhance-
ment of the innovative capabilities of the firm by taking advantage of the recipient coun-
try knowledge base. The process of internationalization of companies was largely under-
taken as a strategy to enhance their capabilities. For instance, French and German firms 
are among the top foreign owners of R&D facilities in the United States.230 Thus, foreign 
subsidiaries are not simply local points of sales, they also contribute to the process by 
which the parent firm increases its knowledge base and develop a position of competi-
tive advantage. The second feature of this process of internationalization deals with its 
impact on the overall specialization profile of companies. French and German firms 
achieved a critical mass status through a focus on their core technologies in their strate-
gy of international diversification. Their acquisitions in foreign markets concentrated on 
a selected number of existing fields of strength which are supportive of domestically-
based core businesses.231 Starting with a relatively low degree of internationalization in 
the late 1970s, firms in the two countries broaden their geographical base by drawing on 
activities and technologies to support their core business strength rather than proceed-
ing through a diversification of their activities in unrelated fields. The outcome of this 
process of internationalization consists not only in the reduction of their exposure to 
their slowly growing domestic markets, but the strengthening of their core business acti-
vities has substantially improved their competitive position relative to that of their 
major rivals.  
 
     What is the impact of the strategy of internationalization of companies on the invest-
ment strategy of actively managed mutual funds? The degree of internationalization of 
French and German companies is operationalized with the ratio of domestic/foreign 
sales as percentage of total sales – the most common measure of internationalization in 
the international business literature.232 Data on the degree of internationalization is pre-
                                                 
230See Walter Kuemmerle, “The Drivers of Foreign Direct Investment into Research and Develop-
ment: An Empirical Investigation,” Journal of International Business Studies 30,1 (January-March 
1999): 1-24; Manuel Separio and Donald Dalton, “Globalization of Industrial R&D: An Examina-
tion of Foreign Direct Investments in R&D in the United States.”  
231See John Cantwell and Rebecca Harding, “The Internationalisation of German Companies’ 
R&D,” National Institute Economic Review 163 (January 1998): 99-115; and John Cantwell and Usha 
Kotecha, “The Internationalization of Technological Activity: The French Evidence in a Compara-
tive Setting,” in Jeremy Howells and Jonathan Michie, eds., Technology, Innovation and Competitive-
ness (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1997).  
232See Daniel Sullivan, “Measuring the Degree of Internationalization of a Firm,” Journal of Inter-
national Business Studies 25, 2 (June 1994): 325-342; John Stopford and John Dunning, The World 
Directory of Multinational Enterprises 1982-83 (Detroit: Gale Research Company, 1983). Another in-
dicator of internationalization is the share of total patenting of domestic firms to research that is 
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sented in Tables 11 and 12. I report for 2003, a relatively recent year in my analysis, the 
percentage of sales generated in the domestic market. These results shed serious doubts 
on the ability of macro, top-down explanations to account for the diverging investment 
patterns of mutual funds. A first preliminary issue concerns the higher overall degree of 
internationalization of German companies. The overall percentage of sales generated in 
the domestic market was 39.03 percent. The corresponding figure for French firms was 
47.79 percent. In other words, German companies are less dependent on their slow-
growth domestic market than are their French counterparts on their basically equivalent 
low-growth home base. This divergence would lead macroeconomic explanations to er-
roneously predict the greater attractiveness of Germany for short-term, impatient in-
stitutional investors.  
 
     Another, and more interesting, aspect of the data presented in Tables 11 and 12 con-
cerns the distribution of internationalization according to whether or not firms were tar-
geted by mutual funds. The relatively low importance of the domestic market for French 
(35.73 percent) and German (38.72 percent) companies targeted by mutual funds sug-
gests that geographical diversification is not an irrelevant condition. The inclusion of 
firms not targeted by these two groups of institutional investors, however, adds to the 
complex contingent nature of the internationalization variable. The degree of depend-
ence on the home market of non-targeted French firms (46.05 percent) is significantly 
higher than that of their German counterparts (37.78 percent). In other words, the degree 
of internationalization of French firms co-varies with investments by mutual funds; but 
the relatively low dependence by German firms on their domestic market is not a suf-
ficient condition for attracting funds from short-term, impatient investors.233 This diver-
gence in outcome highlights the explanatory power of the institutionally-based Varieties 
of Capitalism theoretical perspective for causally complex phenomenon. The impact of 
the geographical diversification variable is contingent upon its institutional context. The 
German case illustrates a “missing” factor; the positive effects of the low degree of de-
pendence on the home base are constrained by the diffusion of power in the firm. The 
issue of the degree of internationalization of French firms, in contrast, highlights its posi-




attributable to research performed in foreign subsidiaries. Empirical data testify to the promi-
nence of the internationalization of the technological activities of French and German firms – re-
search undertaken in their foreign subsidiaries contributing for a large proportion of their patents 
(see John Cantwell and Rebecca Harding, “The Internationalisation of German Companies’ R&D”; 
and John Cantwell and Usha Kotecha, “The Internationalization of Technological Activity: The 
French Evidence in a Comparative Setting”). The data are unfortunately presented at the aggre-
gate level of the economy and thus do not allow for analysis at the firm level.  
233I do not wish to argue that the degree of internationalization of German companies is irrelevant 
to the investment strategies of short-term, impatient institutional investors. Rather, I argue that 
its explanatory value for the German case is limited given the lack of variation – the degree of in-
ternationalization of firms being rather high whether or not they have been targeted by hedge/ 
mutual funds. The German case highlights its potentially trivial nature since it is present in all 
cases in the universe of analysis – both in the presence or absence of the dependent variable.  Table 11: Percentage of Sales (2003) in Domestic Market for French and German Companies Targeted for Investment by Mutual Funds 
                                                          FRANCE                 GERMANY 
European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in France  European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in Germany 
1) Total  (5)  19.8  1) Bayer  (65)  13.7 
2) BNP-Paribas   (20)                    55.1 2)  Volkswagen  (104)  30.0 
3) Aventis  (29)  13.0  3) Hypo Bank  (130)  52.2 
4) Vivendi  (52)  45.2  4) Commerzbank  (131)  NA 
5) Alcatel  (73)  12.7  5) Infineon  (165)  24.9 
6) Renault  (87)  35.5  6) Deutsche Borse  (172)  29.0 
7) Schneider Europe  (92)  48.0  7) Continental  (204)  33.0 
8) Lafarge Western 
Europe 
(95) 42.0  8)  Adidas-Salomon 
Europe 
(223) 54.0 
9) Accor  (134)  34.4  9) Linde  (253)  22.9 
10) Lagarere  (158)  31.8  10) Depfa Bank  (340)  36.0 
11) Bouygues  (160)  72.0  11) Puma  (348)  32.1 
12) Veolia  (182)  45.6  12) Merck Europe  (409)  42.0 
13) Michelin (Europe)  (184)  52.5  13) Hypo Real Estate  (439)  NA 
14) Cap Gemini  (190)  18.0  14) MG Technologies  (462)  18.6 
15) Pernod Ricard  (197)  17.0  15) Celanese  (498)  32.8 
16) Essilor 
International Europe 
(198) 46.2  16)  MLP (547)  89.5 
17) Thomson  (217)  24.0  17) Epcos  (565)  27.0 
18) Pechiney  (231)  41.7  18) Medion  (597)  59.0 
19) Publicis  (236)  10.4  19) Bilfinger Berger  (632)  43.4 
20) TF1 (247)  97.1  20)  K&S (658)  24.3 
21) Unibail  (294)                  99.9  21) Frankfurt Airport  (714)  85.3 
22) Valeo  (329)  23.6  22) Heidelberger 
Druckmaschinen 
(723) 12.2 
23) Dassault Systèmes  (346)  11.7  23) AAreal Bank  (737)  51.9 
24) Thales  (342)  26.2       
25) Wanadoo  (347)  21.0       
26) Business Objects  (374)  12.9       
27) Eurotunnel  (378)  NA       
28) Technip-Coflexip 
Europe 
(381) 24.2       
29) Atos  (434)  34.6      
  71European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in France  European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in Germany 
30) Neopost  (446)  29.6       
31) Havas  (457)  19.0       
32) Natexis Bank  (471)  36.0       
33) BIC Western 
Europe 
(490) 33.0       
Average   35.73  Average   38.72 
    
      
 
Table 12: Percentage of Sales (2003) in Domestic Market for French and German Companies 
Not Targeted for Investment by Mutual Funds 
                                                      FRANCE                  GERMANY 
European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in France  European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in Germany 
1) Société Générale  (34)  56.4  1) Siemens  (16)  23.0 
2) Carrefour  (39)  50.7  2) Deutsche Bank  (24)  25.0 
3) AXA  (43)  23.3  3) Deutsche Telekom  (25)  60.7 
4) L’Oréal  (50)  14.7  4) Allianz  (30)  29.8 
5) Sanofi-Synthelabo  (51)  58.3  5) E.O.N. (33)  60.8 
6) France Telecom  (53)  58.7  6) Daimler-Chrysler  (36)  17.4 
7) Danone (2002)  (59)   33.1  7) SAP (38)  23.7 
8) LVMH (67)  35.7  8)  BASF (44)  21.2 
9) Suez  (74)  24.6  9) Munich Re  (57)  45.2 
10) Crédit Agricole  (75)  65.2  10) BMW (83)  25.5 
11) Air Liquide  (77)  24.0  11) RWE (100)  51.1 
12) Saint-Gobain  (78)  28.6  12) Schering Europe  (129)  49.4 
13) Peugeot   (138)  NA  13) Thyssen Krupp  (152)  35.0 
14) Pinault Printemps 
Redoute 
(161) 45.3  14)  Deutsche  Post  (153)  52.3 
15) Arcelor  (168)  17.1  15) Metro  (178)  52.8 
16) Vinci  (187)  60.7  16) Altana  (211)  18.9 
17) Casino  (265)  79.6  17) Henkel  (214)  21.0 
18) Christian Dior  (287)  17.5  18) Porsche  (220)  34.2 
19) Sodexho  (327)  15.8  19) T-Online  (264)  90.7 
20) Auto. Sud France  (353)  100.0  20) Lufthansa  (294)  50.1 
21) CNP Assurances  (411)  95.9  21) MAN (306)  27.9 
  72European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in France  European Market  Capitalization (Rank)  % turnover in Germany 
22) Sagem  (418)  45.9  22) Beiersdorf  (331)  27.1 
23) Air France  (430)  50.5  23) TUI (368)  14.7 
24) Hermès  (436)  20.1  24) Heidelberger 
Cement 
(382) 12.4 
25) Gecina  (438)  99.3  25) Fresenius Europe   (390)  39.0 
26) Imerys  (469)  26.3  26) Stada Arzneimit  (487)  43.0 
27) Zodiac Europe  (509)  50.0  27) Celesio  (523)  18.8 
      28) Pro Siebensat  (552)  99.9 
     29)  Wella  (558)  26.5 
     30)  Suedzucker    (572)  32.0 
     31)  Hannover  Ruck  (577)  13.0 
     32)  IKB DT 
Industriebank 
(603) 33.0 
     33)  Douglas  (608)  60.6 
     34)  Singulus 
Technologies 
(621) 10.1 
     35)  Karstadtquelle  (643)  72.2 
     36)  IVG Immobilien  (776)  55.3 
     37)  Hugo  Boss  (785)  25.0 





      The inability of the macro-internationalization variable to fully account for the divergence in 
the investment portfolios of hedge/mutual funds is strengthened by further specifying the de-
gree of internationalization of firms. I distinguish between low and high degrees of internation-
alization, with 50 percent of sales in the domestic market as the dividing benchmark, data above 
this figure constituting instances of low degree of internationalization (X=0). The selection of 
this benchmark reflects the lower degree of internationalization for the bulk of top French and 
German firms before the early 1990s.234 The percentage of total sales in the domestic market for 
the majority of firms in the two countries was above the 50% mark. The dependent variable is 
computed by dividing firms according to whether (Y=1) or not (Y=0) they recorded an invest-
ment above the 5 percent threshold by mutual funds. The distribution of observations is pre-
sented in Figure 3. The use of “typological theories” enables the researcher to deduce that high 
degrees of internationalization in Germany are largely insufficient to result in a targeted invest-
ment from hedge/mutual funds. Moreover, the use of the logic of necessary conditions high-
lights the trivialness of the variable of internationalization for German firms given the concen-
tration of observations in cells II and IV. The trivialness of the variable is accounted by two fac-
tors: it is rather hard to find cases of top German companies that are not internationalized; and 
the distribution of observations of high degrees of internationalization fall equally between 
cases of presence and absence of targeted investment.  
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c) Law and the Development of Financial Markets  
 
     What accounts for the divergence in the composition of foreign ownership of French and 
German companies? The development of securities markets and the transformation of owner-
ship structure of listed companies have been critical issues for law and economics scholars. 
Their central concern focuses on the extent to which distant minority shareholders are legally 
protected. The critical precondition for the development of deep and liquid securities markets, 
whereby ownership and control are separate, requires the presence of a system of corporate law 
that is protective of the rights of small investors.235 The willingness of minority shareholders to 
provide equity capital is contingent upon the extent to which their investments are protected 
from expropriation by managers or controlling investors. The implication is that the ownership 
                                                 
234See for example, Dafsa, Annuaire des Sociétés, Paris, annual publication.  
235See Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny, “Investor Protec-
tion and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Financial Economics 58,1-2 (October-November 2000): 3-27; and 
Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” Journal of Finance 52,2 (June 
1997): 737-783.  
  74structure of firms reflects the degree of legal protection provided by the national system of cor-
porate governance – dispersed ownership structure with high degrees of free float highlighting 
the confidence of minority shareholders that they can recoup their investments.236 The presence 
of ownership concentration constitutes an indicator of the failure of corporate law to provide 
sufficient guarantees for minority investors.  
 
     I analyze in this section the explanatory value of the legal perceptive to account for the diver-
gence in the investment portfolio of mutual funds in France and Germany. The argument re-
garding the importance of ownership structures emphasizes how the presence of a dominant 
blockholder – or of a group of friendly shareholders – can act in various ways as a disincentive 
for these two categories of institutional investors to acquire an important equity stake in a firm. 
The prediction is that countries characterized by domestic firms with concentrated ownership 
will prove less attractive to institutional investors. Three different mechanisms act as a deterrent 
for prospective investors. First, a dominant shareholder can effectively outvote the efforts of in-
stitutional investors in introducing changes to the strategy of the company that would boost its 
stock market capitalization. The underlying assumption is that institutional investors engage in 
shareholder activism in order to ensure a sizable return on their investments. The implication is 
that the unlocking of shareholder value through activism from investors is unlikely to happen 
in the presence of a large, controlling shareholder who can resist their efforts to introduce reor-
ganizations though his voting power.237  
 
     Second, the interests of Anglo-American institutional investors can differ substantially from 
that of a dominant shareholder. The main issue is that the benefits and costs of holding control-
ling stakes – which entails a reduction in diversification risks – vary across advanced capitalist 
economies and are alleged to be driven by the degree of legal protection for minority investors. 
In countries with lower protection of shareholder rights, investors can prevent a violation of 
their rights by acquiring a controlling stake in a company (defensive move) and by taking ad-
vantage of their control over the strategy of the firm to extract private benefits of control (offen-
sive action).238 The notion of the private benefits of control refers to the aggregate value a con-
trolling owner can extract from the company at the expense of minority shareholders.239 It has 
long been observed that shareholders do not receive benefits in proportion to their equity stake 
in a corporation. Instead, large owners receive a disproportionate amount of corporate benefits. 
The right to control the corporate policy is valuable per se since large owners receive benefits 
                                                 
236Rafael Laporta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Corporate Ownership around the 
World,” Journal of Finance 54, 2 (April 1999): 471-517.  
237Other arguments on the disincentives effects of ownership concentration, however, are not contingent 
on a state of high institutional activism.  
238Marc Goergen and Luc Renneboog, “Why are the Levels of Control (so) Different in German and UK 
Companies? Evidence from Initial Public Offerings,” Journal of Law and Economic Organization 19,1 (April 
2003): 141-175.  
239The key readings on the notion of the private benefits of control are Michael Barclay and Clifford Hol-
derness, “Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics 25,2 (De-
cember 1989): 371-95; Tatiana Nenova, “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
Country Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics 68,3 (June 2003): 325-51; and Luigi Zingales, “Why It’s 
Worth Being in Control,” in George Bickerstaffe, editor, Mastering Finance (London: Financial Times/ 
Prentice-Hall, 1998).  
  75that are not shared with other shareholders.240 Prospective buyers do not pay pro rata value for 
the stock if they lack confidence in the willingness of dominant owners to pursue friendly 
shareholder value strategies and, if the discount is deep enough, concentrated ownership per-
sists since the latter decide not to sell.241 The issue is critical since the dominant shareholder 
faces tradeoffs in countries with lower degrees of legal protection for minority investors – reap-
ing the economic benefits of higher share prices through shareholder value enhancing policies 
but at the cost of giving up the private benefits of control. The empirical evidence also points to 
the reluctance of blockholders wishing to raise equity finance from the public at large to step in 
and provide legal protection and other safeguard mechanisms for minority shareholders.242 
Finally, the maintenance of a controlling stake in a company is less expensive in countries 
where deviations from the one share/one vote principle are prevalent. Large owners can main-
tain their control over the firm while raising additional equity from the greater public through 
unequal voting rights and non-voting shares.243 Interestingly, the greater use of deviations from 
the one-share/one-vote principle by French firms constitutes another most likely component. 244
                                                 
240What are the private benefits of control? The academic literature has identified two main types of pri-
vate benefits of control. First, the position of dominance of a large owner might allow him to increase his 
stake in the company through dilutive share issues and minority freeze-outs. Second, private benefits re-
sult from the synergy benefits realized by the controlling shareholder. The information acquired by the 
dominant shareholder from the operations of the firm might provide him with potential opportunities in 
other areas. The controlling shareholder can use knowledge from the company he owns to exploit oppor-
tunities in other firms. The value associated with these opportunities constitutes a private benefit of con-
trol since minority shareholders do not reap the gains associated with these opportunities. For a full dis-
cussion, see Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales, “Private Benefits of Control: An International Compari-
son,” Journal of Finance 59,2 (April 2004): 537-600; and Simon Johnson, Rafael LaPorta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, “Tunnelling,” American Economic Review 90, 2 (May 2000): 22-27.  
241See Mark Roe, Political Determinants of Corporate Governance: Political Context, Corporate Impact (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 161-167.  
242Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Cor-
porate Governance, p. 97.  
243Unequal voting rights and non-voting shares constitute two mechanisms by which large shareholders 
can create a gap between their ownership stake and their voting power. The use of unequal voting rights 
by an important number of continental European companies is characterized by granting investors who 
kept their shares for a pre-determined period of time with extra voting power. For example, French cor-
porate law allows companies to give double voting rights to shareholders who have kept their shares for 
a period of two years. One of the intents of this by-law is to reduce the voting power of short-term inves-
tors such as hedge/mutual funds.  
244The prediction is that hedge and mutual funds should have invested more in Germany than in France 
on the basis of the use of mechanisms to separate ownership from control. First, German legislation has 
deprived domestic companies of their ability to use unequal voting rights while their French counterparts 
still rely heavily on them (see Table 15 below). The issuing of multiple voting shares was outlawed in 
Germany as of May 1998, and the grandfather clause was phased out on June 1, 2003. Second, the control 
value associated with deviations from one share/one vote differs also differ substantially between France 
and Germany. French investors are willing to pay a premium of 28 percent for shares with higher voting 
rights in contrast to their German counterparts, which only add an extra 9 percent for shares with extra 
voting privileges (Source: Tatiana Nenova, “The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-
Country Analysis,” pp. 340-341). The gains associated with the ownership of shares with extra voting 
rights in Germany – which would presumably help an investor to become a controlling owner – seem 
more limited than in France. This outcome is consistent with the argument that power is largely diffused 
in German companies.  
  76     Third, the size of the free float of a listed company also plays a role in the investment deci-
sions of funds. Free float is the proportion of shares not held by strategic shareholders and also 
not stock with sales restrictions. It constitutes an indicator of the degree of ownership concen-
tration of the company, a lower free float indicating a higher degree of concentration. Why is 
the free float relevant to the investment decisions of investors? Recent studies have revealed the 
importance of home bias in the investment decisions of American and British funds despite the 
disappearance of barriers to international capital mobility across countries and the potential 
gains associated with greater diversification.245 The domestic bias reflects the extent to which in-
vestors overweight the home market in their holdings. In other words, the share of the home 
market in their holdings is larger that the home market’s share of total world market capitaliza-
tion. The absolute increases in outflows by Anglo-American funds in foreign equities have been 
smaller than the growth of the market capitalization of foreign markets. Initial hypotheses on 
this Anglo-American home bias centred on differences in legal rights for minority investors 
around the world and on the lack of availability of large blue-chip companies. However, these 
hypotheses are incomplete for two reasons. First, the domestic bias is not limited to American 
and British investors, but to institutional investors in large emerging economies and in every 
advanced capitalist economy.246 Second, the domestic bias of American and British institutional 
investors is affected by the fact that the bulk of foreign companies’ shares are held by insiders 
and is thus not readily available to outside investors.247 The degree of free float is often used as 
a rule of thumb by institutional investors. If the free float percentage is low, hedge and mutual 
funds will drive up the price per share when they attempt to acquire a significant number of 
stocks. The implication is that the investments of hedge and mutual funds in France and Ger-
many could be driven by differences in degrees of free float.  
 
     What is the empirical evidence on the influence of the ownership structure of listed French 
and German companies on the investment strategies of mutual funds? Data on the ownership 
structure of large listed French and German firms is presented in Tables 13 and 14. Table 13 is 
comprised of the top companies that have received an investment stake above the 5 percent 
threshold by mutual funds. Firms are listed with their European stock market capitalization 
rank (on December 17, 2003), their ownership structure and their free float at the time of the 
investment stake by hedge/mutual funds. The classification of the ownership structure of com-
                                                                                                                                                             
Table 15: Firms with Deviations to One-Share/One-Vote Principle (in %) 
Exceptions to   France top 40  Germany top 30  France top 120  Germany top 120 
one-share, one-vote 
rule 
1996   1999   2001  1996 1999 2001  1996 1999  1996 1999 
Unequal Voting 
Rights 
   75       68       58    25     15   13         32     68            25      15 
 Source: Davis Global Advisors, Leading Corporate Governance Indicators, various years.  
245Kalok Chan, Vicentiu Corvig, and Lilian Ng, “What Determines the Domestic Bias and Foreign Bias? 
Evidence from the Mutual Fund Equity Allocation Worldwide,” Journal of Finance 60,3 (June 2005): 1495-
1534; and Bong-Chan Kho, Rene Stulz, and Francis Warnock, “Financial Globalization, Governance, and 
the Evolution of the Home Bias,” working paper #12389, (Cambridge MA: National Bureau for Economic 
Research, July 2006).  
246See Kalok Chan, Vicentiu Corvig, and Lilian Ng, ibid., pp. 1501-1511.  
247For example, the percentage of shares of American and British public traded companies that were 
owned by insiders in 2004 was respectively only 12.2 and 12.3 percent. The similar figure for the OECD 
zone was 38.4 percent. Bong-Chan Kho, Rene Stulz, and Francis Warnock, “Financial Globalization, Gov-
ernance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias,” pp. 41-42.  
  77panies builds on prior research on the influence of ownership structures in order to heighten 
comparability. First, investigations focusing on the impact of management-controlled firms 
used a cutoff point of 5 percent as a measure of ownership dispersion.248 The absence of a con-
trolling shareholder owning more than 5 percent of the equity capital of the firm implies greater 
freedom of maneuver for managers. No single shareholder possesses the incentives to monitor 
executives. At the time, however, the absence of ownership concentration entails that the capital 
structure of the firm is vulnerable to speculations on financial markets – an issue of importance 
for executives since they are likely to lose their jobs in the event of the company being acquired. 
Firms in which no single shareholder (or group of friendly shareholders) own at least 5 percent 
of their equity capital are classified as being diversified (DIS). Second, studies on the impact of 
large owners with substantial control – i.e., whereby executives are under their close super-
vision – use the 20 percent threshold for labelling a firm as ownership concentrated.249 An equi-
ty stake of 20 percent greatly contributes to insulate the firm from unwanted takeover bids on 
financial markets and, moreover, enables the large owner to exercise predominant control over 
the conduct of the strategy of the firm since major change in European corporations need a 
supermajority of two-thirds. In other words, an equity stake of at least 20 percent of the equity 
capital of the firm is very close to the 33 percent veto point threshold. Firms in which a single 
shareholder (or group of friendly shareholders) owns more than 20 percent of the equity capital 
are classified as high concentration (HC). Third, firms in which the largest shareholder (or group 
of friendly shareholders) owns between 5 and 20 percent of the equity capital are labelled as 
medium concentration (MC). Such firms are vulnerable to speculations of financial markets, but 
possess more options to delay and block unwanted takeover bids through deviations from the 
one share-one vote principle and other anti-takeover devices. Finally, and because a firm can re-
cord many investment stakes from institutional investors in different years, the number of data 
observations on ownership structure and free float can be higher than the number of firms.  
 
     Table 14 is comprised of firms that did not record an instance of investment stake above the 5 
percent threshold by mutual funds. Firms are also listed with their European stock market capi-
talization rank. I recorded the status of their ownership structure and free float from the data 
found in their 2003 annual reports since they have not received an investment stake from mu-
tual funds. I selected the 2003 report since reported data on ownership structure and free float 
are usually for late 2003 – which broadly corresponds to the sample date of large listed firms, 
namely December 17, 2003. The classification of the ownership structure is the same as for firms 
that recorded an instance of an investment above the 5 percent threshold. 
 
     The influence of the ownership structure – and the degree of free float – on the investment 
strategies of mutual funds reveals the importance of institutionally-based varieties of capitalism 
                                                 
248Eric Gedajlovic and Daniel Shapiro, “Management and Ownership Effects: Evidence from Five Coun-
tries,” Strategic Management Journal 16,6 (June 1998): 533-553; Donald Hambrick and Sidney Finkelstein, 
“The Effects of Ownership Structure on Conditions at the Top: The Case of CEO Pay Raises,” Strategic 
Management Journal 16,3 (March 1995): 175-193; and Richard Whittington and Michael Mayer, The European 
Corporation: Strategy, Structure and Social Science (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).  
249See Luca Enriques and Paolo Volpin, “Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe,” Journal 
of Economic Perspectives 21,1 (Winter 2007): 117-140; Mara Faccio and Larry Lang, “The Ultimate 
Ownership of Western European Corporations,” Journal of Financial Economics 65,3 (September 2002): 365-
395; Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Politics of Corporate 
Governance, pp. 16-20.  
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differences in determining whether ownership structure constitutes a necessary and/or suffi-
cient condition. A first angle of comparison focuses on the characteristics of firms that were tar-
geted by short-term, impatient investors versus those that were not. For the 64 instances of in-
vestment above the 5 percent threshold by mutual funds in blue-chip French companies, thirty-
two took place in firms characterized by high ownership concentration, nineteen in firms with a 
medium concentrated ownership structure, and the remaining thirteen occurred in ownership 
dispersed companies (see Table 13).250 Moreover, of the twenty-seven French firms that did not 
receive an investment above the 5 percent threshold, twenty-one were characterized by high 
ownership concentration (see Table 14). The distribution of the observations on the ownership 
structure of French companies that were/were not targeted by hedge/mutual funds suggests 
two implications. First, the overall predominance of ownership concentration of the French cor-
porate sector has not deterred mutual funds. Although a 2x2 typological comparison is not pos-
sible, the cases of French firms with ownership concentration that were targeted by short-term, 
impatient institutional investors come closest to representing the X=0, Y=1 cell – the occurrence 
of an investment stake despite the presence of ownership concentration. The statistical domi-
nance of this cell casts serious doubts on the necessity of dispersed ownership structure as an 
independent variable. Second, the presence of ownership diffusion appears to co-vary with the 
investment strategies of mutual funds in France. There were only one firm with ownership dis-
persion and five firms with medium ownership concentration that did not record a targeted in-
vestment by hedge/mutual funds. The implication is that the growing diffusion of ownership 
in France could attract even more investments from short-term, impatient investors. Data from 
the German case, however, highlight the importance of institutionally-based varieties of organi-
zational capitalism of the French case. There are thirty-five instances of investment above the 5 
percent threshold in Germany with the following distribution: nineteen with high ownership 
concentration, seven with medium ownership concentration, and nine with ownership disper-
sion. The similar minority position of companies with ownership dispersion among those that 
have recorded an investment stake also testifies to the implausibility of dispersed ownership 
structure constituting a necessary condition. But in contrast to the French case, the characteris-
tics of the companies that did not receive such an investment are sharply different. Of the thirty-
seven firms that did not record an investment, eight of them were characterized by ownership 
diffusion – a much higher proportion than in France. The presence of ownership diffusion in 
Germany does not appear to constitute a sufficient condition to account for the investment pat-
terns of mutual funds.  
 
 
250The number of observations of investment over the 5 percent is greater than the number of firms that 
received such investment since the same firm can receive more than one investment.  Table 13: Ownership Structure and Free Float Rate of French and German Companies Targeted for Investment by Mutual Funds 
      France         Germany   
European Stock Market 
Capitalization  
(rank) 
Ownership Structure  Free Float   European Stock Market 
Capitalization  
(rank) 
Ownership Structure  Free Float  
1) Total (5)  HC NA  1) Bayer (65)  DIS >95 
2) BNP-Paribas (20)  HC NA  2) Volkswagen (104)  HC/HC 68/68 
3) Aventis (29)  HC NA  3) Hypo Bank (130)  MC 82 
4) Vivendi (52)  DIS/DIS 90/90  4) Commerzbank (131)  MC 88 
5) Alcatel (73)  MC/MC/MC 89/86/87  5) Infineon (165)  MC/MC/DIS/ DIS 88/88/100/100 
6) Renault (87)  HC/HC ~40/63  6) Deutsche Borse (172)  DIS/DIS 100/100 
7) Schneider (92)  HC/DIS NA/88  7) Continental (204)  MC 78 
8) Lafarge (95)  DIS 100  8) Adidas-Salomon (223)  MC NA 
9) Accor (134)  MC/HC/MC >75/84/85  9) Linde (253)  HC 69 
10) Lagardere (158)  MC/MC 89/85  10) Depfa Bank (340)  HC <35 
11) Bouygues (160)  HC/HC/HC NA/46/61  11) Puma (348)  DIS 100 
12) Veolia (182)  HC/HC NA/72  12) Merck (409)  HC/HC/HC 26/27/27 
13) Michelin (184)  DIS/MC 97/92  13) Hypo Real Estate (439)  DIS 100   
14) Cap Gemini (190)  MC 93  14) MG Technologies (462)  HC 60 
15) Pernod Ricard (197)  HC/HC NA/57  15) Celanese (498)  HC 7  
16) Essilor International 
(198) 
MC 90  16) MLP (547)  HC/ HC 57/57 
17) Thomson (217)  MC/MC 88/88  17) Epcos (565)  HC/DIS NA/100 
18) Pechiney (231)  HC/HC 79/79  18) Medion (597)  HC/HC 45/45 
19) Publicis (236)  HC/HC 55/68  19) Bilfinger Berger (632)  DIS 100 
20) TF1 (247)  HC/HC NA/57  20) K&S (658)  MC 90 
21) Unibail (294)  HC 66  21) Frankfurt Airport (714)  HC/HC 36/36 
22) Valeo (329)  HC/MC 71/90  22) Heidelberger Druck-
maschinen (723) 
HC/HC 57/57 
23) Thales (342)  HC 54  23) AAreal Bank (737)  HC 54 
24) Dassault Systèmes 
(346) 
HC 49      
25) Wanadoo (347)  HC 16      
26) Business Objects 
(374) 
DIS/DIS/DIS 100/100/100      
27) Eurotunnel (378)  DIS 100      





    
29) Atos (434)  MC 87      
30) Neopost (4446)  MC/ DIS/DIS     81/98/97       
31) Havas (457)  MC/DIS/DIS  88/100/100      
32) Natexis Bank (471)  HC  <20      




Table 14: Ownership Structure and Free Float Rate of French and German Companies Not Targeted for Investment by Mutual Funds 
      France         Germany   
European Stock Market 
Capitalization  
(rank) 
Ownership Structure  Free Float   European Stock Market 
Capitalization  
(rank) 
Ownership Structure  Free Float  
1) Société Générale (34)  MC 69  1) Siemens (16)  DIS 94 
2) Carrefour (39)  HC 71  2) Deutsche Bank (24)  DIS 100 
3) AXA (43)  HC 61  3) Deutsche Telekom (25)  HC 57 
4) L’Oréal (50)  HC 42  4) Allianz (30)  MC 83 
5) Sanofi-Synthelabo (51)  HC 48  5) E.ON (33)  DIS >95 
6) France Telecom (3)  HC 57  6) Daimler-Chrysler (36)  MC 81 
7) Danone (59)  MC 86  7) SAP (38)  HC 65 
8) LVMH (67)  HC 40  8) BASF (44)  DIS 100 
9) Suez (74)  HC 74  9) Munich Re (57)  MC 80 
10) Crédit Agricole (75)  HC 42  10) BMW (83)  HC 53 
11) Air Liquide (77)  DIS 98  11) RWE (100)  MC 89 
12) Saint-Gobain (78)  MC 82  12) Schering (129)  MC 89 
13) Peugeot (138)  HC 46  13) Thyssen Krupp (152)   HC 80 
14) Pinault Printemps 
Redoute  
HC 50  14) Deutsche Post (153)  HC 37 
15) Arcelor (168)  MC 78  15) Metro (178)  HC 44   
16) Vinci (187)   MC 86  16) Altana (211)  HC 61 
17) Casino (265)  HC 39  17) Henkel (214)  HC NA 
18) Christian Dior (287)  HC 31  18) Porsche (220)  HC NA 
19) Sodexho (327)  HC 58  19) T-Online (264)  HC 20 
20) Autoroutes Sud 
France (353) 
HC 26  20) Lufthansa (294)  DIS 90 
  8121) CNP Assurances (411)  HC 25  21) MAN (306)  DIS 100 
22) Sagem (418)  HC 38  22) Beiersdorf (331)  HC 22 
23) Air France (430)  HC <65  23) TUI (368)  HC 69 
24) Hermes (436)  HC 25  24) Heidelberger Cement 
(382)  (09/2005) 
HC 15 
25) Gecina (438)  HC 50  25) Fresenius (390)  HC 49 
26) Imerys (469)  HC 46  26) Stada Arzneimit (487)  DIS 100 
27) Zodiac (509)  HC 57  27) Celesio  HC 42 
     28) Pro Siebensat (552)  HC 36 
     29) Wella (558)  HC <40 
     30) Suedzucker (572)  HC 34 
     31) Hannover Ruck (577)  HC 49 
     32) IKB DT Industriebank 
(603) 
HC 51 
     33) Douglas (608) (2004)  MC 82 
     34) Singulus Technologies 
(621) 
DIS 100 
     35) Karstadtquelle (643)  HC 45 
     36) IVG Immobilien (776)  HC 74 





      There are two inherent and fundamental questions in this section. The first question is: what fac-
tors drive the investment strategy of mutual funds in France and Germany? The second question is: 
what accounts for the greater attractiveness of France over Germany for short-term, impatient inves-
tors? The notion of complex causation constitutes a useful methodological tool to deal with these two 
questions. First, the ownership structure of companies does not appear to be driving the investment 
strategies of mutual funds. The bulk of the investments of these two categories of investors took place 
in ownership concentrated firms – in contrast to the predictions of the legal theoretical perspective. 
The ownership structure of (both) French and German companies does not constitute a necessary con-
dition. A potential objection to the institutionalist argument of the paper is that most companies in the 
two countries are characterized by ownership concentration – therefore, it is less surprising to find 
mutual funds investing in such firms. The comparison of France and Germany should take into ac-
count the fact that dispersed ownership companies do not represent the bulk of my sample, as they 
would if I were working with American and British companies. The ownership structure of com-
panies might not constitute a necessary condition, but would ownership dispersion represent a suffi-
cient condition? I discuss this issue below, but a fundamental question still remains: what accounts 
for the overwhelming selection of France over Germany as an investment site within the concentrated 
ownership group? Second, the issue of ownership dispersion potentially gives rise to a methodology 
problem of co-variation with my dependent variable. There are (slightly) more blue-chip firms with a 
dispersed ownership structure in France than in Germany in aggregate terms – i.e., by counting com-
panies that were/were not targeted by mutual funds. Thus, both firm-level institutional arrangements 
of workplace organization and ownership diffusion (but not ownership concentration) co-vary with 
the investments of mutual funds. Qualitative methods provide important insights to resolve this is-
sue. The typology theory of sufficient conditions are associated with two cells of figure 1; it has 
nothing to say for cases where X=0 (cells I and III). For cases of X=1, the observations should be found 
in cell IV (ownership dispersion and investment stake by mutual funds). Cell I (ownership dispersion 
and no investment stake) should be close to being emptied. But, as previously mentioned, the fact that 
the quasi-totality of dispersed ownership firms in France has recorded an investment above the 5-
percent threshold does not entail that ownership dispersion constitutes a universal sufficient condi-
tion. A high proportion of German firms characterized by ownership dispersion did not receive such 
an investment. I do not want to suggest that the characteristics of the ownership structure of listed 
companies are unimportant, but that their impact depends on the presence of another key factor, 
namely, the degree of power concentration in the CEO. Firm-level institutional arrangements of work 
organization account for the greater attractiveness of France over Germany, but do not constitute the 
sole factor driving the investment strategies of mutual funds – consistent with the Hall and Soskice 
(2001) stressing of the central position of (institutional) structure in conditioning the strategy of actors, 
but not in fully determining it.251 The Varieties of Capitalism theoretical perspective illuminates how 
necessary and/or sufficient conditions vary across the advanced capitalist economies. However, be-
sides highlighting the importance of the national institutional framework, this perspective does not 
predetermine, nor exclude, the additional variables that operate through a process of complex causa-
tion. 
 
c) Educational Background and Career Patterns of Top Executives in Germany  
 
     The educational background and career development of top managers exert considerable influence 
on their frame of reference – presenting them with taken-for-granted world views that, in turn, shape 
                                                 
251Hall and Soskice, “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” p. 15.  
  83the types of corporate actions undertaken.252 Top executives with specific types of educational and 
working experiences direct their attention to certain types of innovation at the expense of others – 
thereby rendering them more (or less) open to learn and borrow from other countries.253 The social 
environment of top executives constitutes a key factor in the arrays of competing visions on how to 
best manage the firm. This statement about the influence of educational background and career devel-
opment is particularly relevant for this study – German managers have been praised for their high 
level of technical expertise, which results from their productionist, engineering-oriented focus.254 A 
higher proportion of engineers have occupied top senior managerial positions. The role of the exter-
nal labor market for German managers, moreover, has traditionally been limited because of the prom-
inence of internal recruitment practices and of in-house careers (Hauskarrieren). The profile of top Ger-
man executives stands in sharp contrast to that of their American and British colleagues, where the 
emphasis on finance has been dominant in the last twenty-five years.255 The implication of this mana-
gerial functional orientation is that it can serve as an alternative explanation to account for the lesser 
attractiveness of Germany to short-term, impatient institutional investors. The cognitive models of 
governance of top German executives is likely to favor productionist objectives over financial ones, 
thereby implementing shareholder value practices less of a legitimate priority.  
 
     The managerial perspective presented above, however, cannot account for the different patterns of 
investment by mutual (and hedge) funds in France and Germany. First, the educational background 
and career patterns of executives of the largest German companies has changed in three fundamental 
ways in the last ten years: the percentage of executives who went through the German apprentice sys-
tem has declined substantially, the proportion of university degrees held by top executives in the 
fields of law or economics is now more than twice that of science or technical subjects, the use of stock 
options increased rapidly after their formal legalization in 1998, and reliance on external labor mar-
kets has more than doubled.256 These developments took place in a context of overall stability in re-
gard to the educational background and career patterns of blue-collar employees.257 Second, formal 
declarations of shareholder value advocacy often mask the inability of managers to implement strate-
gic changes in the firm. In their studies of strategic change in large German companies, Fiss and Zajac 
found a substantial portion of firms engage in decoupling by espousing but not implementing a 
shareholder value orientation.258 The symbolic (i.e., in name only) adoption of shareholder value prin-
                                                 
252For example, see Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control (Cambridge MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1990) for an analysis of the impact of managerial ideologies on the evolution of the dominant forms of 
control in American corporations.  
253Wm. Gerard Sanders and Anja Tuschke, “The Adoption of Institutionally Contested Organizational Practices: 
The Emergence of Stock Option Pay in Germany,” Academy of Management Journal 50,1 (February 2007): 35-56.  
254See Gary Herrigel, Industrial Constructions: The Sources of German Industrial Power (New York: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1996); and Peter Lawrence, Managers and Management in West Germany (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1980).  
255See Mary O’Sullivan, Contests for Corporate Control: Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in the United 
States and Germany for the American case; see Richard Whittington and Michael Mayer, The European Corpora-
tion:: Strategy, Structure and Social Science, for an analysis of top executives in the United Kingdom.  
256See Martin Hoepner, “Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and 
Industrial Relations in Germany,” pp. 20-27. 
257David Reimer and Reinhard Pollak, “The Impact of Social Origin on the Transition to Tertiary Education in 
West Germany 1983 to 1999,” Working Paper 85 (Mannheim: Mannheim Centre for European Social Research, 
2005).  
258See Peer Fiss and Edward Zajac, “The Diffusion of Ideas over Contested Terrain: The (Non) Adoption of a 
Shareholder Value Orientation among German Firms,” Administrative Science Quarterly 49,4 (December 2004): 
  84ciples as a substitute for structural implementation is leaving internal power relations in the firm un-
changed while at the same time enhancing organizational legitimacy.  
 
     Finally, the introduction of shareholder value strategies in German firms cannot be fully accounted 
for by the preferences of managers; they have also been mediated by the broader institutional context 
of the German system of corporate governance. The issue of managerial compensation illustrates 
quite well this dynamic. The adoption of stock options and other forms of variable pay vary consider-
ably across firms in Germany – their award being inversely related to ownership concentration.259 
Stock-based incentive packages, moreover, tend to be significantly lower than they are in the United 
States and the criteria for their award are stricter – increases in the market valuation of the company 
do not result in stock options unless the gains in market value exceed those of other (domestic and 
foreign) firms in the sector.260 This diversity presents a puzzle for a managerial perspective on corpor-
ate governance: why haven’t all German firms adopted and heavily relied upon stock options and 
other forms of variable pay since these two forms of remuneration are added on top of the fixed man-
agerial pay component? The preferences of managers cannot account for the nature of the spread of 
variable pay incentives. The introduction of these financial incentives was instead strongly mediated 
by two sets of factors: the ownership structure of companies and the legally entrenched position of 
power of employees. The presence of ownership concentration implies that there is an alternative 
mechanism to monitor top executives, namely a large shareholder. In other words, German compa-
nies with ownership dispersion are the ones with the greatest need to monitor top executives via vari-
able pay schemes. The legally entrenched position of power of employees, on the other hand, enables 
the latter to co-determine the content of stock option plans. The German case illustrates the possibility 
of a transparency coalition whereby employees and minority investors can act against managerial op-
portunism.261 Institutional frameworks constrain even the most enthusiastic actors. The issue is not to 
deny the influence of the educational background and characteristics of the career development of top 
executives on the implementation of strategies of shareholder value, but to highlight the importance 
of institutional frameworks in mediating managerial preferences.  
 
Conclusions and Implications  
 
     The argument presented in this paper has several implications for the study of comparative corpor-
ate governance and national models of capitalism under conditions of financial globalization and in-
creasing capital mobility across borders. The paper took a two-pronged approach to these issues by 
asking the following: what accounts for the diverging ability of French and German firms to attract 
capital from Anglo-Saxon institutional investors; and what are the consequences associated with the 
growth of foreign ownership? The issue of accounting for institutional change and its effects has be-
come critical for comparative political economists, given that the field has long focused on using insti-
                                                                                                                                                                       
501-34; and Peer Fiss and Edward Zajac, “The Symbolic Management of Strategic Change: Sensegiving via 
Framing and Decoupling,” Academy of Management Journal 49,6 (December 2006): 1173-93.  
259See Peer Fiss, “Social Influence Effects and Managerial Compensation: Evidence from Germany,” Strategic 
Management Journal 27,11 (November 2006): 1013-1031; Anja Tuschke and Wm. Gerard Sanders, “Antecedents 
and Consequences of Corporate Governance Reform: The Case of Germany,” Strategic Management Journal 24,7 
(July 2003): 631-649.  
260Martin Hoepner, “Corporate Governance in Transition: Ten Empirical Findings on Shareholder Value and In-
dustrial Relations in Germany,” pp. 28-29; Anja Tuschke and Wm. Gerard Sanders, “Antecedents and Conse-
quences of Corporate Governance Reform: The Case of Germany,” pp. 646-647.  
261See Peter Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control: The New Global Politics of Corporate 
Governance, pp. 160-167, for an overview.  
  85tutions to account for divergence across countries. Critics have argued that institutional theories asso-
ciated with the Varieties of Capitalism perspective do a better job at accounting for stability than insti-
tutional discontinuity. The argument of this paper, by contrast, has highlighted the continuing useful-
ness of taking domestic institutional frameworks seriously as an independent variable for middle-
range theoretical projects. I argue that key institutions (workplace organization) constitute the single 
most important variable to account for institutional change in the specific case of ownership structure. 
This apparently paradoxical outcome, institutions to explain institutional change, is driven by three 
factors: importance of interaction among institutions, latency of institutional frameworks, and the 
distinction between institutional change and mode of economic coordination. 
 
     First, institutional arrangements interact to complement each other and consequently cannot be 
studied in isolation, whether analyzing the presence of stability or the occurrence of change in the 
broader institutional framework of countries.262 The introduction of an important institutional change 
in the ownership structure of French and German companies does not annul the theoretical impor-
tance of institutions. Substantial institutional differences remain in other areas, and these persisting 
cross-national differences form a distinctive constellation that produces different outcomes across na-
tions. The impact associated with institutional change on the overall operation of the political econo-
my is dependent on the interaction of the new institutions with those already in place, as institutional 
change is almost invariably piecemeal rather than full-scale. This is a significant and worthy aspect of 
analysis, since the occurrence of institutional change is not sufficient in order to assess whether 
change is evolutionary or radical.263 Different processes of change (abrupt and incremental) can both 
result in an evolutionary or radical transformation of the system.  
 
     Second, the institutions of workplace organization in the two countries have become more salient 
in the new context of financial globalization after having being characterized by an element of latency 
prior to financial deregulation.264 The long-term cross-national differences in work organization con-
tributed to the differences in the patterns of economic specialization of the two countries, but they 
had nothing to do with the ownership structure of large domestic companies, given the lack of inter-
national diversification of Anglo-Saxon investors prior to the early to mid-1990s. This last point about 
latency illustrates quite well the importance of the interactive effects associated with an institutional 
matrix. Prior to the mid-1990s, France and Germany were two bank-based financial systems with 
long-term patient capital despite differences in the institutions of workplace organization. The pro-
vision of patient capital in France was previously made possible through a combination of state regu-
lation of the banking sector, which facilitated access to long-term capital through bank loans, and 
cross-shareholdings among large companies.265 The deregulation of the banking sector and the 
decline of cross-shareholdings in France entail that the provision of long-term capital in the form of 
                                                 
262For a full discussion of the macro effects of interaction between institutions in different spheres of the econo-
my, see Peter Hall and Robert Franzese, “Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bar-
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  86debt finance is no longer available; it has instead been replaced by the presence of short-term, 
impatient capital. A key insight is that while the institutions of workplace organization have not 
fundamentally changed, the external environment in which they are embedded has. The 
concentration of power in top management was previously interacting with state policies and 
patterns of cross-shareholdings that enabled firms to have access to long-term capital. This outcome 
contrasts with the German situation. The provision of long-term capital in Germany resulted from 
concentrated ownership and the ability of shareholders to monitor companies via non-market 
mechanisms. The provision of long-term capital has not been affected by recent developments. The 
ownership concentration of large companies has remained intact despite the increasing importance of 
Anglo-American pension funds that are, moreover, themselves long-term owners.266  
 
     Third, the theoretical importance of the degree of power concentration associated with the institu-
tions of workplace organization as an explanation of the ability of companies to attract foreign capital 
is contingent upon its resilience and its ability to sustain cross-national comparisons. The research de-
sign of this paper and the ability to draw causal inferences would be uncertain if both the power con-
centration inside companies and the ownership structure of large firms had changed in recent years, 
given the problem of over-determination. The degree of power concentration of large French and Ger-
man companies, and the process by which they develop their innovative capabilities, have been both 
relatively stable and exhibited striking differences between the two countries for the last thirty years, 
despite changes in ownership structure. A key insight of this paper is that one must distinguish 
between the character of coordination of firms and the institutional framework that supports it.267 
Change in the latter does not entail a modification in the former. The sustainability of national models 
of corporate governance and capitalism cannot rest on the total absence of institutional change. The 
presence of institutional change does not imply inertia.268 Instead, the central issue is whether the 
transformation of the ownership structure of large firms sustains their mode of coordination and the 
complementarities of the model.  
 
     The distribution of power of French and German companies has remained stable over a period of 
time in which their ownership structure underwent a significant transformation. The mode of coordi-
nation of the activities of large companies in the two countries is best understood by analyzing the 
process by which they develop and sustain their innovative competences. The development of inno-
vative capabilities by firms requires the involvement of employees in complex problem-solving activi-
ties as well as the ability to develop a viable strategy that will enable them to compete in different sec-
tors and technology. However, the nature of the integration of employees in the development of or-
ganizational capabilities varies quite sharply between France and Germany. The coordination of ac-
tivities in large French companies is characterized by the vesting of unilateral authority in top man-
agers and senior staff. The acquisition of new competences often takes place through the hiring of 
specialists on external labor markets. The bulk of the work force does not contribute to the develop-
ment of the organizational learning capabilities of the firm. The hierarchical patterns of differentiation 
and the concentration of power inside French companies do not reflect only organizational politics, 
                                                 
266See Pepper Culpepper, “Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism,” World Politics 57, 2 (January 
2005): 173-199 and Bruce Kogut and Gordon Walker, “The Small World of Germany and the Durability of Na-
tional Networks,” American Sociological Review 66,3 (June 2001): 317-335, for an analysis of the stability of owner-
ship concentration in Germany.  
267See Peter Hall and Kathleen Thelen, “Institutional Change and the Varieties of Capitalism,” pp. 30-37.  
268The original thesis of this argument is Kathleen Thelen, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of Skills 
in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).  
  87but constitute the key mode of coordination by which they develop their competitive competences. 
The coordination of activities of large German firms, in contrast, involves high levels of authority 
sharing with the bulk of the workforce. The development of innovative capabilities takes place on the 
basis of the long-term contribution of skilled employees through institutionalized career paths. Con-
tinuing job rotations across functions as well as lateral coordination enable the bulk of employees to 
contribute to the improvement of the organizational problem-solving capabilities of firms. The rise of 
foreign ownership in France and Germany does not constitute a challenge to the mode of coordina-
tion of large domestic firms; it does contribute to reinforce the process of development of their inno-
vative capabilities. I argue in this paper that the relative attractiveness of French and German firms 
for Anglo-American institutional investors is shaped by the different institutional arrangements of 
workplace organization and the power relationships embodied in them. The globalization of financial 
markets and the greater mobility of capital across borders have not undermined the institutions of 




































  88Annex 1 
 
Table A: Equity Stake over 5 Percent, Germany 
1997 (September-August)  Anglo-American Fund  Initial Equity Stake 
Sinn Leffers  Tweedy Browne (MF) 5.53 
Tarkett Goldman  Sachs  (MF)  19.29 
Vossloh  New Germany Fund (MF)  5.00 
1998     
Data Modul  Invesco (MF)  9.0 
DePfa Janus  (MF)  5.3 
Deutsche Babcock Borsing Fidelity  (MF)  5.17 
1999     
Kassbohrer Schroeder  (MF)  25.20 
2000     
Adidas Templeton  (MF)  5.12 
Holsten-Braverei  St James Place Capital (MF)  6.71 
2001     
Beru  Henderson Global Ltd (MF)  7.19 
Bowe Systec  Tweedy Browne Cie (MF)  5.0 
Cargo Lifter  Henderson Investors (MF)  11.4 
Rheinmetall Wyser-Pratte  (HF) 5.05 
2002     
Bowe Systec  Global Value Fund Inc. (MF)  5.58 
Epcos  The Capital Group (MF)   18.84 
Kleindienst Datentechnik  Schroeder (MF)  43.62 
Merck  Tweedy Browne Cie (MF)  10.26 
Suss Microtec  Capital Group (MF)  6.49 
Zapf Creation  Fidelity (MF)  5.73 
2003     
Adphos Advanced Techno  Fidelity (MF)  91.4 
Celanese Fidelity  (MF)  5.05 
Deutsche Borse  Fidelity (MF)  5.1 
Freenet.de Fidelity  (MF)  6.14 
Infineon  Capital Group (MF)  5.06 
Infineon Fidelity  (MF)  5.08 
MG Technology  Capital Group (MF)  5.06 
Pfeiffer Vacuum Technology Harris  Associates  (MF)  5.04 
Puma Fidelity  (MF)  5.02 
Rhon-Klinikum  Capital Group (MF)  5.22 
Software  Capital Group (MF)  5.20 
Syzygy  BAT Trustees (MF)  10.22 
Syzygy  Laxey Partners (HF)  12.12 
Techem  Capital Group (MF)  5.16 
Vossloh Arnold  Bleichroeder  (HF)  5.20 
2004     
AAreal Bank  Capital Group (MF)  5.23 
Amadeus Fire  Fidelity (MF)  9.06 
Amadeus Fire  Gartmore (MF)  5.22 
Amadeus Fire  Parvus Asset Mgt UK (HF)  12.65 
Artnet  Artis Capital Mgt (HF)  5.60 
AWD Holdings  Fidelity (MF)  5.27 
  89Bayerische Hypo Bank  Capital Group (MF)  7.40 
Bijou Brigitte Fidelity  (MF)  5.02 
BKN AG   Capital Group (MF)  7.40 
Comtrade  FM Fund Mgt (HF)  29.57 
Continental  Capital Group (MF)  5.13 
Deutsche Borse  Atticus Capital (HF)  5.07 
Deutsche Borse  Capital Group (MF)  5.01 
Deutsche Borse  Children Investment (HF)  5.50 
Deutsche Borse  TCI Fund Management (HF)   5.01 
DSI Deutscher Services  Jupiter Asset Mgt UK (MF)  5.05 
Eurobike  Small Cap World Fund (MF)  6.17 
FJH  Fidelity  (MF)  5.02 
Greenleasing Schroder  (MF)  5.0 
Heidelberger Druckmasch  Brandes Investment (MF)  10.11 
Heidelberger Druckmasch Fidelity  (MF)  5.04 
IFCO System  Aberdeen Asset mgt (MF)   6.7 
 ISRA Vision  Fidelity (MF)  7.21 
IWKA  Schroder  (MF)  5.05 
IWKA  Wyser-Pratte  (HF)    5.0015 
Kali und Salz (K&S)  Fidelity (MF)   5.45 
Mediclin  Henderson Global Inv. (MF)  5.64 
Medion Fidelity  (MF)  5.34 
Medion  Jupiter Asset Mgt. (MF)  5.0 
Merck  Capital Group (MF)  5.01 
Merck Fidelity  (MF)  5.25 
MWG-Biotech  FM Fund Management (HF)   6.76 
Paion Fidelity  (MF)  7.24 
PC Specialist Fidelity  (MF) 5.85 
Pfleiderer  Capital Group (MF)  7.31 
Pfleiderer Fidelity  (MF)  5.48 
Pfleiderer  Henderson Global Inv. (MF)  10.66 
Pulsion Medical Systems Fidelity  (MF)  9.28 
Senator Entertainment  Marathon Asset Mgt (HF)  8.39 
SGL Carbon  K Capital Partners (HF)   5.22 
SGL Carbon  Jana Partners (HF)   5.30 
Techem  Jupiter Asset Mgt. (MF)   12.8 
United Internet  Fidelity (MF)  5.02 
Vivacon AG  Schroder  (MF) 5.04 
Volkswagen  Brandes Investment (MF)  6.15 
Volkswagen  Capital Group (MF)  5.12 
Wapme Systems  Fortune Management (HF)   13.46 
Washtec AG   Henderson Global Inv. (MF)  7.89 
Wedeco Water Technology Fidelity  (MF)  5.13 
Wincor Nixdorf  Goldman Sachs (MF)  7.20 
Wincor Nixdorf  Schroder (MF)  7.25 
Zapf Creation  Fidelity (MF)  5.04 
2005     
Augusta Technologies  Tragalfar Catalyst Fund (HF)   10.86 
Augusta Technologies  Goldman Sachs Group (MF)  7.3 
Augusta Technologies  Marathon Special Opportunity (HF)   7.2 
Axel Springer  Tweedy, Browne (MF)   5.76 
  90Balda AG   Cycladic Asset mgt (HF)   7.39 
Bayer  Capital Group (MF)  5.03 
Bilfinger Berger Fidelity  (MF)  5.18 
Cash.life AG  Fidelity  (MF) 5.02 
Centrotec AG  Schroder  (MF)  5.08 
Cewe Color Holding Fidelity  (MF)  5.18 
Cewe Color Holding  K Capital Partners (HF)   10.66 
CTS Eventim  Fidelity (MF)   5.25 
D+S Europe AG   Avenue Europe Int’l mgt (HF)   9.46 
Deag AG   Fidelity (MF)   5.60 
Deutz  Fidelity (MF)   5.20 
Escada Schroder  (MF)  10.1 
GFK AG   Fidelity (MF)   5.14 
Hypo real estate  Capital Group (MF)  5.19 
IWKA   Fidelity (MF)   5.61 
IWKA   K Capital Partners (HF)   5.29 
Kontron  Fidelity (MF)   10.16 
Mobil.com  Henderson Global Inv. (MF)  5.67 
MPC Capital AG  Fidelity  (MF)  5.06 
Pfeiffer Vacuum Tech  Arnold Bleichroeders (HF)   10.4 
Phoenix  Trident European Fund (HF)   5.61 
PSI AG  Fidelity  (MF)  5.63 
Re Power System  T Rowe Price (MF)  5.01 
Rheinmetall  Atlantic Investment mgt (HF)   5.12 
Rheinmetall  Perry Inv. Associates (HF)   6.39 
Rhon Klinikum  Columbia Management (MF)   5.21 
Schwarz Pharma  Schroder (MF)  5.0 
Solar World  Fidelity (MF)   5.39 
Solon  Fidelity (MF)   5.17 
TAG Immobilien  Asset Value Investors (MF)  5.11 
Technotrans Gartmore  (MF) 5.15 
Tipp 24 AG  Fidelity  (MF)  6.67 
Uzin Utz AG   Henderson Global (MF)  6.48 
Wavelight AG  Schroder  (MF)  5.02 
Zapf Creation AG  Schroder  (MF)  9.77 
2006 (January-May)     
ADVA AG Optical   Fidelity (MF)   5.01 
ADVA AG Optical   GLG Partners (HF)   5.19 
Borussia Dortmund  Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  25.97 
Caatoosee AG   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  20.75 
Cash.Life AG   M&G Investment (MF)   5.02 
CDV Software AG   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  22.83 
Cewe Color Holdings  M2 Capital Group (HF)  5.36 
Concord Effekten AG   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  9.94 
Deutsche Borse  Lone Pine Capital (HF)  5.09 
Deutsche Wohnen  Asset Value Investors (MF)   5.16 
Deutsche Wohnen  Julius Baer Investment (MF)   5.10 
Deutsche Wohnen  Newton Investment Mgt (MF)   5.88 
Elephant Seven AG   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)   22.15 
Euromicro AG   Cycladic Capital Mgt (HF)  18.34 
Fluxx AG   Fidelity (MF)   9.57 
  91Frankfurt Airport  Capital Group (MF)   5.08 
Frankfurt Airport  Julius Baer (MF)   5.09 
Infineon   Dodge & Cox (MF)   5.07 
Jack White Productions  Schroders (MF)   5.36 
Jenoptik Brandes  (MF)    5.01 
Klassik Radio ag   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  17.77 
Mologen ag   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  15.61 
mtv Aero Engines  Fidelity (MF)  5.0 
Pixelpark ag   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  13.60 
Praktiker Holdings ag   T Rowe (MF)   5.24 
Praktiker Holdings ag   Eton Park K Mgt (HF)  6.61 
Premiere ag   Capital Group (MF)   5.52 
Premiere ag   Fidelity (MF)   5.01 
Pulsion Medical Systems  Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  7.52 
Q-Cells ag   Fidelity (MF)   18.78 
Schon & Cie ag   Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  10.69 
Shs Information Systeme  Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  25.93 
Sputz  Absolute K Mgt Holdings (HF)  20.45 
tds Informations Technologie ag   gap-W Int’l (HF)   74.83 
Techem  Fidelity (MF)   10.46 
Wirecard ag   Avenue Asia Investment (HF)   7.83 
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1997 (September-August)  Anglo-American Fund  Equity Stake 
Alcatel  Fidelity (MF)   10.04 
Avanquest Software  Amvescap (MF)  5.31 
Aventis Templeton  (MF)  >5.0 
Bail Investment  Templeton (MF)  >5.0 
Bains de Mer Monaco  Fidelity (MF)   5.10 
Banque Nationale de Paris   Templeton (MF)   5.01 
Bazar Hotel de Ville  Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)   7.19 
Billon Schroder  (MF)  >10.0 
Bouygues Offshore  Templeton (MF)   5.56 
Chargeurs  Baupost Group (HF)  >5.0 
Chargeurs  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   7.5 
Coflexip   Fidelity (MF)   5.20 
COM 1  Fidelity (MF)  >5.0 
Entrelec   Schroder Investment Mgt (MF)  >5.0 
Eramet Templeton  (MF)  >5.0 
Eramet   Fidelity (MF)   5.03 
Etam Dévelopment  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)  >5.0 
Étam Dévelopment  Oceana Investment (MF)   >5.0 
Europe 1 Communi.   Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)   7.56 
Européenne de Casinos  Fidelity (MF)   5.43 
Européenne Extincteurs   Henderson Global Inves. (MF)  >5.0 
Faurecia   Henderson Financial (MF)   5.03 
Fives-Lille Templeton  (MF)  >5.0 
Galeries Lafayette  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   5.20 
Galeries Lafayette  Templeton (MF)  >5.0 
Gautier France  Schroder Investments (MF)  >5.0 
Géophysique  Templeton (MF)   5.09 
IMS   Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)  11.44 
Jet Multimédia  Fidelity (MF)  >5.0 
Stéphane Kélian  Fidelity (MF)   5.57 
Kindy  Schroder Investments (MF)  >20.0 
Alain Manoukian  Fidelity (MF)  >5.0 
Marine Wendel  Templeton (MF)  >5.0 
Métaleurop   Schroder Investments (MF)   6.36 
Moneyline  Schroder Investments (MF)  >5.0 
Montupet  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)   7.05 
Moulinex  Soros Fund Management (HF)   >5.0 
Natexis-Credit National   Sanford Bernstein (MF)   8.75 
Péchiney   Templeton (MF)  10.22 
Renault   Templeton (MF)   5.40 
SCOR  Templeton  (MF)  10.69 
SCOR  Putnam  (MF)    5.31 
Sécuridev  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)   5.02 
Servant Soft  Schroder Investments (MF)  >5.0 
Simco  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   5.20 
Stédim Amvescap  (MF)  >5.0 
Strafor Facom  Wyser-Pratte (HF)   8.13 
Taittinger  Wyser-Pratte (HF)    6.28 
TF1  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   7.05 
  93Total   Fidelity (MF)  >5.0 
Unibail Templeton  (MF)  >5.0   
Union Assurances 
Fédérale 
Fidelity (MF)   5.03 
Vallourec  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   9.30 
1998     
Atos Fidelity  (MF)    5.07 
Bouygues  Schroder (MF)   6.80 
CERG Finance Fidelity  (MF)    5.73 
D.M.C.  Fidelity  (MF)   5.27 
Europe 1  Harris Associates (MF)   5.03 
Europe 1  Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)   7.27 
Européenne de Casinos  Soros Fund Management (HF)  16.46 
Expand  Odey Asset Management (HF)   6.47 
Galeries Lafayette  Fidelity (MF)   5.20 
Gaumont   Rothschild K Mgt (MF)   6.09 
Guyenne et Gascogne  Wyser-Pratte (HF)  5.29 
Interbail  Wyser-Pratte (HF)    5.43 
ISIS   Templeton (MF)   5.38 
LeGris Industries  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   5.38 
Léon de Bruxelles  Amvescap (MF)  10.51 
Pareil au Meme  Amvescap (MF)  5.43 
Pareil au Meme  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)  >5.0 
Rue Impériale  Ivory & Sime Asset Mgt (MF)  10.40 
Socamel-Recaset   Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)   5.79 
Sorefico Coiffure 
(Proxidis) 
Henderson Global Inv. (MF)  >5.0 
Sucrerie Pithiviers  Sogen Int’l Fund Inc. (MF)   5.40 
Sylea  Sanford Bernstein (MF)   5.18 
Sylea  Templeton (MF)   5.02 
1999     
Altran Technologies  Amvescap (MF)   5.39 
Belvedere Schroder  (MF)  >5.0 
Bongrain   Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)   5.04 
Brice Fidelity  (MF)  5.26 
Brit Air  Small Cap World Fund (MF)   5.67 
Buffalo Grill   Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)  >5.0 
CERG Finance Amvescap  (MF)  6.67 
Chargeurs   Harris Associates (MF)  10.13 
Chemunex Fidelity  (MF)  >5.0 
Courir  Schroder Investments (MF)   5.09 
Christian Dalloz   Schroder Investments (MF)  6.05 
GFI Informatique Schroder  Investments (MF)   5.26 
Groupe André  Dubin Swieca K Mgt (HF)   5.07 
Groupe André  Wyser-Pratte (HF)   5.01 
Groupe Darmon   Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)  18.72 
Groupe Go Sport  Schroder Investment Mgt (MF)  >5.0 
Guyenne Gascogne  Fidelity (MF)   5.84 
Havas Putnam  (MF)   5.77 
HF Company Schroder  (MF)  10.22 
Infogramme Entertain- Schroder Investments (MF)   5.21 
  94ment 
Intertechnique Wyser-Pratte  (HF)  10.07 
ISIS   Harris Associates (MF)   5.09 
Lagardere  Templeton (MF)   5.12 
LeGris Industries  Wyser-Pratte (HF)   5.50 
Léon de Bruxelles  Fidelity (MF)   5.29 
Néopost Fidelity  (MF)  10.39 
Néopost  Egerton K Ltd Partners (HF)   5.39 
N.S.C. Groupe  Harris Associates (MF)   5.01 
Prosodie Wyser-Pratte  (HF)  5.25 
R2i Sante  Schroder (MF)  10.08 
Rue Impériale  Fidelity (MF)   5.17 
Société du Louvre  Edelman Value Partners (HF)   8.68 
Transciel  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)   5.01 
Transgene Fidelity  (MF)  5.06 
Virbac  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)  10.72 
2000     
Aubay Technology  Amvescap (MF)   6.01 
Avanquest Software  Fidelity (MF)  10.92 
CEGID  Fidelity  (MF)   5.11 
Coflexip   Putnam (MF)   5.46 
Elior Fidelity  (MF)    6.64 
ESI Group Schroder  (MF)  5.09 
Groupe André  Atticus Ltd (HF)  20.32 
ILOG  Fidelity  (MF)  5.43 
Immobiliere Marseillaise  Ivory & Sime Asset Mgt (MF)   5.20 
Lectra   Amvescap (MF)   5.09 
Michelin  Templeton (MF)   5.07 
Naf-Naf  Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)   8.37 
Nicox Amvescap  (MF) 5.01 
Nord-Est  Goldman Sachs (MF)   5.01 
Orchestre Kazibao  Fidelity (MF)  5.65 
Pernod-Ricard  Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)   5.04 
Prologue Software  Amvescap (MF)  6.18 
Schneider Electric  Janus (MF)   5.12 
Sommer Alibert  Wyser-Pratte (HF)   5.01 
Systar Fidelity  (MF) 5.41 
Taittinger   Wyser-Pratte & Edelman (HF)  12.42 
UBI Soft Entertainment  Amvescap (MF)   5.84 
2001     
A Novo  Scroder (MF)  5.17 
Alstom Templeton  (MF) 10.30 
Audika Amvescap  (MF)    5.23 
Bic  Templeton (MF)   7.17 
Business Objects  Fidelity (MF)   5.44 
Canal +  Goldman Sachs (MF)   5.08 
Canal +  Centurus Alpha Master (HF)   7.74 
CEREP  Fidelity  (MF) 5.42 
Chargeurs  Baupost Group (HF)  10.82 
Cottin Freres   Ivory & Sime Asset Mgt (MF)   5.10 
Crométal   1st Eagle Sogen Funds (MF)   5.19 
  95J.C. Decaux  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)   5.01 
Essilor International   Amvescap (MF)   5.04 
Euler Fidelity  (MF)    5.06 
Européenne de Casinos  Hambro Capital Mgt (MF)   6.52 
Expand   Centaurus Alpha Master (HF)   5.21 
Galeries Lafayette  Scudder Investments (MF)   5.16 
Genysys Schroder  (MF)  5.12 
G FI Informatique Putnam  (MF)    5.01 
Infovista Fidelity  (MF)  5.36 
Lectra   Harris Associates (MF)   5.11 
Nexans  Voltaire Asset Mgt UK (HF)   5.02 
Nexans  K Capital Partners (HF)   5.07 
Pernod-Ricard Fidelity  (MF)    5.03 
Prismaflex International  Fidelity (MF)  9.9 
Publicis Putnam  (MF)    5.16 
Riber Amvescap  (MF)  7.97 
Robertet   1st Eagle Sogen Funds (MF)   6.62 
Simco  Henderson Int’l Investors (MF)   5.07 
Somfy International   Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)  5.04 
Taittinger   Edelman Value Fund (HF)  >10.0 
TF1 Putnam  (MF)    5.03 
Valéo  Templeton (MF)   5.07 
2002     
Alcatel  Brandes Investment (MF)  10.5 
Altédia   Fidelity (MF)   5.02 
Bains de Mer Monaco  Fidelity (MF)   5.41 
BIC  Oppenheimer Funds (MF)   5.47 
BIC Amvescap  (MF)    6.60 
BIC  Silchester Int’l Investors (MF)  6.1 
Bouygues Putnam  (MF)  5.06 
Bouygues Offshore  Carlson Offshore Advisor (HF)   5.65 
Canal +  K Capital Partners (HF)   5.88 
Carbonne Lorraine  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)  5.18 
Chargeurs Goldman  Sachs  (MF)  12.8 
Club Med  Fidelity (MF)   5.73 
Devoteam Fidelity  (MF)  5.03 
Euler   K World Growth/Income (MF)   5.04 
Eurotunnel  Oppenheimer Funds (MF)   6.61 
Galeries Lafayette  Templeton (MF)   5.04 
Générale de Santé  Lansdowne LP (HF)   5.08 
Geophysique Goldman  Sachs  (MF)  >5 
Groupe Partouche  Fidelity (MF)   5.05 
Havas Putnam  (MF)  10.01 
Lafarge Putnam  (MF)    5.07 
Linedata Services  Schroder (MF)  5.03 
Nexans  Goldman Sachs (MF)   6.38 
Nexans   Brandes Investment (MF)   5.23 
Nexans  Tweedy Browne Cie (MF)   5.13 
Nicox Fidelity  (MF) 5.10 
Nicox Oppenheimer  Funds  (MF) 9.62 
NSC Groupe  1st Eagle Sogen Funds (MF)  10.40 
  96Péchiney Fidelity  (MF)    6.27 
SCOR   Templeton (MF)   7.86 
SDR Bretagne Goldman  Sachs  (MF)  7.16 
Tessi   Schroder Investment Mgt (MF)   6.62 
UBI Soft Entertainment   Oppenheimer Funds (MF)  10.94 
Vivendi Environment  Putnam (MF)  5.05 
Wanadoo Goldman  Sachs  (MF)  8.6 
2003     
Accor Putnam  (MF) 5.13 
Fimalac Fidelity  (MF)  5.24 
Gaumont  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)   5.04 
Groupe Bourbon  Schroder (MF)  5.36 
    
Guyenne Gascogne  Schroder (MF)  5.27 
Havas Fidelity  (MF)  10.01 
Infogramme 
Entertainment 
General Atlantic Partners (HF)  >5 
IPSOS  Fidelity  (MF)  10.37 
Laurent Perrier  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)   5.37 
Legris Industries  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)  5.06 
Néopost Harris  Associates  (MF)  5.38 
Nicox Goldman  Sachs  (MF) 5.01 
Remy Cointreau  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)  5.4 
Rue Imperiale  Asset Value Investors (MF)  5.02 
Sabeton Arnold  Bleichroeder  (HF)  12.72 
Stallergenes Fidelity  (MF)  5.03 
Vet’Affaires  Henderson Global Inv. (MF)  5.15 
Wendel Investissement  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)  5.60 
2004     
A Novo  Cycladic Capital Mgt (HF)  6.06 
A Novo  Parvus Asset Mgt (HF)  8.69 
Accor Templeton  (MF) 5.03 
Alcatel Fidelity  (MF)  5.09 
Altran Technologies  Gartmore (MF)  5.21 
Au feminin.com  Oppenheimer Funds (MF)  7.26 
Bacou Dalloz  Fidelity (MF)  5.01 
Business Objects  Fidelity (MF)   >5 
Business Objects  MA Financial Services (MF)  5.79 
Cesar Fidelity  (MF) 5.03 
Conflandey Arnold  Bleichroeder  (HF)  >5 
Dassault Systemes  Fidelity (MF)  5.04 
Francarep  Asset Value Investors (MF)  5.68 
Générale de Santé  Templeton (MF)  5.24 
Ingenico Wyser-Pratte  (HF)  5.01 
Lagardere  Highfields K Mgt (HF)  5.15 
Latecoere Fidelity  (MF)  5.09 
Lectra Fidelity  (MF) 5.02 
LVL Medical Groupe  Schroders (MF)  5.11 
Nexans  Dodge & Cox (MF)  5.03 
Nexans Fidelity  (MF)  5.03 
Nexity Fidelity  (MF)  5.19 
  97Nicox  Federated Kaufmann (MF)  5.17 
Nicox  QVT Financial (HF)  5.66 
Orpea Fidelity  (MF) 5.13 
Paris Orleans  Asset Value Investors (MF)  6.82 
Pierre Vacances  Fidelity (MF)  5.04 
Publicis Harris  Associates  (MF)  >5 
Rhodia  TIAA-CREF (MF) 5.3 
Sodexho Arnold  Bleichroeder  (HF)  5.02 
Technip Oppenheimer  Funds  (MF)  5.12 
Tour Eiffel  Asset Value Investors (MF)  8.16 
Vivarte Atticus  Funds  (HF)  >20 
Vivarte Wyser-Pratte  (HF)  >5 
Vivendi Fidelity  (MF)  5.02 
Vivendi  South East Asset Mgt (MF)  >5 
2005     
Acanthe Development  Centaurus Capital (HF)  10.85 
Acanthe Development  VHC Int’l Ltd (HF)  10.57 
Accor  Capital Group (HF)  8.8 
Altamir Fidelity  (MF)  5.68 
Bail Inv. Fonciere  Centaurus Alpha Master (HF)  5.01 
Belvedere  VHC Int’l (HF)  8.05 
Bouygues  Capital Group (MF)  8.11 
Buffalo Grill  Amber Fund Ltd (HF)  10.17 
Bull  Jana Partners (HF)  5.64 
Bull  Mellon Capital Partners (MF)  5.63 
Carbonne-Lorraine  Columbia Wanger (MF)  5.59 
Camaieu  Sandell Asset Mgt (HF)  7.24 
Club Med  Oryx (HF)  5.58 
Compagnie Alpes  M&G Investment Mgt Ltd (MF)  5.04 
Eiffage Fidelity  (MF)  5.23 
Elior  Dodge & Cox (MF)  5.29 
Etam Development  GLG Partners UK (HF)  5.71 
Euromedis Groupe  Fidelity (MF)  6.10 
Finifo  Amber Funds (HF)  16.74 
Gaumont Arnold  Bleichroeder  (HF)  10.19 
Generale de Sante  Amber Funds (HF)  5.59 
Geophysique Fidelity  (MF)  10.17 
Infovista Fidelity (MF)  10.09 
ITS Sema Groupe  European Small Cap Company (MF)  >5.0 
Linedata Services  Amber Funds (HF)  6.31 
Lisi Fidelity  (MF)  5.01 
Medipep  Amber Fund Ltd (HF)  23.88 
Mines Lucette  Asset Value Investors (MF)  5.12 
Papiers Peints  Arnold Bleichroeder (HF)  >5 
Poncins Yachts  Henderson Global (MF)  11.22 
Saft Groupe  Kairos Fund Ltd (HF)  5.04 
Saft Groupe  Threadneedle Asset Mgt (MF)  >5.0 
Schneider Electric  Capital Group (MF)  5.14 
Soitec Fidelity  (MF) 5.82 
Spir Communication  Fidelity (MF)  5.29 
Stedim Fidelity  (MF)  6.08 
  98Technip Lehman  Brothers  (MF)  6.06 
Tessi Goldman  Sachs  (MF)  5.07 
Ubi Soft Entertainment Fidelity  (MF)  5.25 
Valeo  Brandes Investment (MF)  5.16 
Vivendi Environment  Capital Group (MF)  7.08 
2006 (January-May)     
A Novo  Goldman Sachs Int’l (MF)  5.17 
Amboise Investissement  Adelphi European Small Cap Fund (HF)  9.59 
Amboise Investissement  Fidelity (MF)  10.86 
Amboise Investissement  Schroders (MF)  7.78 
Alten Fidelity  (MF) 5.10 
Autoroutes Paris Rhin-
Rhone 
Elliot Management Corporation (HF)  10.03 
Bongrain  Brandes Investment (MF)  5.06 
Boursorama Fidelity  (MF)  5.02 
Carrerre Groupe  Schroders (MF)  5.51 
Dalet  Windcrest Partners (HF)  10.11 
Elior  Goldman Sachs Int’l (MF)  5.01 
Eramet  M&G Investment Mgt Ltd (MF)  5.01 
Euronext  The Children’s Trust (HF)  8.54 
Generale de Sante  Amber Master Fund (HF)  15.12 
Generale de Sante  Franklin/Templeton (MF)  10.62 
Generale de Sante  Julius Baer Investment (MF)  5.26 
Genesys  Tragalfar Asset Mgt Ltd (HF)  11.01 
Icade Fidelity  (MF)  5.04 
Infovista  Powe Capital Mgt Ltd (HF)  5.81 
Ingenico Fidelity  (MF)  5.66 
Kaufman & Broad  Fidelity (MF)  >5.0 
Lagardere Fidelity  (MF)  5.03 
Latecoere  Capital Group (MF)  5.68 
Medipep Lehman  Bros  (MF)  5.16 
Michelin  Capital Group (MF)  6.46 
Naturex Fidelity  (MF)  5.98 
Rubis  Columbia Wanger (MF)  7.08 
Saft Groupe  Schroders (MF)  5.39 
Solving International  Fidelity (MF)  5.20 
Store Electronic Systems  Schroders (MF)  10.16 
Sword Groupe  Schroders (MF)  5.01 
Sword Groupe  Threadneedle (MF)  5.03 
Technip  Capital Group (MF)  5.34 
Tessi   Parvus Asset Mgt (HF)  7.40 
Vallourec Lehman  Bros  (MF)  5.89 
Zublin Immobiliere 
France 
Asset Value Investors Ltd (MF)  5.16 
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